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Abstract
Over the past decade, NGOs and government agencies have helped millions
of refugees repatriate to their countries of origin, providing them free ﬂights,
travel documentation, and modest stipends. This thesis considers when
such repatriation assistance is morally permissible. Drawing on original
data from East Africa, I distinguish between six sets of cases, which require
six distinct policies. In the ﬁrst set, refugees choose to return because they
are unjustly detained by the government. In such cases, NGOs should avoid
helping with return if their actions causally contribute to the government's
detention policy. In the second set of cases, refugees are not detained, but
return to a country they know little about. In such cases, both NGOs
and government agencies have duties to inform refugees of the risks of
returning. If they fail to inform refugees of the risks, they are engaging in
a form of wrongful immigration control. In the third set of cases, refugees
regret returning and, based on this, NGOs and government agencies can
predict that future refugees will likely also regret returning. I develop a
novel theory of when future regret is a reason to deny a service, and apply
this theory to the case of repatriation. In a fourth set of cases, refugees are
paid a great deal of money to repatriate, and would not have returned had
they not been paid to leave. I argue that paying refugees to repatriate is
only permissible when conditions are safe in countries of origin. In a ﬁfth
set of cases, parents repatriate to high-risk countries with their children.
I argue that parents, in general, do not have a right to live in a country
unsafe for their children, and NGOs and government agencies should refuse
to help with such returns. In a ﬁnal set of cases, refugees of a minority
ethnicity are provided generous assistance to leave, while refugees of the
majority ethnicity are not. I argue that such discriminatory assistance is
permissible only when third parties remain unharmed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
At 7:12 pm on March 13th, 2012, a man started screaming on Kenya Air-
lines ﬂight 101. Two British Border Control oﬃcers shoved him forcefully
into his seat, handcuﬃng him. Mugabe will kill me! he cried out.
The woman sitting to my left looked concerned. Don't worry, an
oﬃcer told her, they always stop screaming when the ﬂight lifts oﬀ. The
man in handcuﬀs heard this, and said, I will continue screaming until you
get me oﬀ this ﬂight. The border oﬃcer shook his head. Trust me, he
told the woman next to me, they always stop screaming.
The man threatened self-harm, but nobody responded, so he instead
threatened to scream the entire ﬂight and, as a last resort, threatened
to defecate in his seat. Oﬃcials eventually unlocked his handcuﬀs, and
escorted him oﬀ the ﬂight.
Everyone relaxed.
While this event had transﬁxed the passengers, a similar incident un-
folded moments later, but appeared to pass without notice. A second man,
wearing no handcuﬀs, started making a low moaning noise. He was sitting
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between two unarmed individuals, one holding a clipboard, the other say-
ing, It will be ﬁne. He did not believe them, and was eventually escorted
oﬀ the ﬂight.
Around the world, refugees often ﬂee their home countries and, upon
reaching safe states, cannot access residency status, work visas, or social
services. Some are forced into detention, where they are told when to eat,
drink, shower, sit and stand. They are not deported, but instead ﬁnd their
lives too diﬃcult to stay, so seek help repatriating to the countries they ﬂed
from. Various humanitarian agencies, hoping to help, pay for their ﬂights
home, arranging their travel documentation, at times accompanying them
on the journey. In 2012 alone, the UN helped 526,000 refugees repatriate to
Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and dozens of other countries of
origin.1 While the screaming man on my ﬂight was likely being deported,
the second man was likely repatriating, escorted by civilians working for
an NGO.2
These NGOs struggle to determine whether they ought to help with
returns. In interviews I conducted with organizational staﬀ members in
2011, they explained that return was better for refugees than staying in
indeﬁnite detention. Assisting with return also upheld the value of choice,
providing an option that refugees would otherwise not have. Nonetheless,
the staﬀ members were hesitant as to whether their actions were morally
permissible, given the involuntary nature of the return.
1UNHCR Displacement in the 20th Century Chal-
lenge in UNHCR Global Trends 2012 available at
http://www.unhcr.org.uk/ﬁleadmin/user_upload/pdf/UNHCR_Global_Trends
_2012.pdf.
2At the time, all repatriation in the UK was organized by Refugee Action, a refugee-
rights NGO. See International Organization of Migration (IOM), Return and Reinte-
gration, http://unitedkingdom.iom.int/return-and-reintegration.
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In an attempt to better understand this dilemma, I conducted ﬁeldwork
over the course of a year in East Africa, the Middle East, and South-east
Asia, interviewing 160 refugees and migrants who had repatriated, or were
about to repatriate, from Israel. I chose to focus on their cases partly
because the NGOs in Israel claimed to be especially ethical when helping
with return, even while the government continued to detain refugees. I
wished to ﬁnd out if they had truly succeeded in ensuring a morally per-
missible return in the midst of unjust background conditions. Initially,
there were reasons to believe they had. Unlike the UN, NGOs in Israel had
the resources to interview each refugee to ensure they were not coerced
into returning. NGOs also had resources to travel regularly to countries
of origin, ﬁnding out about the conditions refugees faced after returning,
and relaying this information to refugees still in Israel, to ensure they were
informed about conditions. Importantly, they took no government funds,
relying on private donors alone, to avoid acting as an arm to the govern-
ment's immigration goals. Some were also active in lobbying for a more
just refugee policy, and so refused to assist with any returns that were the
result of this unjust policy, such as helping refugees return from detention.
I quickly learned, while in South Sudan in 2012, that many refugees had
returned to avoid detention, despite the NGOs' best eﬀorts to only help
with voluntary returns. But even if refugees were returning involuntarily,
NGOs' actions may have been ethically permissible, assisting escape a life
of detention in Israel. A dilemma remained despite the NGOs' best of
intentions and resources. As such, the case illustrates the depth of the
dilemma, and the need for philosophical analysis.
In the following section I explain why we ought to focus on this dilemma
concerning assisted return, rather than focusing on deportations alone. In
10
Sections 2 and 3 I describe the broader context of global repatriation, and
the case of Israel in particular. In Section 4 I describe six normative puzzles
that arise in repatriation, which this thesis attempts to resolve.
1.1 Why Focus on Voluntary Return?
Focusing on the question of voluntary return is essential partly because
it is empirically relevant. Tens of millions of refugees and migrants have
repatriated over the past decade alone,3 but we know little about the con-
ditions before and after repatriation. Such returns are also philosophically
relevant. It is especially diﬃcult to establish what NGOs and the UN ought
to do. While the government is often acting wrongly when threatening a
refugee with detention or deportation,4 perhaps NGOs are permitted to
help with such returns. An assisted coerced return may be better than an
unassisted deportation, or a life in detention. Nor is it clear that helping
with uncoerced return is always permissible. Even if a refugee is returning
without any coercion, it might still be wrong to help a person take a risk to
their lives, however voluntary their choice may be. The criteria for when
repatriation is wrong is diﬀerent than the criteria for when deportation is
wrong.
This thesis establishes such criteria. In doing so, I shall avoid commit-
ting myself to a particular theory as to who states can legitimately deport
or detain. Instead, I aim to consider whether, in cases where nearly all
3UNHCR, Displacement in the 20th Century Challenge, 2012.
4Megan Bradley, Refugee Repatriation: Justice, Responsibility, Redress, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2014; Katy Long, The Point of No Return: Refugees, Rights,
and Repatriation, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013; Lauren Fouda, Compulsory
Voluntary Repatriation: Why Temporary Protection for Sudanese Asylum-Seekers in
Cairo Amounts to Refoulement, Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law 10(3)(2007):511.
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agree that deportation or detention is wrong, helping with repatriation is
morally permissible.
Of course, there is much debate over when deportation is wrong, and
this may, by extension, impact when we believe repatriation is wrong. I
shall assume, for simplicity, that deportation is wrong when individuals'
lives will be at immediate risk if they return, whether from violence or
extreme poverty. There is an increasing consensus regarding this claim
in both philosophy and state policies. Joseph Carens and David Miller,
though strongly disagreeing on who states can exclude, agree that deporting
migrants is wrong when their lives will be at immediate risk, regardless
of whether they have ﬂed hunger or persecution.5 States are similarly
recognizing that those ﬂeeing hunger or general violence deserve protection,
even when they are not ﬂeeing persecution.6 For simplicity, I shall call all
individuals refugees if their lives will be at immediate risk if they return,
regardless of why.
Though I assume deportations are wrong to any life-threatening con-
ditions, this assumption is not central to my general argumentation. My
goal is not to consider who deserves protection but whether, if someone
deserves protection, it is also wrong to help them repatriate.
5David Miller, Immigration: The Case for Its Limits in (eds.) A. Cohen and C.
Wellman. Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing
2005: 202; Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The case for open borders, The Review
of Politics 49(2)(1987):251-273.
6European Council on Refugees and Exile, Complimentary Protection in Europe,
July 2009; Alexander Betts, Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework, Global
Governance 16(2010): 361-382; Ruma Mandal, Protection Mechanisms Outside of the
1951 Conventions ('Complimentary Protection'), Legal and Protection Policy Research
Series, UNHCR 2005.
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1.2 What Occurs in Repatriation?
Voluntary repatriation is often enthusiastically embraced by governments,
who hope to avoid deporting anyone if possible,7 while still decreasing
the number of refugees within their borders. Repatriation has a ring of
legitimacy, especially if organized by separate humanitarian organizations,
or a separate wing of the government uninvolved in deportations. Those
who help with such returns may not agree with the government's sentiment,
but they argue that, if refugees have few rights, then helping with return
is better than doing nothing at all.
Some agents helping with return have referred to their activities as
repatriation facilitation.8 I shall adopt this term, referring to all who
help with return as repatriation facilitators. Their activities vary, but
generally include paying for transport back to countries of origin, at times
providing a stipend and arranging travel documentation, and occasionally
accompanying migrants and refugees during the journey. They are non-
armed actors, and distinguish themselves from the border oﬃcials who
handcuﬀ individuals on ﬂights, or the doctors who inject psychiatric drugs
into those who resist.9 I am interested in those holding clipboards and pens
7The reasons a government may not want to deport are varied. In Israel's
case, various international aid packages and trade beneﬁts are conditional on gen-
eral human rights in the country. Deportations may be a point against Israel's
human rights record, which can impact its trade status. See Implementation of
the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2009: Progress Report Israel, Brussels,
12/05/2010 (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2010/sec10_520_en.pdf)and
Justice, Freedom and Security section in individual country progress reports:
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#3.
8UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection, 1996: Chapter 3, Sec-
tion 1.
9Leanne Weber and Sharon Pickering, Exporting Risks, Deporting Non-Citizens,
pp. 110-128 in (ed.) Francis Pakes, Globalization and the Challenge to Criminology.
Abingdon, UK: Routledge 2013 and Liz Fekete, Europe's Shame: a report on 105
deaths linked to racism or government migration and asylum policies, European Race
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rather than guns or needles.
Some of these facilitators are part of the government, such as the head of
the Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) Unit in Israel's Ministry of Interior.
He, like others involved in return, insisted on his neutral status. I'm not
involved in deportations at all, he explained, I want them to leave Israel
happy.10 In addition to such immigration oﬃcials, government-employed
social workers may assist unaccompanied minors return to their countries
of origin.11 Judges may have a role in determining if an adult can repa-
triate, if the adult has a mental illness and lacks the capacity to make
decisions on their own behalf.12 In addition to state-employed repatriation
facilitators, there are non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and intra-
governmental organizations (IGOs) like the International Organization of
Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR).13 In the United States, some hospitals also pay private compa-
nies to facilitate repatriation.14
Bulletin, London: Institute of Race Relations.
10Interview with Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) oﬃcial, Tel Aviv, 7 August 2013.
11The practice of welfare services assisting in repatriation of migrants dates back to
at least the ﬁrst half of the 20th century in the United States. See Norman Humphrey
Mexican Repatriation from Michigan: Public Assistance Historical Perspective, Social
Service Review 15(3)(1941):497-513. In Israel, social workers accompanied minors to the
ﬂight for repatriation.
12For a contemporary discussion on social workers' roles in helping asylum seekers,
See Ravi Kohli, Social work with unaccompanied asylum-seeking young people, Forced
Migration Review 12(2002):31-33. See High Court of Justice 4845/12, ASSAF, The
Hotline for Migrant Workers and the Association of Civil Rights in Israel vs. The
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Welfare.
13Alex Betts, Gil Loescher, and James Milner, UNHCR: The Politics and Practice
of Refugee Protection, Second Edition Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012.
14Philip Cantwell, Relevant `Material': Importing the principles of informed consent
and unconscionability in analyze consensual medical repatriations, Harvard Law and
Policy Review 6; Lori A Nessel, The Practice of Medical Repatriation: The Privati-
zation of Immigrant Enforcement and Denial of Human Rights, Wayne Law Review
55(2009):1725-1756; Mark Kuczewski, Can Medical Repatriation be Ethical? Estab-
lishing Best Practices, American Journal of Bioethics 12(9)(2012):1-5.
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1.3 Repatriation from Israel
While such repatriation facilitators are common globally, repatriation was
uncommon in Israel until 2010, when a small number of South Sudanese
refugees began returning home to Juba with the help of an NGO.
Most who returned knew little about the region they were repatriat-
ing to, having ﬂed as children decades prior during the Second Sudanese
Civil War, fought primarily between the northern Sudanese government
the southern Sudanese opposition forces. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s
they had arrived in Egypt, where they received refugee status, but grew up
facing severe xenophobic attacks at work, on the street, and outside of UN
oﬃces. In 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in
Sudan, allowing for a referendum for an independent South Sudan in 2011,
but many were hesitant to return until independence day arrived.
The same year as the 2005 CPA, Egyptian police opened ﬁre on protesters
sitting in front of the UN oﬃces, killing ﬁfty-three refugees,15 and encour-
aging eleven youths to pay smugglers to take them across the Sinai desert,
and up to the border fence with Israel.16 They crossed through a small
opening and into Israeli territory, where they were granted temporary res-
idency permits. Others soon followed and, though an unknown number
were immediately deported back to Egypt, hundreds were allowed to stay
when sympathetic border soldiers refused to deport them, instead driving
them to the Negev desert in the south of Israel, dropping them oﬀ at a bus
station, and telling them to ﬁnd organizations that assisted refugees.
15Michael Slackman, After Cairo Police Attack, Sudanese Have Little but Rage,
3/1/06. New York Times.
16Galia Sabar and Elizabeth Tsurkov, Israel's Policies Towards Asylum Seekers, 2002-
2014, Istituto Aﬀari Internazionali Working Paper 2015.
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Kind strangers at the bus station would help. Nyandeng, who arrived
in Israel when she was a teenager in 2007, remembers her ﬁrst day:
At the station, an Ethiopian woman came and asked what we
were doing there....She bought me and my siblings and mother
food and gave us money to take the bus to Jerusalem and said
we should call her if we had no place to go and we would stay
with her. We took a taxi and my mother told the driver to
take us to a church  it didn't matter which one. He took us
to a guest house and there was a man there, at reception. My
mother told him we needed help. Without thinking he gave us
a room for free with food.17
Soon after, Nyandeng and her younger sister and brother began attend-
ing school, and her mother found a job at one of the dozens of hotels that
began employing East African refugees as cleaners. They rented an apart-
ment in Naharia, a town in the north of Israel, but as the months passed
they failed to gain any oﬃcial residency status. There were 1,000 other
asylum seekers in the country by 2007 and, like them, Nyandeng's mother
could not legally work. Within a year the High Court of Justice ordered
the government to provide temporary residency status to all asylum seek-
ers, and allow them to apply for refugee status. The government partially
complied, handing them three-month visas, and instructing police to not
arrest East African refugees who were working, but never establishing an
oﬃcial Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedure.
By 2010 there were approximately 1,200 southern Sudanese nationals in
the country, and approximately 35,000 other asylum seekers, all of whom
had crossed over from Egypt since 2005, most originally from Eritrea and
Sudan. No claims for asylum were heard, so none were recognized as
17Interview with Nyandeng, Entebbe, 9 May 2013.
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refugees, their legal status remaining in limbo.18 Given their precarious
position, in 2010 some southern Sudanese nationals wished to return home.
A charity based in Jerusalem, called the International Christian Em-
bassy (ICE), oﬀered to help, paying for their ﬂights, arranging travel docu-
mentation, and providing a stipend worth $1,500. The organization worked
with oﬃcials in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-
HCR) and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), a refugee rights
organization.19 Several dozen individuals returned, they found jobs, and
the project was deemed a success. Another NGO, Operation Blessing In-
ternational (OBI) took over the project in 2011, still working with HIAS
and UNHCR. When OBI took over, many Darfur refugees also wished to
repatriate. They, too, accepted OBI's free ﬂight to Juba, paying for their
own buses or ﬂights to Khartoum, and then from there to Darfur. By 2012,
OBI and HIAS had helped 900 individuals repatriate.
A year after South Sudan gained independence in 2011, the Israeli gov-
ernment announced that return to South Sudan was safe, as the country
was no longer part of Sudan. OBI continued helping with return, and the
Ministry of Interior also set up its own repatriation program, called Op-
eration Returning Home (ORH).20 It was supposedly voluntary, but the
Ministry threatened to detain anyone who stayed.21 In response, South
Sudanese activists organized protests, and raised a court petition, but it
was rejected by the court, and all were ordered into detention.22
18Gilad Nathan, The Policy Towards the Population of Inﬁltrators, Asylum Seekers,
and Refugees in Israel and European Countries, Israel Knesset Research and Informa-
tion Center 2012: 13 (Hebrew).
19Interview with HIAS Director, Jerusalem, 12 December 2012.
20Laurie Lijnders, Deportation of South Sudanese from Israel, Forced Migration
Review 2013(44).
21Interview with AVR oﬃcial, Tel Aviv, 7 August 2013.
22Administrative Petition (Jerusalem) 53765-03-12: ASSAF vs. Ministry of Interior
17
It was so strange, one aid worker recalls. When refugees found out
they would be detained, they just stopped protesting, all at once. They
went out, bought the nicest clothes, and boarded the ﬂight back.23 After
return, at least twenty-two individuals were killed or died of a disease within
a year, representing at least 2% of returnees.24 When I travelled to South
Sudan in December 2013, civil war broke out two days later, and I learned
of an additional ﬁve who were killed, representing 3.7% of my sample of
134 returnees to South Sudan.25 The exact mortality rate was likely higher,
as I never reached the most insecure areas, and most returnees were never
contacted by any researchers or aid workers after returning.
Many of the staﬀ members helping with return were uncertain if their
actions were ethical. Based on the data I collected, they faced six normative
puzzles, prevalent not only in the case of Israel, but in repatriation globally.
1.4 Six Puzzles
The ﬁrst type of puzzle concerns coercion. Refugees who are returning to
avoid detention are coerced into their decision. We might suppose NGOs
should not assist with their return, given its involuntary nature, but per-
haps assistance is justiﬁed if the alternative is for refugees to remain in
indeﬁnite detention. In Chapter 3 I describe the global prevalence of this
puzzle, and attempt to resolve it, before addressing a second type of case,
(7.6.12); Laurie Lijnders, Deportation of South Sudanese from Israel, Forced Migration
Review 44(2013): 66.
23Interview with Sharon, ASSAF volunteer, Tel Aviv, 2013.
24Yuval Goren, (Hebrew)`Aid organizations: Over 22 refugees expelled to South Sudan
die within the ﬁrst year' 5/6/2012. http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/477/197.html.
25Interview with Matthew, Juba, 4 January 2014; Interview with Simon in IDP camp,
Juba, 4 January 2014; Interview with Gatluak, Juba, 4 January 2014.
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relating to information. Many refugees are uninformed about their coun-
tries of origin, and UNHCR oﬃcers and NGOs know little about the coun-
tries they are helping refugees return to.26 As I will demonstrate in Chapter
4, it is not clear who, if anyone, has a duty to ﬁnd information about the
risks of repatriating and so unclear who is culpable for uninformed repatri-
ation.
Many refugees are fully informed about the risks of returning but, after
return, regret their choices.27 In such cases, perhaps the UN, NGOs and
governments should stop facilitating return if future regret is likely. But
this claim is controversial. In general, we often have a right to services,
even if we are likely to regret them. When I book a ﬂight to an unsafe
country, the airline company is not required to consider whether I will
regret my decision, and when a woman requests an abortion, a doctor does
not consider if she will regret her choice before performing the abortion. In
Chapter 5 I will argue that, though regret is not usually a reason to deny
a service, it sometimes is, including in cases of repatriation.
In Chapter 6 I address cases concerning money. Government agencies
often provide generous stipends to encourage refugees to repatriate, often
using no coercion at all. We might suppose that paying refugees to repatri-
ate is a justiﬁed form of immigration control, because the choice to return
is completely voluntary. Yet, given the risks in a refugee's country of ori-
gin, it is not clear if it is morally permissible to encourage refugees to risk
repatriation.
26Michael Barnette, The International Humanitarian Order, Abingdon, Oxon: Rout-
ledge; Myron Weiner, The Clash of Norms: Dilemmas in Refugee Policies, Journal of
Refugee Studies 11(4):433-453.
27UNHCR Brieﬁng Note, Iraqi Refugees Regret Returning to Iraq, Amid Insecurity,
19/10/10.
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In all of the cases above, those returning include parents whose children
will be put at risk in their countries of origin. It is not clear if states or
NGOs should assist with such return, an issue I shall address in Chapter
7.
The ﬁnal puzzle concerns migrants whose lives will not be at risk if
they repatriate. In a range of cases, governments provide generous return
assistance to unwanted ethnic minorities, fulﬁlling the racist preferences of
society, and also helping minorities who are eager to return home. It is not
clear if such racism is wrong, if those who receive the assistance wish to
repatriate, and feel grateful for the assistance they receive.
In describing the above puzzles, I will draw upon the interviews I con-
ducted in South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, and other countries of origin,
where former refugees described to me why they arrived in Israel, their rea-
sons for returning from Israel, and the conditions they faced after returning.
These interviews help demonstrate the nuanced diﬀerences between cases,
creating a more precise understanding of when and how NGOs and oﬃcials
should assist with repatriation.
Unfortunately, in drawing upon actual interviews to describe and re-
solve moral puzzles, there is a major methodological concern. In the next
section I will argue that real-world cases, due to their complexity, can be
diﬃcult to utilize for establishing general moral principles and guidelines.
A particular methodological approach can overcome this diﬃculty.
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Chapter 2
Methodology
In normative theory, philosophers often draw upon simple examples, often
from ﬁction, to highlight a given intuition. Simple examples are useful
because, if we intuit a wrong has occurred, we can be fairly certain which
feature explains this intuition. In one famous example concerning negli-
gence, a parent leaves his baby in a bathtub, is distracted, and the baby
drowns. We know we are disturbed by the parent being distracted, or the
baby drowning, or both,1 because there is little else occurring in the case.
Similarly, when asked if we would push a man to his death in a trolley
example, we can be fairly certain pushing the man to his death disturbs
us,2 because there are few other features in the case. The fewer features,
the easier it is to determine, or at least suspect, the wrong-making features
of the case.
Non-ﬁction cases do not have this advantage. The more complex a case,
the more diﬃcult it is to know why we react a particular way. Consider
1Douglas Husak, Negligence, believe, blame, and criminal liability: The special issue
of forgetting, Law and Philosophy 5(2011):199-218.
2Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, The Yale Law Journal
94(6)(1984):1395-1415.
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an example raised by Michael Sandel. He describes a South African gov-
ernment policy to help save the black rhino population from extinction. In
this policy, the government allows wealthy hunters to ﬂy into South Africa
and pay locals for the right to kill black rhinos for trophy hunting. This
encourages locals, who receive the money, to preserve the black rhino pop-
ulation, so that more wealthy hunters come to hunt, and pay money to do
so. Some may hold the intuition that this policy is morally impermissible,
or possibly impermissible.3 But it is not clear which property in the case
explains this intuition. Perhaps one is concerned because black rhinos are
high-level sentient creatures, or the hunters are rich, or the hunters are
paying money to kill, or the locals must sell hunting rights for an income,
or that they proﬁt from killing rhinos. It may be one of these properties,
some of these properties, or all properties that disturb us.
Because it is diﬃcult to know which properties explain an intuition in
complex cases, many philosophers use simple ﬁction. But as a result of
using ﬁction, we limit the range of properties we consider. Some wrongs
are complex; they only occur when multiple features are present. We will
never explore complex wrongs if we limit ourselves to simple cases.
In this chapter, I propose a method of systematizing intuitions in the
face of complex cases.
In the following Section 1 I argue that we can adopt comparative meth-
ods, common in the social sciences, to better determine which property
or properties in a complex case explains a given intuition. We can then
formulate principles that are consistent with these intuitions. I provide an
example of such a methodology using a single complex case of immigration
3Michael Sandel, What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, New York:
Farrar, Straus and Girouz 2013.
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control.
In Section 2, I show how conducting in-depth qualitative interviews can
increase the range of properties we consider. This allows us to determine
more intuitions we might otherwise not be aware of, and raise puzzles we
might otherwise not consider. This, in turn, can help us formulate more
precise and robust principles. To demonstrate this methodology, I will
present cases of three women I interviewed, describing how they help us
formulate principles. In Section 3 I will then describe my general sampling
methods for the larger project on repatriation.
Before beginning, a brief note on my assumptions.
I assume that, when we formulate principles, it is better if these princi-
ples are consistent with our intuitions about speciﬁc cases. If our principle
claims it is permissible to push a man to his death to save ﬁve lives, that
is a point against this principle if we do not have that intuition. I shall not
attempt to provide a justiﬁcation for this stance. Instead, I shall consider
how, if we do accept this stance, we can better systematize the intuitions we
have, to better ensure they are consistent with the principles we formulate.
I use the word intuition to refer to feelings that arise regarding the
actions of individuals in cases. There are two such types of intuitions that
concern me. The ﬁrst type is a feeling that arises from what I call Obvious
Cases, where our intuition is that a wrong has clearly taken place, and no
amount of considerations and thought would likely change our mind. For
many, the feeling that it would be wrong to push a man onto a train track
to stop a train might be considered such an intuition. The second type of
intuition is that arising from Diﬃcult Cases, where our intuition is that
we do not know, or are not conﬁdent, whether a wrong has taken place,
and we feel we are facing a moral dilemma that needs resolving.
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For an example of how we use Obvious Cases, imagine we wish to
establish under which conditions causing another human to die is wrong.
We might start with a working principle: It is wrong to intentionally cause
someone to die. We might then come up with a counter-example to this
principle. Imagine a doctor who, with the consent of a patient, agrees
to stop life-saving surgery. Technically, the doctor's act of omission lead
someone to die. If we feel this is not wrong, we might then reﬁne the
principle, perhaps changing it to: It is wrong to intentionally commit an
active act (as opposed to an omission) that leads someone to die, without
their having consented to this act. We may then ﬁnd other obvious counter-
examples, to further change and reﬁne the principle. Similarly, consider the
rule, Murderers should be imprisoned for life. We might come upon a case
of a minor who has murdered, and feel she should not sit in prison for life.
We would then modify the principle to, Murderers should sit in prison for
life if they are adults. As before, we may reﬁne the rule further, if we think
of new counterexamples, possibly further narrowing the number of people
who should sit in prison for life.
Such a process of considering multiple examples is necessary, because
we cannot be certain a given principle is plausible based on one or two
examples alone. Even if a principle is plausible in one case, we might
realize the principle was counter-intuitive in other cases, and so in need
of revising.4 More speciﬁcally, a range of Obvious Cases can clarify which
property or properties creates a wrong-making feature, and so clarify the
types of actions we ought to avoid. We cannot be certain it is always
4James Wilson, Internal and External Validity in Thought Experiments, Proceed-
ings of the Aristotelian Society 137th Session, 2(116)2015/2016; David Thacher, The
Normative Case Study, American Journal of Sociology 111(2006)163176; Shelly Ka-
gan, The Additive Fallacy, Ethics 99(1)(1988):5-31, p. 18
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wrong to cause another person to die, and always right to implement a
given punishment, if we have not considered all cases where we cause a
person to die, and all cases where a person receives a given punishment.
In this sense, the more Obvious Cases we consider, including both complex
and simple cases, the more corroborated our principles become. This is not
to claim that all principles must generalize to all cases. It is to claim that,
if we have a principle we claim generalizes to at least many cases, we must
consider these many cases, rather than one or two alone.
In contrast to Obvious Cases, in Diﬃcult Cases we cannot decide what
actions should be taken. Perhaps we come upon a case of a minor, aged
sixteen, who has murdered many people. We are uncertain if she should
receive the sentencing of an adult or a minor. We must resolve the case, in
order to have a more precise action-guiding principle concerning criminal
justice. To resolve the case, we might appeal to various principles which, in
turn, must be consistent with intuitions about Obvious Cases. For example,
we might appeal to a general principle that holds minors should not be
responsible for their actions. To corroborate this principle, we must ensure
it is consistent with our intuitions about Obvious Cases involving how we
treat children in other spheres, such as in education, voting, and driving.
We would not want to claim that minors are never responsible for their
actions like adult, as this would likely conﬂict with our intuitions about at
least some cases, such as minors driving. Nor would we want to claim they
are always held responsible like adults, as this would likely conﬂict with
other intuitions we have in other spheres. Whatever general principle we
do arrive at could then be applied to the Diﬃcult Case of the sixteen year
old who has murdered many people.5
5When discussing Obvious and Diﬃcult Cases, I focus on cases intended to elicit
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In focusing on intuitions about cases, I do not refer to the general
intuitions that a deﬁnition or principle is a plausible one. You might, for
example, just intuit that murder is deﬁned as causing someone to die,
without thinking of a particular case. Rather, I limit my discussion to
intuitions about speciﬁc cases. Similarly, I do not refer to a strong feeling
that arises only after thorough deliberation. I refer to the types of feelings
that we have prior to deliberation, or despite it, like the feeling that it
would be wrong to push an innocent man to this death, or the feeling that
it is diﬃcult to determine if a judge should ever try a sixteen year old as
an adult.6
intuitions. I put aside other types of cases, such as illustrations intended to demon-
strate what we mean by a concept. For example, if I wish to explain what I mean by
manslaughter I might describe a person who has killed someone while driving under
the inﬂuence of alcohol. The example is not intended to demonstrate any intuition. It
is to explain what the concept of manslaughter refers to. My discussion in this chapter
puts such cases aside.
6Some may object to the claim that all intuitions matter, claiming that only consid-
ered intuitions matter, arrived at following extensive and rational deliberation. After
all, a supporter of slavery in a slave-owning society may support the practice because
she has not thought about its implications, or deliberating about the value of freedom
and liberty. However, limiting our intuitions to those which are thoroughly considered
would likely still lead to some seemingly objectionable intuitions: a very brilliant slave-
owner, who has deliberated about the ethics of slavery, may very well judge that slavery
is right.
Some may raise another objection: because individuals do not agree on intuitions, then
we ought not appeal to intuitions in formulating principles. Because the slaveowner's
intuitions clash with my own, and we cannot both be right, we cannot be certain that
either of us are right. More generally, there is no reason to believe an intuition that a
judgement is correct is an indication that this judgement is objectively correct. Instead,
some argue, we should appeal to facts that are true apart from our intuitions, such as
logic, utility, and rationalism. See, for example, R. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and
the Right, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1979. There are two possible responses to
this objection. First, we have little choice but to appeal to intuitions on some level. Even
if we were to determine principles based on how rational and logical they are, we would
still be relying on the intuition that rational and logical thought brings us to correct
judgements. Second, even if we do not know whether our intuitions are correct, we do
know that we could never accept principles that conﬂict with some of our deeply-held
intuitions about certain cases. Just as I believe 2+2=4, and would reject a mathematical
axiom that was produced by a mathematician who intuited that 2+2=5, I would reject
a principle produced by a slave-owner who intuited that slavery is right. Intuitions are
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Finally, when formulating a principle, I assume it is preferable to ap-
peal to intuitions that a broad audience could accept. Of course, individuals
have very diﬀerent intuitions about some Obvious Cases, and a single in-
dividual may have diﬀerent intuitions at diﬀerent points in their lives or
even times of day.7 Some may believe the sixteen year old should clearly be
tried as an adult, while others believe she should clearly not, while others
believe this is a Diﬃcult Case that needs resolving. We can still attempt to
formulate principles that are as consistent as possible with the intuitions
we do agree on. It may be that all agree that a sixteen year old who kills
only a small number of people should not be placed in prison for life, view-
ing this as an Obvious Case. We might also agree about a sub-set of cases
where she kills a large number of people, such as a sixteen year old who is
very immature, and so should not be tried as an adult. If we agree about
a sub-set of Obvious and Hard Cases, then we can attempt to use the Ob-
vious Cases to formulate principles relevant for the Hard Cases. In this
sense, we can formulate principles consistent with at least some intuitions.
Though my assumption is that we can corroborate principles by ensur-
ing they are consistent with intuitions, I hope the methodology I present
will appeal to those who are slightly more sceptical about the importance
of intuitions. Some claim that intuitions are only important if they can be
explained by appealing to a higher order-principle, such as Kant's categor-
ical imperative, or Rawlsian or Scanlonian contractualism, or the Golden
Rule, or Utilitarianism. Yet, those who attempt to formulate these higher-
order principles often appeal to intuitions, at least partially. Rawls does
valuable because they help us determine the principles we can accept. And I assume it
is important to determine the principles we can accept.
7Jeﬀ McMahan, Moral Intuition, in (eds.) Hugh LaFollette and Ingmar Persson,
The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, p. 105.
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this explicitly,8 as does Parﬁt when he attempts to show how Kantian
principles can be reformulated to be consistent with intuitions about hypo-
thetical cases.9 Even those who do not explicitly appeal to intuitions still
use them,10 as when Peter Singer asks if you should save a drowning baby
in a pond, thereby ruining your expensive suit. If you think you should,
argues Singer, you should also sacriﬁce wealth to save a poor person on
the other side of the globe.11 He uses his baby-in-a-pond example to per-
suade you to accept his claims, even if he thinks that intuitions have little
normative force.
Therefore, intuitions have some role to play in a range of theories. This
has implications for our choice of examples. Complex examples are less
useful if they cannot tell us which property our intuition is responding to.
If we do not know why killing rhinos may be wrong, the example is less
helpful for determining what principles may be wrong. It could be wrong
to create a market for killing to save future lives. It could be wrong to
kill endangered animals, regardless of whether there is a market. It could
be wrong to kill in general, regardless of which living being is being killed.
It could be wrong to use a living being as a means to an end, even if it
does not involve killing. Knowing what bothers is necessary to know what
principles we should revise, but we struggle to know what bothers us in
8John Rawls, At Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1971
ans 1999.
9Derek Parﬁt, On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011.
10Ernest Sosa, Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition, Philosophical
Studies 132(2007): 99-107; Many ethicists are, as Robert Audi labels them, intuitivists;
they use intuitions to appeal to claims without viewing themselves as intuitionists,
in the sense of viewing intuitions as foundational. See Robert Audie, The Right in the
Good: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value, Princeton: Princeton University Press
2004. See p. 24-25. For a similar argument, see Francis Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights,
Responsbilities and Permissable Harm, New York: Oxford University Press 2007: 417.
11Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty, London:
Picador 2009.
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complex cases.
We could choose simple examples instead; but then we might overlook
intuitions that only arise in complex cases. It may be that every feature
in the black rhino example creates a wrong in combination, but no one
feature is wrong on its own. It seems complex cases are necessary, but it
is not clear how to use them.
2.1 Comparative Case Selection for Norma-
tive Theory
One way to utilize complex cases is to adopt a comparative method. More
speciﬁcally, in order to know what properties explain an intuition, we
should compare similar cases, where all is similar except for one or several
properties, or all is diﬀerent except for one or several properties. When our
intuitions change from one case to the next, we can be fairly certain that
this change in intuition can be explained by the change in a given property
or properties, assuming all else is equal.
Philosophers already seem to employ this technique for ﬁctional exam-
ples, though not explicitly. Consider, for example, trolley cases. In Philippa
Foot's original case, a driver of a runaway tram. . . can only steer from one
narrow track on to another; ﬁve men are working on one track and one
man on the other; anyone on the track he enters is bound to be killed.12
You must decide if the driver should steer the tram onto the track with ﬁve
people, killing them, or the track with one, killing only him. Most would
say he should steer the train onto the track with only one man.
12Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Eﬀect in
Virtues and Vices, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1978.
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In an example by Thomson, a third party sees the train, which will
continue going on the ﬁrst track and kill the ﬁve, unless you can throw a
switch and change the train from one track to another, killing one man on
the other track.13 You might feel this is a diﬃcult case that is not easy to
resolve. If so, the change in intuition from Foot's case is likely related to
the fact that you are a third party. For, that is the only property which
has changed.
In the third trolley case, also by Thomson, you also see a runaway
trolley about to run over and kill ﬁve workers on the track. In this case,
there is no other track the train can switch to. You happen to see a man
looking down from above the track. You are a train expert, so you know
that if you push him onto the track it will stop the train, killing him but
saving ﬁve lives.
Thomson assumed that many would feel it was wrong to push the man.14
We can be fairly certain it is the man being pushed which changes our
intuition from the previous case, because that is the only property which
has changed from the previous case. We can then consider why it is wrong
to push the man. I shall not delve into this debate. My point is merely
that continuity between cases, except for small changes, helps us determine
the wrong-making feature of a given case.
You might think the simplicity of trolleys makes them easy to compare.
But Thomson's trolley cases are not so simple. If you recall, she speciﬁes
that you are a trolley expert. She also speciﬁes that you just happened,
by chance, to see the large man. These details, I believe, make the cases
more similar to each other and to Foot's example. If you are an expert,
13Thomson 1984: 1395-1415.
14Thomson 1984: 1407.
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your certainty of success is close to 100%, just like Foot's driver who is
deciding whether to switch tracks, or Thomson's other example where you
can throw a switch. If you just happened to see the large man, your decision
must be quick and not premeditated, just like the driver in Foot's example.
When Thomson's cases are paraphrased today, these details are often left
out,15 but they are essential. The more similar examples are, except for
one property, the more we can be certain that our intuitions are responding
to this property.
We can adopt this method in cases that are more complex. Imagine
we are considering a principle of justice, the 1000 Lives Principle: it is
just to harm one person if it saves at least 1,000 lives. We want to see if
this principle is consistent with our intuitions, and so concoct a case where
we must decide whether to push a man to stop the train, causing him to
become paralysed, and saving 1,000 lives. If we feel that pushing the man
is morally permissible, we do not yet know if the 1,000 Lives Principle
is true in general, or just in some cases, such as when a man becomes
paralysed from pushing him. To know the strength of the principle, or how
it might be revised, we would need to know which property our intuitions
are responding to: the method of harming the one man, the harm imposed
on him, the number of lives saved, or an interaction between two or all of
these properties.
To see which property in the complex case explains an intuition, we
can create other complex cases that vary along the properties: the method
of killing the one person (pushing the man versus a pulling a switch),
15For example, See Daniel Statman, Targeted Killings: Fairness and Eﬀectiveness
in (eds.) Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman, Targeted Killings:
Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012
and Wikipedia Entry: Trolley Problems, accessed on 24 October 2014.
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the lives saved (more or less than 1,000), and the harm imposed on him
(killing him versus paralysing him). Assuming the properties are binary 
an assumption I shall later remove  this leads us to consider 2^3=8 possible
cases, representing possible variations along the three binary properties.
We could start by comparing two cases where the man is pushed to save
1,000 lives. In one he is killed and the other he is paralysed.
Table 2.1: Trolleys 1 and 2
Trolley 1 Kill by pushing 1 harmed to save 1,000 killed
Trolley 2 Kill by pushing 1 harmed to save 1,000 paralysed
You might think it is wrong to push the man when he is killed, but
permissible if he is paralysed. In other words, two properties  the fact that
he is pushed and the fact that he is killed  may be interacting to explain
the intuition that an act is impermissible. One way to help determine if
this interaction eﬀect arises is to consider whether you have the following
intuitions: in cases where you observe the man being pushed and killed you
usually think the act is impermissible; in cases where the man is pushed and
merely paralysed you usually feel the act is permissible; in cases where the
switch is pulled and the man is killed you usually feel the act is permissible;
and in cases where the switch is pulled and the man is paralysed you
usually feel the act is permissible. Of course, it is unlikely you would feel
the interaction eﬀect between pushing and killing is absolute: it is unlikely
that only pushing which leads to killing is impermissible. But you might
still reach the conclusion that, when both are present, they tend to elicit
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a feeling that a wrong has occurred compared to when only one or neither
are present.
To see if this is the case, you might start by comparing the following
two scenarios. In both, a man is harmed to save 1,000 lives, he is killed in
both, but in one he is pushed onto the track, and in the other he is killed
by pulling a switch.
Table 2.2: Trolleys 3 and 4
Trolley 3 Kill by pushing 1 harmed to save 1,000 killed
Trolley 4 Kill by switch 1 harmed to save 1,000 killed
If you think that it is wrong to push the man and kill him to save 1,000
lives, but right to pull the switch, and also right to push him if he is
merely paralysed, then the 1,000 Lives Saved Principle should be modiﬁed
to specify the way the one man is killed and the harm imposed. It might
read: To save 1,000 lives, it is permissible to push a man and paralyse
him, permissible to pull a switch and kill him, but wrong to push him and
kill him. Of course, you may wish to abstract out more, and formulate
two general principles, one regarding direct harm and another regarding
proportionality. But this, too, would require you to look at more examples
where an act leads to killing versus other harms, and where the number of
lives saved varies, using the same comparative method.
These ﬁctional examples, though slightly more complex, still only have
three ﬁxed binary properties, requiring us to look at only eight possible
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cases. The real world has far more properties. This can result in the need
to look at hundreds of thousands or even millions of cases, to see if an act
seems intuitively wrong when the properties change. For us to really know
if the 1,000 Lives Saved Principle stands, we would need to consider cases
where 999 lives are saved, 1,001 lives are saved, and so forth. If you felt
that even paralysing the man was wrong, you would need to consider cases
where the man was not paralysed, but had his leg broken, or left pinky
broken, and so forth.
If a principle can only be validated by ensuring it is consistent with
our intuitions, and we only know it is consistent with our intuitions by
considering all possible variations, then we would struggle to ﬁnd the time
to truly validate a principle.
This problem is apparent in immigration ethics. Consider the Principle
of Non-Refoulement, found in international refugee law. This principle can
be expressed as: It is wrong for the state to deport a person to their country
of origin if their lives will be at immediate risk after returning.
You might look at actual cases of immigration control to formulate this
principle so it is speciﬁc and consistent with our intuitions. Consider, for
example, the case of immigration control in Israel:
In December 2013 Israel passed an anti-inﬁltration law, which
required all asylum seekers, including the refugees amongst
them, to stay in an enclosed detention facility in the desert. The
state refused to recognize any asylum seekers as refugees, in-
cluding those ﬂeeing from Darfur and Eritrea.16 It also provided
$3,500 to any asylum seekers agreeing to repatriate to their
16Mollie Gerver, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Repatriation
of Refuges, Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 31(1)(2014): 1-13; Reuven Ziegler,
No Asylum for `Inﬁltrators': the Legal Predicament of Eritrean and Sudanese Nationals
in Israel, Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Law 29(2)(2015): 173-191.
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country of origin. Since 2014 at least 2,200 have returned,17
including many with children who were born and raised in Is-
rael.18 After returning, many were forced to ﬂee persecution or
found themselves homeless, living in life-threatening poverty.
All of these migrants and refugees were not deported in the traditional
sense. They were threatened with detention, or paid to leave, or both. If
you feel this policy was not just, you might want to revise the Principle of
Non-Refoulement. The new formulation would read:
It is wrong to deny someone the option of applying for
refugee status, and to
1. detain them or
2. deport them or threaten them with deportation and/or
3. pay them to leave.
But we cannot be certain this principle is valid based on one complex
case alone. For, we do not know which property or properties in the case
is explaining a given intuition. The wrong-making feature could be that
asylum seekers feared detention; or that they were paid to leave; or that
they left to low-income countries; or that some were likely refugees, and so
forth, or an interaction between two or more of the properties in the case.
If we found ten properties that we suspected explained our intuitions, we
would need to consider 2^10=1,024 cases to know the impact of each given
property on its own, and the impact of interactions between properties.
Indeed, the real number of properties is inﬁnite. Each migrant arrived in
17IRIN News, African migrants in Israel face voluntary return or detention, Down-
loaded on 12 July 2015 from http://www.irinnews.org/report/99712/african-migrants-
in-israel-face-voluntary-return-or-detention.
18Interview with Muhamad, Addis Ababa, 9 June 2014.
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Israel for diﬀerent reasons, some ﬂeeing war and others ﬂeeing poverty and
others ﬂeeing both. Each migrant worked in a speciﬁc job upon reaching
Israel. Each was told something slightly diﬀerent as they signed on a dotted
line, agreeing to accept cash to leave Israel. And for a given migrant, each
one of these experiences is made up of a sequence of smaller events, rich in
details, from the thoughts that crossed their mind as they were oﬀered cash
to repatriate, to the fear felt as they boarded a ﬂight. If the properties are
inﬁnite, so are the possible variations. We could not consider all possible
cases in our lifetime.
We could limit the number of properties, focusing on those we hypoth-
esize create a possible wrong, such as the properties relating to detention,
deportation, money, and so forth, ignoring other properties. But even if
we limit the number of properties we consider to those we hypothesize de-
termine our intuitions, we are likely to often come up with at least ten or
more binary properties. This still forces us to consider over 1,000 cases
that vary along these properties, possibly far more than we have time to
consider.
2.2 How to Select Cases
Before addressing a methodological solution to this problem, I would like
to brieﬂy respond to a related problem. Some might claim that my en-
tire approach, of reformulating principles whenever they conﬂict with an
intuition about a new case, would force us to sacriﬁce moral philosophy
more generally. If we must modify principles in light of new intuitions that
arise in every new case we consider, then our principles would become ex-
tremely complex, possibly growing every time we were exposed to a new
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case. And if every new property in a new case would completely change
a principle, then this would also change the moral evaluation of all other
acts whose permissibility is based on this principle. It would be diﬃcult to
say anything general about morality at all.
This would be a problem if it turned out that, every time we considered
a new case, we learned about an intuition that clashed with our principles. I
assume this is highly unlikely, and that most cases will not yield intuitions
that conﬂict with our principles. The result of considering thousands of
cases is not that a principle would change every time, but that a principle
might change some of the time. My concern is that, because a principle
might change, we cannot be certain it is valid until looking at thousands
of cases.
This problem has three possible solutions. We could reject the view that
principles must be consistent with all intuitions that arise in every case,
and instead conclude that principles are merely contributory.19 This would
mean that, if we establish a principle, and ﬁnd a counter-example where
the principle seems impermissible to follow, then the principle still stands,
but is merely not decisive in that particular counter-example. If so, then we
needn't consider every possible example before establishing a principle. For
example, imagine I claim there is an Anti-Encouragement Principle: It is
wrong to encourage others to risk their lives, which is why refugees should
not be paid to repatriate to danger. You come up with a counter-example
against my so-called principle: Just last week I hired a security guard to
accompany me on a treacherous terrain, thereby encouraging her to risk
19Jonathan Dancy, Moral Particularism, in (ed,) Edward N.
Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition),
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/moral-particularism/>.
37
her life. It seems, intuitively, that I acted permissibly. If principles are
merely contributory, this example of the security guard is not a counter-
example against the Anti-Encouragement Principle. The example is merely
a case where the principle is not decisive. Perhaps another principle, such
as a Principle of Informed Consent, is decisive in this instance. The guard
consented to protect me, and I compensated her duly, and she was aware
of the risks, and so forth, making it morally permissible for me to pay her
to protect me, even if this encouraged her to risk her life. We might come
up with the same conclusion regarding payments to refugees. One reason
not to pay them is that it is wrong to encourage others to risk their lives,
but this reason may not be decisive if refugees are not in detention, and
informed about the risks of repatriating. When we formulate a contributory
principle, we needn't consider over 1,000 cases because we needn't claim a
principle must be decisive in over 1,000 cases.
This approach is not helpful. Even if we accept that principles are only
contributory, we must still consider whether a principle is decisive in a
given case. To consider when a principle is decisive, we must consider a
plausible general rule as to the contexts that makes a principle decisive.20
This requires us to look at a range of cases. For examine, if I claimed
that my principle was decisive whenever a vulnerable individual was paid,
but not an empowered individual like a security guard, I would need to
validate this general claim. This would require me to consider a range
of cases where an agent was vulnerable and paid to risk their lives, and
not vulnerable and paid to risk their lives, varying along properties that
20Jonathan Dancy, Moral Particularism, in (ed,) Edward N.
Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition),
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/moral-particularism/>.
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may impact our intuitions, such as the extent of vulnerability, the type
of vulnerability, the cause of the vulnerability, and so forth. This would
require considering far more cases than we have time to consider.
There is a second possible solution to this problem. We could adopt a
type of Moral Particularism, and reject moral principles altogether. This
would entail looking at a given case, in all its complexity, and focusing on
the various properties of that particular case. If properties exist that create
decisive reasons to act a certain way in a particular case, then we ought to
act that way. If an asylum seeker is in prison and paid to repatriate to a war
zone, the fact that he is in prison and returning to a war zone are reasons
enough to view the government's policy as impermissible. Importantly,
even if we conclude this for Israel's policy, this needn't mean that, every
time a person's options are constrained and they are paid to risk their lives,
it is wrong to pay them. Reasons to act one way in one case needn't create
reasons to act the same way in another case.21 If we can create a rule for
one case without applying it to all cases, we needn't ensure our rules are
intuitive in all cases.
This solution is helpful for cases where there is at least one clearly de-
cisive reason to act a particular way. If a refugee is detained and paid to
leave to a warzone, we can conclude they have been wronged because they
were detained and returning to a warzone, and create a rule for similar
cases of detention. However, particularists may still be forced to consider
potentially thousands of cases when faced with more diﬃcult dilemmas,
such as a refugee who is not in detention and paid to repatriate to a high-
risk country. To consider if it is permissible to pay refugees to take such
21Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004:
p. 7.
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risks, particularists must consider what sorts of risks create reasons to re-
frain from payments. This might require considering cases where the risks
are moderate, extreme, and very extreme; known, unknown, or partially
known; risks to life, or limb, or happiness; and so forth. If there are over
ten possible properties that are relevant, particularists would need to look
at thousands of cases to determine the particular context where risks create
decisive reasons to not pay refugees to repatriate. For example, perhaps
payments should only be avoided if refugees are returning to known and ex-
treme risks to life, but not if they are returning to known and extreme risks
to limb, or partially known and extreme risks to life. Perhaps the precise
context where payments should be avoided is more complex, involving a
speciﬁcation not only of the extent of risks, but the likelihood that refugees
will later regret their decision, or will have their freedom undermined. If
certain reasons only arise in quite particular contexts, we may only realize
this upon looking at thousands of varying contexts, more than we have
time to consider.
A ﬁnal solution would be to concede that, regardless of whether one is
a particularist or a generalist, or believes principles are absolute or con-
tributory, we can never be certain that a principle is plausible or a reason
decisive until looking at more cases than we have time to consider. The
most we can do is ﬁnd evidence that conﬁrms a given principle, or evidence
that a reason is decisive. We should therefore adopt a method of selecting
cases that provides the strongest evidence of a principle's plausibility or a
reason's decisiveness. One such method, I argue, is to select a random sam-
ple out of the domain of cases that vary along the hypothesized relevant
properties. If, for example, there are ten binary properties we hypothe-
size explain our intuitions, and so 1,024 possible cases to consider, we can
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randomly select a segment of these 1,024 cases. If the principle22 seems
consistent with intuitions that arise in these randomly selected cases, the
principle is corroborated, even if never completely conﬁrmed. If the princi-
ple seems counter-intuitive in at least one randomly selected Obvious Case,
we ought to revise the principle, or at least consider revising the principle,
if we can do so without it conﬂicting with intuitions about other randomly
selected Obvious Cases.23
Psychologists and sociologists adopt this approach when using what
they call experimental vignettes. In such experiments, subjects are given
a series of ﬁctional stories, each slightly diﬀerent, to determine their opin-
ions. In one study, subjects were asked if they believed diﬀerent immigrants
should be allowed to stay in the country. Some immigrants in the stories
were male, others female; some had a criminal history, others did not; and
so forth. Experimenters then examined these answers to determine if sub-
jects were more likely to support a given type of migrant staying,24 such
as a migrant with a criminal history, or a migrant with a lower income,
or a migrant with a particular criminal history and income. When com-
plex vignettes are used in this manner, then each vignette has dozens of
properties, and so there are often millions of possible variations. There are
an insuﬃcient number of subjects to test all possible variations. Rather
than showing all cases to all subjects, experimenters randomly select some
22I shall assume, from here on, that principles are relevant for normative theorizing,
though all that I write is consistent with a particularist approach. Simply replace
principle with decisive reasons if you are a particularist.
23If there is no principle that seems consistent with all intuitions, then I concede we
have a problem, and should either keep trying, or at least establish the most plausible
principles, even if it remains imperfect.
24Christiane Atzmüller and Peter M. Steiner, Experimental Vignette Studies in Sur-
vey Research, Methodology 6(3)(2010): 128-138.
41
cases.25 If subjects tend to answer a given way whenever a property is
present, even though each case is randomly diﬀerent in other ways, this is
strong evidence that the property is important in explaining a given intu-
ition. If subjects are far more likely to answer a given way whenever two
variables are present, but not when each variable is present on its own, this
is evidence that the two variables interact to explain an intuition.
Moral and political philosophers can take a similar approach. When
there are more than three or four properties that we strongly suspect
explain our intuitions in various cases, philosophers can randomly select
properties, evenly distributing them across cases, except for one or more
properties they hypothesize impacts intuitions. If this property of interest
is always correlated with a given intuition that a wrong has taken place,
even when all other properties vary randomly, this is strong evidence that
the property is important in determining if a wrong has taken place, or if
a wrong may have taken place. Similarly, if the presence of two or more
properties is always correlated with a given intuition, but never when these
properties are present on their own, this is evidence that the properties in-
teract to explain a given intuition.
To see how this is done, imagine we look at the case of returns from
Israel, and hypothesize which properties, or groups of properties, are im-
portant. Some are most likely not; if we happen to know the colour of
the hat the pilot wore as he ﬂew the plane, this is less likely to impact
our intuitions, and so we can put this aside, focusing on other properties
that are more likely to explain our intuitions about various cases.26 I noted
25David Heise, Surveying Cultures: Discovering Shared Conceptions and Sentiments,
New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons 2010.
26Some may feel that, if we are already selecting properties we suspect are important,
then there is no need to randomly select properties, as we already have a sense of what
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that some migrants had children who had grown up in in Israel. We can
call this the Settled Property. We suspect that it may partly explain our
intuition that a wrong has occurred. We also hypothesize that nine other
properties also explain our intuition that a wrong has occurred. For ex-
ample, some migrants were detained; some were refugees; some were paid
money to leave, and so forth.
We can then create two sets of ﬁctional cases to determine if the Settled
Property at least partly explains our intuitions that a wrong has occurred.
In the ﬁrst set there is no settled property, and in the second there is. In
both sets, half of each set includes cases where a random sample of the
other nine properties are present, but not all. The other half of each set
includes the absence of these same properties.
If we only randomly select two other properties unrelated to settlement,
in addition to the settled property, then we would look at 2^3=8 cases.
For example, we might compare cases that  in addition to the settled
property  also diﬀer in whether a migrant feared detention and whether
she was returning to a very poor country. This might involve comparing
the following two sets:
matters. However, though we may hypothesize that a property might matter, we can
better corroborate its importance by observing how we react when it is present alongside
other properties. Given that we cannot observe all cases varying along all properties,
we ought to randomly select a segment of such cases.
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Table 2.3: Settlement, detention, and poverty
Feyise has settled in Is-
rael but fears deten-
tion and is returning to
a poor country.
Mulugeta has
not settled in Israel
and fears detention
and is returning to a
poor country.
Seid has settled in Is-
rael but fears deten-
tion and is returning to
a wealthy country.
Siduk has not settled in
Israel and fears deten-
tion and is returning to
a wealthy country.
Hani has settled in Is-
rael and does not fear
detention and is re-
turning to a poor coun-
try.
George has not settled
in Israel and does not
fear detention and is
returning to a poor
country.
Biruk settled in Israel
and does not fear de-
tention and is return-
ing to a wealthy coun-
try.
Celine has not settled in
Israel and does not fear
detention and is re-
turning to a wealthy
country.
Imagine we look at the ﬁrst column, where the migrants all settled in
Israel. In all of these cases we feel the policy is wrong or a diﬃcult case,
even though the cases are diﬀerent from each other with regards to two
other properties. We then look at the second column and feel that no
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wrong has taken place in any of them, or a lesser wrong, even though
the cases are diﬀerent from each other with regards to these two other
properties. This is evidence that settling in Israel explains our intuition
that the return policy was wrong. We might then modify the Principle of
Non-Refoulement, claiming that it is wrong to forcibly facilitate return of
a migrant who has settled in a country.
When selecting or creating cases to compare, it is important that no
property is correlated with the property of interest. This would undermine
our ability to determine if there was evidence that a property was explain-
ing a given intuition on its own. For example, if we looked at cases where
refugees were both in detention and also paid to leave, we might intuit that
a wrong occurred in all of these cases, but we do not know if our intuitions
are only reacting to detention, or payments, or both, or an interaction
between the two. To know whether our intuitions are responding to the
payments, we must look at cases where refugees are not living in deten-
tion and paid to leave. To know whether our intuitions are responding to
detention and not payments, we must look at cases where refugees are in
detention, and not paid to leave. To know if there is an interaction eﬀect,
we need to look at cases where both properties are present, and see if our
intuitions are diﬀerent compared to cases where only one of each property
is present.
Eight is a small number of cases to look at. Even if we look at another
set of eight, totalling sixteen cases, we are still overlooking many properties.
Most notably, I have not speciﬁed who amongst these migrants are refugees
whose lives will be at risk if they return. To further corroborate a principle,
we would need to randomly select more cases, and make more comparisons,
better understanding which properties are causing an intuition. But if there
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is a limit to the number of cases we can look at, then we should at least
randomly select varied cases, rather than a single complex case alone.
Until now, I have essentially argued that complex cases can be compared
in a similar way to how trolley cases are compared, with the only diﬀerence
being that we randomly select complex cases, because there are too many
possible variations to choose from. There is another important diﬀerence
between trolleys and complex cases. In the real world, each property can
take on more than one value. While there is only one way of throwing a
switch in a trolley case, there are many ways of settling in a country for a
migrant. A migrant can have children, live there many years, have many
friends, build a business, and so forth. The choice of how we deﬁne settled
in a country may impact our intuitions.
For example, let us say we look at cases where migrants settled in the
country in that they had children and lived there many years, and cases
where they did not settle in the country, in that they never had children
and only lived there a short while. Imagine that, after comparing cases,
we conclude that settling in a country is not a reason to grant a migrant
residency rights. We can still zoom into the property, and see if particular
types of settling impact our intuitions. Some may have lived fewer years
in the country, but started a family. Others may have started no family,
but lived many years in the country. There are now new binary properties:
the Family Property, describing if they started a family, and the years
property, describing if they lived many years in the country. We can then
determine the impact of each property on its own. We can ﬁrst compare
cases where migrants started a family, and cases where they did not. As
before, the other properties will be evenly distributed in both sets and no
property will be correlated with the Family Property. Importantly, the
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other property related to long-term settlement  the number of years in
the country  should also be evenly distributed and not correlated with the
Family Property.
After determining the impact of the Family property on our intuitions,
we can determine the impact of the Years property. As before, we must
ensure that all other properties, including the Family property, are evenly
distributed and not correlated with the Years property.
We may still ﬁnd that neither property leads us to believe that settling
in a country impacts whether a person should be permitted to stay. We can
zoom in once more. For migrants who have families in the country, we might
feel diﬀerently about those with children who have lived enough years in
the country to know the language ﬂuently and integrate culturally.27 Every
time we zoom in, we can make similar systematic case comparisons. When
we formulate principles, we can then specify which types of features create
a wrong, or a diﬃcult case, and which do not.
I shall follow this general spirit throughout the thesis, making compar-
isons between complex cases, rather than looking at single complex cases
on their own. For example, in Chapter 4 I will discuss agencies who mis-
informed refugees they helped return. In each case, which I learned about
in ﬁeldwork, agencies misinformed refugees in diﬀerent ways. Some told
wrong information, and others told no information. Some agencies were
NGOs, and others were government bodies. Some failed to provide infor-
27You might feel that it would be wrong to make comparisons between children,
claiming that children who speak the language ﬂuently should stay, but not children
who have yet to master the language. This meta-intuition can also be incorporated into
a comparative approach. You can compare philosophical acts of comparing children,
and philosophical acts that involved no such comparisons. If you consistently believe
this approach is intuitively morally wrong, then that is a point against this approach,
which will impact the ﬁnal principles formulated.
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mation that was easily available, others failed to provide information that
was diﬃcult to obtain. By comparing cases that varied along all of these
properties, and more, I could better determine if a particular property, or a
number of properties, was creating a distinct wrong, better corroborating
a particular formulation of a principle or guideline.
In using this method, I will not only rely on real-life cases I learned
about from interviews, but also ﬁctional cases, where several properties are
diﬀerent from the real-life ones, except for one or two properties that are
similar. This will help establish if a given property or properties seems to be
a wrong-making feature in general, helping formulate a principle for diﬃcult
cases in repatriation. For example, it is unclear if NGOs are blameworthy
when unwittingly giving refugees false information about their countries of
origin. I will raise ﬁctional examples of a car salesman unwittingly giv-
ing false information to a customer, and a doctor unwittingly giving false
information to a patient. These examples will help establish when it is
blameworthy to unwittingly give false information in general, and not just
in the context of repatriation. This, in turn, will help me formulate a gen-
eral principle for when giving false information is wrong, helping determine
when NGOs are blameworthy for giving false information to refugees.
It is important to note that, in the methods I present, the interaction
eﬀects between properties cannot be conﬁrmed. Nor can we be certain
that a property or properties explain an intuition. However, if we intuit
a particular way whenever a combination of properties is present, but not
when these properties exist on their own, this would be evidence in sup-
port of the claim that the interaction between the properties explains our
intuition. This, in turn, would be evidence for or against the plausibility of
a given principle. If a principle claims that an act is permissible whenever
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this combination of properties is present, but our intuitions say otherwise,
then we should revise the principle. And once we revise the principle, we
can better determine how to act in diﬃcult cases, where we are not quite
certain what ought to be done.
2.3 Fieldwork for Philosophy
One way to make comparisons, as is done above, is to read about com-
plex cases in newspapers or literature, and then create ﬁctional cases that
vary along key properties in the complex case. There is a disadvantage
to looking at existing cases from newspapers and literature. Such cases
may capture only a narrow range of properties, and so a narrow range of
possible intuitions. This, in turn, may lead to principles that would seem
counter-intuitive, had we considered a broader range of cases. At the very
least, the principles we formulate may be overly-speciﬁc, relevant for only
some cases, while ignoring others.
This is a risk for debates on immigration, a ﬁeld that focuses over-
whelmingly on poor individuals who are forcibly blocked from entering or
staying in wealthy countries. Within the ﬁeld of immigration ethics, three
properties are often left the same:28
1. Force is used in immigration control.
2. Migrants or refugees are vulnerable, in that their lives will be at risk
if they return home.
28Matthew Gibney, Is Deportation a Form of Forced Migration? Refugee Survey
Quarterly 32(2)(2013):116-129; Liz Fekete, The Deportation Machine: Europe, Asy-
lum, and Human Rights, Race and Class 47(1)(2005):64-78.
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3. Migrants are forced to leave wealthy states, or never enter them.29
If we only look at cases that vary along these three properties, we may
conclude that it is wrong to force an individual to leave a country if her life
will be in danger, largely consistent with the Principle of Non-Refoulement
as I formulated it above.
By only focusing on cases of return from wealthy countries, it remains
unclear whether poor countries act wrongly when deporting refugees, when
these countries cannot aﬀord to absorb them. Similarly, by only focusing
on cases where a state uses force to encourage a migrant to return home,
it remains unclear when states act wrongly if they pay a migrant to leave,
or if they omit information on the risks of returning, leading migrants to
repatriate.
To expand the range of cases we consider, we can conduct ﬁeldwork,
listing additional complex cases to better distinguish between properties.
To brieﬂy demonstrate how this is possible, consider the following three
women I interviewed in Israel and South Sudan.
The ﬁrst woman, Ajouk, had grown up in Cairo, her parents having
ﬂed southern Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil War in the 1980s.
In 2007 Ajouk felt unsafe, and so paid smugglers to take her across the Sinai
Desert and into Israeli territory, where she received a visa to work, but no
access to any beneﬁts, such as national healthcare. In 2010 a staﬀ member
29For philosophers focusing on cases involving these three properties, see: David
Miller, Immigration: The Case for Its Limits in (eds.) A. Cohen and C. Wellman. Con-
temporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2005: 193206;
Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum, Oxford: Oxford University Press
2004; Alexander Betts, Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework, Global
Governance 16(2010): 361-382; Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The case for open
borders, The Review of Politics 49(2)(1987):251-273 Javier Hidalgo, Resistance to
Unjust Immigration Restrictions, Journal of Political Philosophy 23(4)(2015):450-470.
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from an NGO approached her. Working with the Israeli government, the
NGO told her it was safe to return to South Sudan, assuring her there were
job opportunities and healthcare. She returned to South Sudan, where she
found no free healthcare, job opportunities, or security, especially after the
outbreak of the South Sudanese Civil War in 2013. Today, she regrets she
returned.30
I also interviewed Saeda, who ﬂed Ethiopia to Sudan as a young girl
with her parents. She failed to ﬁnd protection in Sudan, so eventually
travelled to Israel in the early 2000s, where she asked for humanitarian
protection from the Israeli government. She was given a residency visa,
but no right to work, and feared homelessness. In 2013 a civil servant
told her that, if she returned to Ethiopia, she would receive $3,500. She
accepted the oﬀer and returned, uncertain if the money would be suﬃcient
for her to survive.31
In 2013 I interviewed Grace, whose parents ﬂed South Sudan for Uganda
in the 1980s, before she was born. The Ugandan government gave her and
her family land for farming, and Grace grew up helping on the farm and
excelling in school, eventually receiving the top marks in her class. In 2011
the Ugandan government revoked her parents' land, claiming it was safe
in South Sudan, despite the UN's claims that it was still insecure.32 They
returned, feeling they had no choice. Grace now works in her mother's
teashop in South Sudan, unable to continue her studies. I met her during
the ﬁrst week of the South Sudanese Civil War, on a dirt road next to a
30Interview with Ajouk, Aweil, South Sudan, 2 April 2012.
31Interview with Saeda, Tel Aviv, Israel 29 July 2014.
32Emergency Relief Coordinator Press Brieﬁng on South
Sudan, 2/2/12. Downloaded on 13 July 2015 from
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/ERC%20press%20remarks%20South%20Sudan%
202%20Feb1012.pdf.
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military base, where soldiers where ﬁring on each other, occasionally onto
civilians walking by. She does not feel safe.33
I found six properties in these cases that I suspected impacted my in-
tuitions as to whether a wrong had taken place:
1. Money paid
2. Force used against migrants, including detention
3. Poverty or violence in country of origin
4. Beneﬁts denied (including healthcare and land)
5. Wealth of expelling state
6. Extent of misinformation
The ﬁrst three were found in the news story I paraphrased earlier, and so
were not new for me when interviewing Ajouk, Saeda, and Grace. But I
learned about the last three properties from the interviews.
To consider if these three properties were wrong-making features, I cre-
ated ﬁctional cases that varied along these and other properties. I ﬁrst
considered whether misinformation was a wrong-making feature, the last
property listed. I then randomly selected two additional properties: the
property relating to detention (2) and the property relating to the poverty
of the country a migrant was returning to (3). This allowed me to compare
two sets of four ﬁctionalized cases, one with misinformation and one with-
out, each set varying along the two randomly selected properties, as seen
in Table 2.4 on the following page.
33Interview with Grace, Juba, South Sudan, 2 January 2014.
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Table 2.4: Misinformation, detention, and poverty
Feyise was misinformed
but fears detention
and is returning to a
poor country.
Mulugeta was
not misinformed and
fears detention and
is returning to a poor
country.
Seid was misinformed
but fears detention
and is returning to a
wealthy country.
Siduk was
not misinformed but
fears detention and is
returning to a wealthy
country.
Hani was misinformed
and does not fear de-
tention and is return-
ing to a poor country.
George was
not misinformed and
does not fear deten-
tion and is returning to
a poor country.
Biruk was misinformed
and does not fear de-
tention and is return-
ing to a wealthy coun-
try.
Celine was
not misinformed and
does not fear deten-
tion and is returning to
a wealthy country.
If you feel that a wrong has taken place in all of the four cases in the
left-hand column, but not in the right-hand column, this is evidence that
misinforming migrants is wrong even in the absence of detention in the
host country and poverty in the country of origin.
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However, you may not have very diﬀerent intuitions in the left-hand set,
as compared to the right-hand. This might be because you feel misinform-
ing a migrant makes little diﬀerence if they are also coerced into leaving,
or are returning to extremely poor countries. We can make other compar-
isons, controlling for more properties I learned about from the interviews.
I shall address such cases in Chapter 4, when discussing misinformation.
There is another type of comparison we may wish to make. Rather than
comparing every possible variation along three properties, we can compare
two very complex cases to determine if a given property has normative
force on it's own, even when no other wrong-making features are present.
For example, to see if misinformation impacts our intuitions on its own, we
can compare the following two cases:
Immigration oﬃcials
in a wealthy country
misinformed Fuad
about the conditions
in Canada, a wealthy
country of origin that
Fuad wants to return
to. He was never of-
fered any money, no
force was used against
him, and he continued
to be eligible for
state beneﬁts prior to
returning.
Immigration oﬃcials in
a wealthy country did
not misinform Miriam
about conditions in
Canada, a wealthy
country of origin
she wants to return to.
She was never oﬀered
any money, no force
was used against her,
and she continued
to be eligible for
state beneﬁts prior to
returning.
Table 2.5: Fictional Canada comparison
No force is used in both cases, no money is paid, no beneﬁts are with-
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drawn, and the migrants are returning to a wealthy country. The only
diﬀerence is that the ﬁrst migrant is misinformed, and the second one is
not. Some may feel that if a civil servant provides intentionally false in-
formation to a migrant from Canada, as in the ﬁrst case, this is wrong,
or possibly wrong, compared to the second case. If one felt this way, this
would be evidence that misinforming can be wrong even in the absence of
other wrong-making features. But if we feel there is no wrong in either of
the two cases, then it may be that misinforming a migrant is not, on its
own, very problematic.
We can then compare two more complex cases, one with a migrant
who is misinformed and returning to a poor country, and the other with a
migrant who is not misinformed and returning to a poor country:
Immigration oﬃcials
in a wealthy country
misinformed Joseph
about the conditions
in Burundi, a poor
country of origin.
He was never of-
fered any money, no
force was used against
him, and he continued
to be eligible for
state beneﬁts in the
wealthy country prior
to returning.
Immigration oﬃcials in
a wealthy country did
not misinform Mary
about conditions in
Burundi, a poor coun-
try of origin. She
was never oﬀered
any money, no force
was used against her,
and she continued
to be eligible for
state beneﬁts in the
wealthy country prior
to returning.
Table 2.6: Fictional Burundi comparison
If you believe there is a wrong occurring in the ﬁrst case with Joseph,
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and not the second with Mary, this is evidence that there is something
distinctly wrong about misinforming a migrant returning to a poor country,
even when other properties suggest no wrong has taken place.
Another important property I learned about though ﬁeldwork was that
migrants were paid to leave, as occurred with Saeda. To determine if
payments may be wrong, even in the absence of misinformation and other
potentially wrong-making properties, we can compare eight simple ﬁctional
cases for comparison. All in the ﬁrst set involve payments to leave, while
all in the second set do not. Other properties, such as the poverty in the
country-of-origin, are randomly distributed across both sets.
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Feyise was paid, misin-
formed and is return-
ing to a poor country.
Mulugeta was not paid,
but misinformed and
is returning to a poor
country.
Seid was paid and mis-
informed and is re-
turning to a wealthy
country.
Siduk was not paid but
misinformed and is re-
turning to a wealthy
country.
Hani was paid and does
not misinformed and
is returning to a poor
country.
George was not paid
but not misinformed
and is returning to a
poor country.
Biruk was paid and not
misinformed and is re-
turning to a wealthy
country.
Celine was not paid
and not misinformed
and is returning to a
wealthy country.
Table 2.7: Payment comparisons
As with misinformation, I also zoomed into this property. I learned that
there were diﬀerent ways of giving money. Some were told they must leave
within a month to receive money, and were required to decide relatively
quickly. Others were told they could decide over the course of a year, or
more, and there was no deadline. To begin considering whether the deadline
could explain any intuitions I might have about a given case, I compared
two sets of cases, as seen below. In the ﬁrst set there is a deadline, and in
the second there is no deadline.
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Feyise was
paid with a deadline,
was misinformed and
is returning to a poor
country.
Mulugeta was
paid without a deadline,
was misinformed and
is returning to a poor
country.
Seid was
paid with a deadline,
was misinformed
and is returning to a
wealthy country.
Siduk was
paid without a deadline,
was misinformed and
is returning to a
wealthy country.
Hani was
paid with a deadline,
was not misinformed
and is returning to a
poor country.
George was
paid without a deadline,
was not misinformed
and is returning to a
poor country.
Biruk was
paid with a deadline,
was not misinformed
and is returning to a
wealthy country.
Celine was
paid without a deadline,
was not misinformed
and is returning to a
wealthy country.
Table 2.8: Deadline comparisons
If you feel there is a wrong occurring in all of the cases on the left, but
not all of the cases on the right, this is evidence that a deadline is relevant
for determining if payments are permissible. As before, we may also wish
to compare complex cases, such as the two below:
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Immigration oﬃcials
in a wealthy coun-
try told Sara that
she would receive
$3,500 if she returned
to Uganda, a poor
country, within a week.
She was not misin-
formed, no force
was used against her,
and she could access
state beneﬁts in the
wealthy country prior
to returning.
Immigration oﬃcials
in a wealthy country
told Stephen that he
would receive $3,500
if he returned to South
Sudan, a poor country,
whenever he wished to.
He was not misin-
formed, no force
was used against him,
and she could access
state beneﬁts in the
wealthy country prior
to returning.
Table 2.9: Complex deadline comparison
If you feel that Sara was wronged, but feel Stephen was not, this suggests
that payments with a deadline are a distinctly wrong form of immigration
control. If you feel that no injustice has occurred against either migrant,
this is evidence that the limited time frame for paying someone to leave is
not an independent wrong-making feature.
Fieldwork is not always necessary. We could create ﬁctional cases from
our own imagination alone. But ﬁeldwork helps broaden the range of
ﬁctional cases our imagination might conceive of. Once I realized how
much variety there was in payment schemes to encourage return, I could
then consider further hypothetical payment schemes, such as the possibil-
ity that refugees receive continuous funds after return, or the possibility
that refugees could later re-enter the host country that paid them to leave.
Looking at a broader range of cases that actually exist helps us consider
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a broader range of cases that might exist, allowing us to consider more
intuitions, and to better test our existing principles, making them more
robust and precise.
2.4 Fieldwork on Repatriation
Throughout the thesis, I have selected cases that have the advantages of the
comparative methods described above. Though I do not merely consider
intuitions, and provide arguments as to why I reach certain conclusions, I
strived to compare similar cases, with certain key diﬀerences. This helped
determine which diﬀerences might create reasons for various actions.
To select cases that were suﬃciently varied, I conducted varied ﬁeld-
work, interviewing a range of refugees who repatriated from Israel, and
learning about diﬃcult cases concerning repatriation. While I do not ex-
plicitly spell out a full range of comparisons, as in this chapter, I strived
to select cases that could be easily compared because certain properties
remained consistent, and others changed.
In comparing cases, I primarily start by examining Diﬃcult Cases,
where we are not quite certain what ought to be done, and then draw
upon Obvious Cases from ﬁction to help determine what ought to be done.
My goal is to establish whether a range of Diﬃcult Cases ought to be
resolved diﬀerently because of their diﬀerent properties.
Most non-ﬁction cases were selected from the interviews I conducted in
Israel, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda.34 In each interview, migrants
explained to me precisely why they reached Israel, what they experienced
34For an overview of the steps taken to ensure an ethical research process, See Ap-
pendix A. For the dates and locations of all interviews, see Appendix B.
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in Israel, why they decided to return to East Africa, who helped them
return, and what their conditions were after returning. To ensure I had
a broad array of cases, I travelled to a variety of towns within countries,
and spoke to both those living in urban and rural areas, in both safe and
unsafe regions.
My ﬁrst set of interviews took place between 2008 and 2010, when I
spoke to NGO staﬀ members in Israel who helped with return, and twelve
refugees living in Israel, one of whom was interested in returning. I later
travelled to Juba, Aweil, and Wau in South Sudan in March and April
2012, interviewing 27 individuals after they returned from Israel to South
Sudan. Soon after I arrived in Juba, the Israeli government announced that
all were required to repatriate.35 Almost all remaining South Sudanese
nationals in Israel returned by the summer of 2012, a large number via
NGOs. I travelled to East Africa again to interview these new returnees,
ﬁrst conducting ﬁeldwork in Kampala and Entebbe in 2013, as many had
migrated to these cities shortly after returning to South Sudan. While
there, I interviewed thirty returnees, the majority children. In August
2013 I again travelled to Israel to interview a government oﬃcial who was
facilitating return,36 and NGO staﬀ members assisting individuals return
as of 2013.
On December 13th, 2013 I travelled to South Sudan a second time,
interviewing those who had stayed in South Sudan after returning in the
summer of 2012. On December 15th civil war broke out, and I stayed for six
35For the text of the letter sent to South Sudanese, see
PIBA "A Call for the people of South Sudan,"31/01/11,
http://www.piba.gov.il/SpokesmanshipMessagess/Documents/2012-2192.pdf. Down-
loaded 2/1/2015.
36Interview with head of Voluntary Return Unit, Tel Aviv, 28 July 2013.
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more weeks, interviewing 61 returnees who stayed in Juba, including one
of the twelve subjects I had already interviewed in 2010 in Israel, before he
returned. Roughly half the interviews were conducted with Nuer citizens
forced by Dinka militias to ﬂee their homes to the UN's Internally Displaced
Persons (IDP) camp. In June 2014 I travelled to Ethiopia, interviewing
nine returnees from the Nuer tribe who had ﬂed or migrated to Gambella,
a town situated along the border with South Sudan.
In total, I interviewed 126 returnees to South Sudan, and learned of the
conditions of eight additional returnees, representing approximately 11%
of the roughly 1,200 South Sudanese nationals who returned by 2012.
To select these subjects, I arrived in each country and called two to
ﬁve contacts provided to me by repatriation facilitators, volunteers, and
friends in Israel. I then used a snowball methodology to interview their ac-
quaintances, their acquaintances' acquaintances, and so forth, until all links
were exhausted. After each interview, I coded responses for subjects' rea-
sons for returning, including detention or threats to deportation in Israel. I
also coded the interviews for properties related post-return conditions, in-
cluding whether they had access to food, income, medical care, education,
and shelter, and whether they were again displaced. Finally, I recorded
the number of subjects who, after return, died from illness, ethnic-based
killings, or cross-ﬁre during the war.
I could not obtain a full list of phone numbers of those who returned and,
even if I had, I would not have been able to interview a random sample of
this list, as I could not access extremely remote areas. Nonetheless, I strived
to interview a diverse range of subjects. I speciﬁcally strived to counteract
survivorship bias, which arose because I was less able to learn about those
who were killed, partly because they could not answer their cell phones,
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and partly because they were more likely to have returned to insecure areas
I could not reach. To counteract this bias, I travelled extensively within
each town, and the surrounding rural areas, to meet with returnees who did
not have access to a secure healthcare, a cell phone, or a close tarmac road.
During the war, I also conducted interviews in and around both UN IDP
camps in Juba, including one in the Jebel neighbourhood, where ethnic
cleansing and ﬁghting were especially widespread. And though I could not
interview those who were killed, I attempted to establish a mortality rate.
When I learned of a subject who was killed, and who I would have met
had they survived, I included them in the sample of 134 subjects whose
conditions I could conﬁrm.37
In addition to interviewing South Sudanese subjects who returned, I in-
terviewed a smaller sample of other refugees and migrants who repatriated
during the same period, via a distinct NGO called the Center for Interna-
tional Migration and Integration (CIMI). This NGO worked with a special
Voluntary Return unit set up in the Ministry of Interior.38 The sample
included a family of four who had repatriated in 2012 to Sudan, and then
ﬂed to Ethiopia; two Eritrean refugees who had accepted resettlement to
Ethiopia from Israel; a father and his eight year old daughter who repa-
triated to Ethiopia; and three migrants who repatriated to Nigeria, two
to Guinea, one to the Philippines, and fourteen to Thailand. These cases
are in many ways diﬀerent than the cases of repatriation to South Sudan,
but have certain important similarities  most notably the level of misin-
formation they received  and so provide useful comparisons to the cases
37I did not include those I learned about only because they had died, as this would
bias my sample in opposite direction, over-representing those who had died.
38Interview with CIMI Director, Jerusalem, 22 September 2011
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of repatriation to South Sudan.
One might suppose that we cannot rely on the responses of those who
returned. They may have misrepresented how much they were coerced to
return, how misinformed they were, and how diﬃcult their conditions were
after returning, especially if they were not satisﬁed with their choice to re-
turn. My method of sampling strived to mitigate this possibility. Because
I interviewed individuals living in a diverse range of countries and regions,
a signiﬁcant portion were very satisﬁed with their return, but still recall
being coerced into returning, being misinformed, and later ﬂeeing their
homes after returning. If even these individuals recall similar challenges to
those who regretted repatriating, this provides stronger evidence as to the
accuracy of such testimonials. I also witnessed conditions described by re-
spondents, such as overcrowding, unhygienic latrines, food availability, and
soldiers ﬁring into IDP camps. As such, I could corroborate the responses
of many interviewees regarding these conditions.
This original data on repatriation from Israel is central to this thesis.
However, I situate it within the broader range of repatriation cases. The
case of Israel is not unique because of the dilemmas NGOs faced. What was
unique was the NGOs' greater ﬁnancial investment to avoid these dilemmas.
If such extraordinary measures failed to succeed, this highlights the depth
of the problem and the need for an ethical analysis.
2.5 Conclusion
For those who are concerned about the widespread use of trolleys and
babies in bathtubs, there is an urgent need to ﬁnd complex examples from
the real world. But if we want our examples to be as useful as ﬁction, we
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need an eﬀective method of selecting and comparing them. We also need
ﬁeldwork to learn about new cases, expanding the range of cases to include
those we would not imagine on our own.
This need is especially apparent in immigration ethics. Philosophers
and social scientists focus overwhelmingly on the use of force in immigration
control, rather than assistance in repatriation. Focusing on the latter raises
considerations we might otherwise overlook, and diﬃcult cases we might
otherwise ignore. In the following section, I shall raise the ﬁrst diﬃcult
case I learned about, concerning a man named George.
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Chapter 3
Coercion*
As George was followed home, a policeman stopped him from behind.
Pack your belongings, the policeman ordered, informing him he had
a week to return to South Sudan or be detained indeﬁnitely in Israel.
George had originally ﬂed South Sudan for Egypt during the Second
South Sudanese War in the 1980s. He failed to ﬁnd secure protection in
Egypt and so crossed the Sinai Desert in 2008, entering Israeli territory
with the help of smugglers. Like 60,000 other asylum seekers who had
crossed over, George could not apply for refugee status or legally work as
of 2012.1
As the policeman drove away, George called OBI. He asked for help
returning to South Sudan, and was given a free ﬂight home and travel doc-
umentation. By 2012, nearly all South Sudanese in Israel had repatriated
via similar means.
It is against international law to indeﬁnitely detain asylum seekers with-
*This chapter is based on a forthcoming publication. See Mollie Gerver, "Refugee
Repatriation and the Problem of Consent," British Journal of Political Science.
1Interview with George, Juba, 2 January 2014.
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out ﬁrst establishing if they are refugees.2 What is less obvious is whether
humanitarian organizations should help individuals return to avoid such
detention.
The UN claims it should.3 Over the last decade, it has assisted 7.2 mil-
lion refugees repatriate, many from detention.4 They help because, even
if governments detain refugees,5 the UN is using no coercion itself, and is
helping refugees obtain freedom through repatriation.6 It is analogous, one
could claim, to civil servants clandestinely helping individuals ﬂee perse-
cuting regimes. During the Rwandan Genocide and the Holocaust, such
civil servants were celebrated as helping individuals escape injustices.7 Of
course those who ﬂed were coerced; that is why it was commendable to
help them.
Yet, unlike ﬂeeing from danger to safety, refugees who return home may
be trading one injustice for another. In this case, repatriation facilitators,
including NGOs and UN agencies, cannot normally justify their actions
by appealing to the outcomes of return. In this eventuality, NGOs have
2B. S. Chimni, From Repatriation to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Crit-
ical History of Durable Solution to Refugee Problems, Refugee Survey Quarterly
23(3)(2004); Michael Barnett, UNHCR and the Ethics of Repatriation, Forced Mi-
gration Review 10(2001):31-34.
3Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Orga-
nizations in Global Politics, Cornell: Cornell University Press 2004: 75.
4UNHCR, Displacement: The New 21st Century Problem, UNHCR Global Trends
2012, p. 17.
5Matthew Gibney, Is Deportation a Form of Forced Migration? Refugee Survey
Quarterly 32(2) (2013): 116-129.
6Repatriation assistance usually involves the paying for transport home when refugees
lack the funds to do so, and the arranging of travel documentation. There is also, in
some cases, the provision of food aid during the ﬁrst year after return. See UNHCR
Handbook - Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection, Geneva: 1996.
7Lee Anne Fujii, Killing Neighbours: Webs of Violence in Rwanda, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press 2009; Bo Lidegaard, Countrymen: How Denmark's Jews Escaped the
Nazis, London: Atlantic Books 2013.
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justiﬁed their assistance by reference to refugees' consent.8 But it is unclear
if there is consent, given the presence of coercion.
In the following section I will describe one version of this dilemma, which
I shall call the Coercion Dilemma. These are cases where facilitators
help with coerced returns without causally contributing to the coercion.
In Section 2 I will then address Causation Dilemmas, where facilitating
return does causally contribute to coercion.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to precisely state the aims and clarify
the assumptions of this chapter to avoid misunderstanding about the highly
contentious questions addressed.
I shall consider whether facilitators are morally permitted to assist with
return, rather than whether they are legally permitted to do so.9 The
refugees under consideration are primarily those who the UN claims should
not be forcibly returned, but instead given asylum or the opportunity to
apply for refugee status. These are individuals whose lives will likely be
at risk from persecution if they return. Using the UN deﬁnition permits
discussion of the UN's facilitation dilemmas according to the UN's own
standards. In a similar vein, I use the deﬁnition of coercion provided by the
International Organization of Migration (IOM), a major global repatriation
facilitator. According to IOM, coercion occurs when one is repatriating to
avoid detention, but also when one lacks basic necessities if they stay, such
as food or shelter.10 More speciﬁcally, I assume states unjustly coerce
8NGOs in Israel explicitly justiﬁed their actions on these grounds. See Mollie Gerver,
Is Preventing Coerced Repatriation Ethical and Possible? The case of NGO repatria-
tion of South Sudanese in Israel, International Migration 53(5)(2015):148-161.
9UNHCR Handbook - Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection, Geneva:
1996.
10See Glossary on Migration, IOM, 2004, p. 34.
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore
/free/IML_1_EN.pdf. This deﬁnition of coercion is consistent with a range of
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refugees to leave if they have the capacity to provide basic services to
refugees within their territory, but refuse to.11
Though I mostly focus on refugees ﬂeeing persecution, I will at times
discuss individuals ﬂeeing general violence, food insecurity, and a lack of
medical care. As noted in the introduction, I assume that coercing such
survival migrants12 to leave is morally impermissible if the state has the
capacity to accept such individuals, and if accepting these migrants is the
only way to ensure that they obtain basic human rights. This claim is
supported not only by philosophers who believe in open borders, such as
Joseph Carens,13 but also by those who defend states' right to exclude im-
migrants, such as David Miller, Matthew Gibney, and even some states
themselves.14 As such, it serves as a minimal ethical standard, deter-
mining when the state should not deport,15 while still leaving open the
question of who repatriation facilitators should help return. As noted in
the Introduction, I will refer to individuals as refugees even if their return
is unsafe for reasons related to general violence or food insecurity, rather
than persecution.
Though I make the above assumptions throughout the chapter, one
may accept my general conclusions, while still disagreeing on who deserves
philosophical approaches. See Scott Anderson, Coercion in (eds.) Edward N.
Zalta The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Summer 2015 Edition) URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/coercion/>Coercion, Stanford
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2011.
11When very poor states lack the resources to support refugees, then wealthier states
may have a duty to provide these funds. If they do not, then they may be viewed as the
agents coercing refugees to leave.
12Alexander Betts, Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework, Global Gov-
ernance 16(2010): 361-382.
13Carens 1987 ibid.
14Miller 2005 ibid: 202; Gibney 2004 ibid; Betts 2010 ibid.
15Javier Hidalgo, Resistance to Unjust Immigration Restrictions, (Forthcoming)
Journal of Political Philosophy.
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asylum. My goal is not to settle the debate about whom states should
protect, but to resolve the dilemma of who should be helped to return by
the aforementioned organizations, if governments are coercing individuals
to leave.
3.1 The Dilemma
Coercion Dilemmas occur when NGOs and UN agencies are faced with a
choice. They can either help with return, or watch refugees face conﬁne-
ment in camps, detention, or an inability to access basic necessities. I will
ﬁrst describe this dilemma, and then consider how we might resolve it.
3.1.1 Describing the Dilemma
In 1991 two million Kurdish refugees ﬂed Iraq, most hoping to reach Turkey.
They reached a mountainous area separating the two countries, but Turkish
oﬃcials refused to grant them entrance. While current theorists focus on
the Turkish policy, there was also an ethical dilemma for NGOs: they could
do nothing, forcing refugees to stay in the mountains, or help them return
to Iraq, and risk being killed.
Within four days, 1,500 died from exposure, the rest uncertain what
would happen if they stayed. Like in Israel, no NGOs claimed that the
Turkish government's response was morally permissible. But helping with
return seemed preferable, because the Turkish government refused to change
its policy regardless.16
One might suppose that such Coercion Dilemmas are not relevant when
16Katy Long, The Point of No Return: Refugees, Rights, and Repatriation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2013: 107.
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claims for asylum are heard in wealthier countries, where genuine refugees
are given residency rights and freedom. Yet, even when claims are heard,
strict evaluation criteria mean many refugees are denied refugee status,
especially those ﬂeeing life-threatening poverty.17 They are then detained
and wish to repatriate. Some do, with the help of NGOs, and end up again
displaced or killed after return.18 Even if one believes that states have
acted legally according to a strict deﬁnition of international law, it seems
unlikely they are acting ethically, and so it remains unclear whether NGOs
should assist with such returns.
A similar dilemma is also found when states lack the capacity to accept
refugees. In such cases, states may both deny refugees the right to work,
and also lack the means to provide them aid to survive. This was the case
between 1982 and 1984 when Djibouti both denied refugees work visas, and
also reduced their rations, compelling many to return to Ethiopia.19 More
recently, the Tanzanian government gave refugees the choice between living
in camps or returning to Burundi without access to basic necessities.20
Similarly, the Ugandan government has revoked land from South Sudanese
refugees, and refugees in both Uganda and Kenya are often conﬁned to
17Richard Black and Saskia Gent, Sustainable Return in Post-Conﬂict Contexts.
International Migration 44(3)(2006): 15-38; Brad K Blitz, Rosemary Sales, and Lisa
Marzano, Non Voluntary Returns? The Politics of Return to Afghanistan, Political
Studies 53: 182-200.
18Richard Black and Saskia Gent, Sustainable Return in Post-Conﬂict Contexts.
International Migration 44(3)(2006): 19.
19Jeﬀ Crisp, The Politics of Repatriation: Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti, 1977-1983,
Review of African Political Economy 30(1984).
20US Department of State IDIQ Task Force Order No. SAWMMA13F2592,
Field Evaluation of Local Integration of Former Refugees of Tanzania,  2014.
See p. iii for summary of ﬁndings; See, also a report from Refugee Interna-
tional, cited by the IRIN news agency, on strict conﬁnement to camps, available
at http://www.irinnews.org/report/49519/east-africa-special-report-on-repatriation-of-
burundian-refugees.
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camps, limiting their freedom.21 In such cases, we may feel that poor
states are not blameworthy for failing to provide aid to refugees, but there
is still a background injustice if wealthier countries could provide this aid
to poorer states, and refuse to, thereby compelling refugees to leave.22 In
such cases, it remains unclear whether NGOs and the UN should help with
return.
As noted, the current academic discussions focus almost entirely on
state injustices,23 but the few scholars who do discuss the ethics of UN-
HCR repatriation tend to assume that a coerced return is, by deﬁnition,
impermissible.24 Their position is that UNHCR has a repatriation cul-
ture and uses a distorted deﬁnition of voluntariness, where a refugee in
detention is considered suﬃciently free to consent to return.25 This critique
is incomplete. Though the deﬁnition of voluntariness is skewed and the cul-
ture of repatriation problematic, UNHCR may be helping with involuntary
returns because doing nothing is far worse.
When OBI began its repatriation program in 2010, the Israeli govern-
ment had yet to detain a signiﬁcant number of refugees, and had yet to
prevent them from working, but OBI was still facing a Coercion Dilemma.
21James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2005: 380.
22Khalid Koser and Richard Black, The End of the Refugee Cycle? Editorial In-
troduction in (eds.) Khalid Koser and Richard Black, The End of the Refugee Cycle?
Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction, p. 2-17; B. S. Chimni, From Repatriation to
Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable Solution to Refugee
Problems, Refugee Survey Quarterly 23(3)(2004): 65.
23Megan Bradley, textitRefugee Repatriation: Justice, Responsibility and Redress,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014; Long 2013 ibid; Megan Bradley, Back to
Basics: The Conditions of Just Refugee Return, Journal of Refugee Studies 21(3)(2008):
285-304.
24Barnett 2001 ibid.
25Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 75; Barbara Harold-Bond, Repatriation: Un-
der What conditions is it a Durable Solution for Refugees? African Studies Review
32(1)(1989):41-69.
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At the time, refugees were denied legal residency, a small number were
detained, and all were uncertain if they would be deported in the near fu-
ture.26 They could not apply for refugee status27 and, even if they could,
their claims would likely be denied, as Israel provides refugee status to only
0.25% of applicants.28
Though conditions were diﬃcult in Israel, returning to South Sudan
entailed signiﬁcant risks. The country was part of Sudan until 2011, and
had only recently emerged from a war which began in 1983, fought mainly
between southern Sudanese opposition forces, and the ruling northern Su-
danese forces.29 From 1991, the southern Sudanese forces had split into
two opposing groups, one mainly from the Dinka ethnic group, and the
other mainly from the Nuer ethnic group.30 When South Sudan eventually
achieved independence from northern Sudan in 2011, a coalition govern-
ment was formed in Juba, comprised of members from both Nuer and Dinka
groups, but the president stiﬂed dissenting voices.31 Inter-ethnic violence
continued into 2012, with thousands of civilians killed that year alone.32
26Christian Mumras, (Hebrew) The activities of Israel to Promote the Return of
South Sudanese Asylum Seekers in (ed.) Tally Kritzman-Amir, Where Levinsky Meets
Asmara: Social and Legal Aspects of Israeli Asylum Policy, Jerusalem: Van Leer Insti-
tute 2015.
27Christian Mumras, (Hebrew) The activities of Israel to Promote the Return of
South Sudanese Asylum Seekers in (ed.) Tally Kritzman-Amir, Where Levinsky Meets
Asmara: Social and Legal Aspects of Israeli Asylum Policy, Jerusalem: Van Leer Insti-
tute 2015.
28Ziegler: 181.
29The Second Sudanese Civil war lasted from 1983 until 2005, leaving approximately
2 million dead from the both the war itself, and the consequences of the war, including
famine and disease. For a more complete background on the history of South Sudan,
see Anders Breidlid, Avelino Androga and Astrid Kristine Breidlid, A Concise History
of South Sudan: New and revised edition, Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers 2014.
30International Crisis Group, South Sudan: Jonglein  `We have always been at
war,' Africa Report 221, 22 December 2014.
31Douglas Johnson, Brieﬁng: The crisis in South Sudan, African Aﬀairs
113(451)(2014):300-309.
32Judith McCallum and Alfred Okech, Drivers of Conﬂict in Jonglei State, Human-
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As a result of the instability, the country lacked basic services, including
food security and healthcare.33
Given that Israel let South Sudanese work in 2011, and given the condi-
tions in South Sudan at the time, many refuges stayed in Israel. Consider,
for example, Vanessa, who explains why she had initially left South Sudan,
and why she did not accept OBI's help to return in 2011:
I am from Unity State, and we ﬂed the war to. . . Khartoum when
I was a young girl. Later, I married there, and had four kids, and
crossed into Israel, via Egypt, in 2007. I was in prison for half a year,
but then released, so decided to stay. It was good. I worked, at ﬁrst,
in the Renaissance hotel in Tel Aviv. The kids went to school.34
But others wished to return, such as Joseph:
My state is Lega State. . . I was born in Khartoum in 1982, but came
back to South Sudan from 1995 until 2000, so I was familiar with
Juba. I went to Egypt in 2000, and in 8 August 2005 I went to
Israel. . . I went to prison for one year, and after one year they released
us. I worked in a hotel, but could not get an ID, or legally start a
business. So I saved $20,000. I was in touch with my family in Juba,
and so asked for help returning.35
Joseph was one of the ﬁrst refugees to return. At the time, many
human rights organizations opposed OBI's assistance, claiming Joseph and
others had few rights, and so their return was involuntary.36 In response,
OBI hired a refugee rights organization called the Hebrew Immigrant Aid
Society (HIAS) to interview each refugee, asking them, Why do you want
itarian Exchange Magazine 57 (May 2013).
33Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) South Sudan: Violence against healthcare 1 July
2014. http://www.msf.fr/actualite/publications/south-sudan-conﬂict-violence-against-
healthcare.
34Interview with Vanessa, 25 December 2013, Juba.
35Interview with Joseph, 10 April 2012, Juba.
36Interview with HIAS Director, Jerusalem, 11 December 2012; Mumras 2015 ibid.
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to return? If an individual said they were only returning to avoid detention,
their return was viewed as involuntary and not supported.
In total, OBI and HIAS helped roughly 900 individuals return between
2009 and 2012. Once an asylum seeker left Israel they could not re-enter
Israeli territory.37 But OBI and HIAS were convinced that this choice,
though irreversible, was entirely voluntary.
OBI's intentions seemed genuinely humanitarian. It was a Christian
humanitarian organisation with a strong history of providing food, shelter,
and medical assistance to all denominations in developing countries.38 It
had never, until 2010, been involved in repatriation. Nor had HIAS, a
humanitarian organization founded in 1881 to assist Jews ﬂeeing pogroms
in Russia and Eastern Europe, and which later focused on helping non-
Jewish refugees, resettling 3,600 refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos into the United States.39 HIAS said it opposed repatriation in other
contexts, refusing to assist with repatriation from Kenya due to the risks
involved.40 In Israel it made an exception, as it could conduct individual
interviews to ensure there was no coercion.
In total, out of the 126 subjects I interviewed, 67 returned because they
thought life was better in South Sudan, rather than only to avoid diﬃcult
37Interview with HIAS Director, ibid.
38See: http://www.ob.org/frequently-asked/. Some subjects believed that OBI was
a Christian Zionist organization, and was motivated to help the Israeli government
decrease the number of refugees in Israel. I found no actual evidence, however, of these
motivations. Nonetheless, further research on this topic is warranted, to help clarify
OBI's possibly hidden motivations. If OBI had ulterior religious or political motives,
then it was perhaps exploiting refugees, encouraging return to promote its own values,
rather than refugees' wellbeing and rights. I put it aside for now. For, even if OBI
was completely humanitarian, and only intending to help refugees, there is still a major
ethical dilemma as to whether they should have provided such return.
39http://www.hias.org/history.
40HIAS Kenya, Protection Intervention. Downloaded from
http://hiasafrica.org/interventions/Protection-Interventions/ on 6 December 2015.
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conditions in Israel. However, there was a marked distinction between
those who returned prior to and after 2012.
That year, thousands of Israeli citizens marched through the streets of
Tel Aviv, calling for the expulsion of African asylum seekers, described by
the Prime Minister as ﬂooding the country41 and by one politician as a
cancer to the body.42 Legislation was passed to detain asylum seekers,43
and all South Sudanese were told they must return or face imprisonment,44
with the exception of those who had medical problems. Vanessa describes
life during this period, and why she changed her mind about staying in
Israel:
Every day started with a mess. You go outside and they tell you,
Go back to your country! Why are you here? Your country has
money! Go home!
In June they took my husband's visa and said, We will not give
you a new visa. We were left without work for two months. I said
What? What will I do. . . ? So I thought, I will say thank you to
God that we are healthy and go back.
Vanessa called OBI, which eventually agreed to help her return.45 Hun-
dreds of others soon followed. Of those I interviewed, thirty-seven returned
to avoid detention, and thirty-six returned partially or wholly because they
41Harriett Sherwood, Israelis Attack African Migrants During Protest Against
Refugees, The Guardian, 24/5/12.
42Ephraim Yaar, and Tamar Hermann. 2012, Peace Index  May 2012 Down-
loaded on 3 October 2014 from http://en.idi.org.il/media/602071/Peace%20Index-
May%202012(1).pdf.
43Law for the Prevention of Inﬁltration (Crimes and Jurisdiction (Amendment No 3
and Temporary Order) 5772-2012 (Amendment 3).
44Population, Immigration, and Border Authority of Israel, A Call for the peo-
ple of South Sudan (31/01/11) http://www.piba.gov.il/SpokesmanshipMessagess/
Documents/2012-2192.pdf.
45Interview with Bol, Juba, 21 December 2013; Interview with Nathaniel, Juba, 14
December 2013; Interview with Vanessa, ibid.
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could no longer work, fearing they would lack access to basic necessities if
they stayed. Fourteen left because they feared deportation.
It is not immediately clear whether OBI's ﬁrst policy of refusing coerced
returns was better than its second policy of supporting such returns. Nei-
ther was more principled than the other. It may seem ethical to only help
with voluntary returns, but this would force refugees to stay in detention.
The case demonstrates that the dilemmas of repatriation cannot easily be
avoided even when working independently from the government, and even
with the best of intentions and resources.
3.1.2 Resolving the Dilemma
To resolve this dilemma, we must address a pressing question: whether
refugees can truly give their consent when faced with coercion. In many
cases outside the sphere of repatriation, consent may very well be valid even
if there are only injurious alternatives. A patient is perfectly capable of
giving consent to life-saving surgery, even though the alternative to surgery
is death. As such, some philosophers argue that cases of third party
coercion are also cases of valid consent.46 Imagine that Abbey threatens
to shoot Babu if he does not buy Cathy's watch. Cathy sells Babu her
watch because she does not want him shot by Abbey. Babu's consent
seems valid for Cathy, even if not for Abbey. Of course, Cathy would have
an obligation to later give back the money to Babu once the threat has
subsided, but Cathy has not wronged Babu at the time of the transaction
and, if she cannot later undo the transaction, then she has not wronged
46Franklin G. Miller and Alan Wertheimer, Preface to a Theory of Consent Trans-
actions: Beyond Valid Consent in (eds.) F Miller and A Wertheimer The Ethics of
Consent: Theory and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009: 94.
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Babu, even though his consent was under duress. One could similarly argue
that refugees' consent is valid for repatriation facilitators, even if it is not
valid consent for the government.
However, according to a number of theories, consent would be invalid
for Cathy if she could easily persuade Abbey to put her gun down.47 Cathy
should do this, instead of selling her watch. In other words, Cathy's duty
is to get Abbey to stop threatening Babu, and therefore Babu's consent is
not valid for Cathy. This approach is consistent with the Good Samaritan
principle, which holds that agents should help those in great need, if they
easily can. If there is nothing that Cathy can do, then Babu's consent is
perfectly valid for her, but not if she can easily help stop Abbey's violent
threat.
With repatriation to dangerous countries, we may ask if a facilitator can
easily raise money for basic necessities and legal aid to avoid detention. If
instead it raises money for repatriation, then it fails to honour the Good
Samaritan principle. Of course, basic necessities may be an ongoing cost,
while repatriation is one-oﬀ. But if a refugee lacks necessities after they
have returned, it is unclear if the repatriation facilitator can simply ignore
their needs. If they owed them this aid before return, an action absolving
them of this duty without alleviating the need seems unethical.
In some cases, it might be far from costless for NGOs or the UN to try
and stop coercive policies. We might, then, suppose that the Good Samar-
itan principle does not apply, as this principle relates to costless or low-cost
actions. But there are two reasons why organizations may face more de-
manding duties than individuals like Cathy, and so be required to invest
47Joseph Millum, Consent Under Pressure: The Puzzle of Third Party Coercion,
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17(1)(2014): 113-127.
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more time and eﬀort in helping prevent coercive conditions. Humanitar-
ian organizations were created precisely to protect vulnerable populations,
and so should be held to a higher standard in protecting these populations.
This may translate to special duties, such as lobbying for policy changes;
providing legal aid; and raising money for necessities. Demanding costly
duties from Cathy, by contrast, could infringe on her right to a personal
life. While organizational staﬀ also have a private life, they have voluntar-
ily agreed to allocate an insulated portion of their lives to the goals of the
organization, so their personal lives are not infringed.
Some organizations may also have costly duties because they have sig-
niﬁcant power.48 When an agent has power, they have a greater ability to
help others, and so may have greater duties to help.49 For example, a doc-
tor on a ﬂight may have a duty to save a life, because she can more easily
do so, even if this is diﬃcult for her. Similarly, Medicines Sans Frontiers
(MSF), during a famine, may have a duty to widely publicize the famine,
because it is more able to do so.50 If repatriation facilitators have a greater
ability to publicize the plight of refugees, and lobby for the end of coercive
conditions,51 they should take these actions, even if they are more diﬃcult
than only helping with repatriation.
There are situations where repatriation facilitators do work hard to end
coercive conditions, but fail to create any change. In such cases, assisting
48Jennifer Rubenstein, The Misuse of Power, Not Bad Representation: Why it
is besides the point that nobody elected Oxfam, Journal of Political Philosophy
22(2)(2014):218.
49Diane Jeske Diane Jeske, Special Obligations, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philos-
ophy 2014 and Francesco Orsi, Obligations of Nearness, The Journal of Value Inquiry
42(2008):121.
50Michael Barnett, Humanitarianism, Paternalism, and UNHCR, in (eds.) Alex
Betts and Gil Loescher, Refugees in International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University
Press 2011.
51Barnett 2011 ibid.
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with return may be legitimate. For example, when Kurdish refugees were
trapped between Iraq and Turkey, NGOs tried and failed to persuade the
Turkish government to provide them asylum. More refugees were likely to
die from exposure, and so NGOs acted ethically when helping with their
return. Similarly, had OBI and HIAS worked hard to end detention, but
failed, perhaps helping with return would have been legitimate, so long as
South Sudanese nationals were aware of the risks.
This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that repatriation does
not itself causally contribute to coercion. If there is such a causative link,
then further considerations become relevant, which I will now address.
3.2 Causation Dilemma
Causation Dilemmas encompass three categories of causal scenario. In
all three, helping refugees to repatriate causally contributes to coercive
government policies. As such, return should generally not be facilitated,
with some exceptions.
3.2.1 Simple Counterfactual Causation
In Simple Counterfactual Causation, an agent causes an event if, had
the agent not acted as she had, the event would not have occurred. I also
assume that, for an agent to cause an outcome, it must be the case that,
in acting as she did, the outcome did occur.52 In other words, A causes B
if A's actions were necessary for B to occur, and B did in fact occur.
If the government is detaining refugees to encourage return, and an
52See David Lewis, Causation, The Journal of Philosophy 70(17)(1973):556-567.
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organization makes return possible, this can motivate the government to
detain more refugees than it otherwise would. IOM is an example of an
organization that may have such an impact. Globally, the organization
visits survival migrants in detention, taking down their details, and try-
ing to secure their passports so they can repatriate, when they otherwise
would not be able to.53 If governments are only detaining refugees so that
they repatriate, and refugees are only repatriating because of IOM, then
IOM is causally contributing to detention, in the sense that its actions are
necessary for the detention to occur.
UNHCR may contribute to coercive policies in a similar manner. In
1994 and 1995 UNHCR began facilitating the repatriation of Rohingyan
refugees from Bangladesh back to Burma. Soon after, the Bangladeshi gov-
ernment signiﬁcantly increased its pressure on refugees to return, seeing
that their return was now possible, as it was funded by UNHCR.54 Simi-
larly, in 2012, one Israeli Knesset report states that OBI had established
that repatriation for South Sudanese was possible, and so the government
should endorse a more aggressive return policy for those who had not yet
returned.55
Facilitating return may also increase the government's capacity to use
coercive measures. When OBI helped a refugee return from detention, the
government quickly ﬁlled his cell with a new refugee, who had previously
not been detained, keeping in line with the government's policy of ﬁlling
53Ishan Ashutosha and Alison Mountz, Migration management for the beneﬁt of
whom? Interrogating the work of the International Organization for Migration, Citi-
zenship Studies 15(1)(2011):21-38.
54Barnett and Finnemore ibid: 106.
55Protocol 84 (Hebrew) Distancing South Sudanese in Israel, Committee for the
Problem of Foreign Workers, 30 April 2012; 18th Knesset.
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the detention centre to its maximum capacity.56 Thus, in this scenario,
repatriation eﬀorts directly determine the rate of detention at a given time.
The case of Israel raises an additional complication, overlooked in the
examples above. OBI and HIAS were not the only agents facilitating re-
turn. The government also began its own repatriation programme in 2012,
eventually returning thousands of asylum seekers.57 In other countries,
UN agencies, multiple private charities, and refugees themselves pay for
transport home.
In such a scenario, any single NGO helping with return may seem to
have no impact on the level of coercion, nor may it have an impact if any
single means of repatriation fails. If existing bodies have the capacity to
repatriate all refugees, a single NGO may very well not causally contribute
to coercion. For, were it to discontinue its repatriation services, refugees
would still be able to repatriate at the same rate, via a diﬀerent facilitator.
However, if the other facilitators are incapable of facilitating all refugees
then each facilitator directly contributes to the rate of detention. The
more agencies that are available for repatriation, the more refugees can
repatriate, freeing up cells for further detention.
When NGOs' actions are necessary for coercive policies, coercion is not
a mere background condition, but is dependent on repatriation. This leads
to a simple argument for NGOs discontinuing repatriation services, related
to the Good Samaritan Principle. Refraining from helping with return
is costless. If this costless act of omission helps refugees avoid detention
56Removing Barriers: Coalition for a just migration policy in Israel (co-funded by
the European Union), The Legal Corner, downloaded on 30 May 2015, http://the-
migrant.co.il/en/node/4; Ilan Lior, Asylum seekers thrown our of detention center
after stroke, Haaretz 6/6/14.
57Galia Sabar and Elizabeth Tsurkov, Israel's Policies towards Asylum-Seekers: 2002-
2012, Instituto Aﬀari Internazionali, Working Papers 15, 20/5/15.
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and coercive conditions, then, as organizations created to help others, they
should exploit this omission to eﬃciently achieve their goals.
We might argue that, in some cases, causally contributing to coercion
does not harm refugees. In my sample, some refugees did not particu-
larly mind that the government threatened to detain them or revoke their
visas, because they would have returned regardless, for reasons unrelated
to coercion. Some missed their families, or wished to contribute to the
development of their country.
Even for these cases, it may be wrong for NGOs and the UN to help
with return, because it is wrong to causally contribute to coercive policies,
even if those subject to coercion do not feel subjectively worse oﬀ. For
example, imagine again that Abbey puts a gun to Babu's head, telling
him to buy Cathy's watch, but Babu wanted to buy the watch regardless.
When Cathy sells her watch, she may be making Babu's life better in some
ways, but she is also causally contributing to Abbey's act of raising a gun
to another person's head. In such cases, Cathy should refuse to sell Babu
her watch if she knows that this refusal will make Abbey put down her
gun. She should wait until Abbey does this, and only then sell Babu her
watch.
In a similar way, NGOs and the UN should avoid encouraging govern-
ments to detain refugees, as the act of detention is especially unjust, even
if many refugees would have returned regardless. Repatriation facilitators
should wait until the government ends detention, and only then agree to
help with return.
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3.2.2 Causation as Inﬂuence
There are instances where repatriation is not necessary for coercion, and
so does not cause coercion in the counterfactual sense. Facilitating repatri-
ation may still be wrong according to other criteria. Sometimes, a person
wrongly causes an event by inﬂuencing it, even if their actions were not
necessary for the general event to occur.58
For an example of such a phenomenon, imagine there is an assassin,
and she pulls her trigger, leading the bullet to shoot out her barrel into the
heart of a victim, unjustly killing him on the spot. She also has a hundred
backup assassins, who are all working independently from her, and who
would have killed the victim, had she not killed him ﬁrst. As such, she was
not necessary for his death, or even almost necessary for his death. She
still causally contributed to his death if she inﬂuenced the particular way
the death transpired.59 This would be the case if, in a world without her,
the bullet would have ﬂown in a slightly diﬀerent direction, piercing the
victim's heart in a diﬀerent place, while in a world without other assassins,
her bullet would have still ﬂown in the same direction it really did, piercing
the victim's heart in the same way. She causally contributed to the event
58David Lewis, Causation as Inﬂuence, The Journal of Philosophy 97(4)(2000):182-
197. Some may claim a person is merely contributing to an event in such cases;
regardless, it seems clear that a wrong can take place when one contribute to an unjust
event.
59This claim contrasts somewhat with those made by Lepora and Goodin. They argue,
ﬁrstly, that for an agent to be complicit in a particular death, the agent must contribute
to the death. To contribute to the death, an agent must be essential for the death
or potentially essential for the death. To be potentially essential, an agent must have
been necessary in a nearby possible world, and the closer the possible world, the more
complicit they are. I do not believe that this closest-possible-world approach is entirely
plausible. The assassin seems very complicit in the death of the victim, and very much
causing his death, even if she would only be essential in a very distant possible world
without the thousand back-up assassins. See Chiara Lepora and Robert E. Goodin, On
Complicity and Compromise, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013: 63-65.
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by being necessary for the way the event transpired, even though she was
not necessary for the general event to occur.
In such cases, even if the assassin causally contributed to the event by
inﬂuencing it, we might still claim that she did not inﬂuence it in a way
that harmed the victim; he would have been killed regardless. Nonetheless,
as noted above, we have duties to avoid causally contributing to injustice,
even if the victims are made no worse oﬀ from the causal contribution. If
inﬂuence is a form of causation, then the assassin may be acting wrongly
by inﬂuencing the injustice of killing another human being, regardless of
whether the victim is worse oﬀ compared to a world where the assassin
does not pull her trigger. In a similar sense, a single NGO may be wrongly
causing an unjust event by inﬂuencing it, even if the general injustice would
still have occurred had it not provided repatriation.
In cases where we causally contribute to injustice by inﬂuencing the
event, such causal inﬂuence may still be justiﬁed if the inﬂuence is signif-
icantly helpful for the victim. The assassin, for example, may know she
can more accurately shoot the victim directly at the centre mass of his
body, leading to a quicker death compared to the backup assassins. If the
assassin is in no way responsible for the presence of other assassins, and
is shooting the victim only to reduce suﬀering, pulling the trigger may be
morally justiﬁed. In a similar manner, an NGO can justiﬁably help with
repatriation in cases where, though the help causally contributes to unjust
coercion, it can also ensure a much safer return than would otherwise take
place. However, unless the NGO is quite certain that its actions signiﬁ-
cantly help with return, it should avoid helping with repatriation, to avoid
causally contributing to injustice.
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3.2.3 Uncertainty
In some cases, a given NGO has essentially no inﬂuence. Their actions
are neither necessary for coercion, nor do they inﬂuence coercion or the
safety of return. This may be the case if there are multiple NGOs, each
one providing equally safe repatriation, such that if one pulled out, the
level of coercion and safety of return would be the same. Similarly, there
may be only one NGO, but the government is detaining refugees both to
encourage return, and also to placate protesters, or to deter new refugees
from arriving in the country. We might suppose that an NGO assisting
with return here does not causally contribute to coercive policies. For, had
it not been for repatriation, there would still be other decisive reasons for
the government to detain refugees. In such cases, an NGO may still have
a strong reason to avoid helping with return.
An agent has a reason to avoid an act if she subjectively suspects that
her act may increase the probability of a harmful event occurring, even
if she is not ultimately necessary for the outcome and does not inﬂuence
it. Imagine two assassins pull their triggers at the same time, both bullets
ﬂying out their barrels simultaneously, piercing the victim's heart in the
same location at the same moment, such that neither assassin inﬂuenced
his death.60 One reason that each assassin acted wrongly is that, at the
time she pulled her trigger, she could never be 100% certain the other
would pull her trigger. In choosing to pull her own trigger, she increased
the probability, in her mind, of the death occurring.
When there are multiple facilitators helping with return, then each can
60Frank Jackson, What Eﬀects? in (ed.) Jonathan Dancy, Reading Parﬁt, Black-
well Wiley 1997; Michael McDermott, Inﬂuence versus Suﬃciency, The Journal of
Philosophy 99(2)(2002)84-101.
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never be 100% certain that the others will make return possible. In choos-
ing to help with repatriation, they risk possibly increasing the chances of
repatriation occurring, and so the chances of coercion occurring. Simi-
larly, when the government has multiple reasons for using coercive policies,
the NGO can never know for certain that the government will still detain
refugees in the event that repatriation is no longer a possibility. As such,
repatriation should be discontinued, so that NGOs are certain they are not
causally contributing to injustice.
Nonetheless, an exception may be made if the government has a large
number of reasons for detaining refugees, such that detention would almost
certainly continue even if repatriation ceased. Helping with such coerced
returns are not ideal, but may be morally permissible, as the causal impact
on coercion is unlikely, and the beneﬁts signiﬁcant, if the return is safer
than alternatives.
We have, as such, reached a general conclusion: Coerced repatriation
should only be facilitated if it does not signiﬁcantly contribute to the co-
ercive policies, and if all eﬀorts have been made to ﬁrst stop the coercive
policies. Such repatriation is permissible on balance, assuming refugees are
aware of the risks. When they are not aware of the risks, a distinct question
arises, which I shall address in the next chapter.
3.3 Conclusion
When a refugee is detained, her choices are far from voluntary. Given that
this is the case, humanitarian agents have two options, neither ideal. They
can help with an unsafe return, and free refugees from detention, or refuse
to help, forcing refugees to stay. In reality, this case comes in two forms,
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requiring two distinct policies.
In some cases, the government will arrest refugees, force them into
detention, or deny them visas regardless of whether they return. NGOs
and the UN should lobby for an end to such policies, and appeal to donors
to provide food security and shelter. If they fail, it may be ethical to
facilitate return, so long as refugees are aware of the risks.
In other cases, repatriation causes coercion. Facilitators are not mere
third parties, as their actions impact government policies, intentionally or
not. The more refugees are able to repatriate from detention, the more
spaces become available in detention centres. This not only allows the
government to detain more refugees, it gives them a reason to, seeing that
past detainees were persuaded to return. In such cases, NGOs and the UN
should not help with return, unless their assistance has only a small impact
on coercion, and ensures a much safer return than would otherwise take
place.
In light of these conclusions, NGOs and the UN ought to change their
current policies and practice. Today, these bodies spend little of their
budget on lobbying for the end of coercive conditions, and more on ﬂights,
stipends, and coordinating return. This is partly because NGOs and the
UN often rely on government grants, at times competing with other NGOs
to repatriate refugees at the lowest possible cost, at the fastest possible
rate. But even NGOs who raise their own funds, such as OBI, continue
allocating their entire budget to repatriation, feeling pressure from refugees
who want to return as quickly as possible to avoid detention. Though
refugees have good reason to return quickly, NGOs have good reasons to
slow down return, freeing up resources for lobbying, and possibly dissuading
governments from detaining quite so many refugees. Such a policy shift for
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NGOs may mean fewer refugees can return, but fewer may want to, if
conditions improve in the host country.
When George called OBI in 2012, it might have implemented a diﬀerent
policy, in light of these conclusions. It is unclear that George's detention
was inevitable. The NGO might have done more to persuade the gov-
ernment to provide George residency right, or to provide greater residency
rights for South Sudanese nationals in general. OBI should also have waited
to facilitate this return, to see whether the government would eventually
free George, seeing that he had no way of going back.
For George, and millions of others, immigration control involves not just
force, but assistance. How organizations provide assistance can impact how
governments respond, and how refugees react. If we are to have a fuller
picture of what an ethical refugee policy would entail, we must shift our
focus away from the policeman who followed George home, and onto NGOs
who sit in small oﬃces, answering calls from refugees who feel they need
help returning, and quickly. While the urgency is clear, the best policy is
not.
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Chapter 4
Information*
In 2009 the director of OBI landed in Juba, and met with ministers in the
South Sudanese parliament. She then travelled to secondary towns, taking
photographs of clinics, markets, schools, and solid buildings. After sev-
eral weeks she ﬂew back to Israel and showed these images on Powerpoint
slides to South Sudanese refugees in community centres across the coun-
try, informing them that South Sudan had housing, security, free schools,
universal healthcare, and income-generating opportunities.1
By 2011 several dozen families accepted OBI's assistance to repatri-
ate. After return, most were without reliable shelter, medical care, regular
meals, or school. Most notably, they lacked clean water, instead drinking
from contaminated rural wells in villages, or streams that ﬂow through
mounds of waste in Juba. Some lived oﬀ the unreliable charity of distant
relatives, or the occasional kind stranger in teashops which dot the corners
of South Sudanese streets. While a small number started small businesses,
*This chapter is based on a manuscript that has been accepted for publication, subject
to minor revisions, in Res Publica.
1Interview with Bol, Juba, 21 December 2013; Interview with Nathaniel, Juba, 14
December 2013; Interview with Vanessa, Juba, 25 December 2013.
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they mostly failed. An unknown number were killed in ethnic-targeted
killings2 or illness,3 and the majority were displaced within two years.4
In the larger philosophical discussions on informed consent, it is widely
acknowledged that, if an agent is providing a high-risk oﬀer, she must
tell the recipient the known risks of accepting this oﬀer. A surgeon must
disclose known risks about surgery, a ﬁreworks manufacturer must disclose
known risks about ﬁreworks, and the military must disclose known risks
of joining the military. But though known risks must be disclosed, it is
not clear what risks must be known. OBI did disclose what it knew, but
perhaps it ought to have conducted more rigorous research than a short
ﬁeld visit in South Sudan.
To establish if this is true, we must establish when agents providing
high-risk oﬀers must work hard to learn about the risks of their oﬀers.
In some cases, it seems agents have no such duties. If I book a ﬂight to
Somalia, my airline needn't tell me the risks of my choice. While some
agents do have responsibilities to learn about risks, it is not clear when
such responsibilities arise.
This ambiguity has serious implications for repatriation, and has been
largely overlooked in broader debates on immigration ethics. These de-
bates overwhelmingly focus on when it is wrong to deport or detain an
immigrant, rather than misinform an immigrant.5 Throughout the past
2Mollie Gerver, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Repatriation
of Refuges, Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 31(1)(2014): 1-13.
3Yuval Goren (Hebrew) Aid organizations: More than 22 refugees expelled to South
Sudan killed this year, Maariv 5/6/13.
4Based on the testimonies of returnees and NGO aid workers.
5David Miller, Immigration: The Case for Its Limits, in (eds.) A. Cohen and C.
Wellman, Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing
2005: 193-206; Gibney 2004 ibid; Alexander Betts, Survival Migration: A New Protec-
tion Framework, Global Governance 16(2010):361-382; Javier Hidalgo, Resistance to
Unjust Immigration Restrictions, Journal of Political Philosophy 23(4)(2015):450-470.
91
three decades, misinformation has been a common reason for repatriation,
as seen in the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees to Uganda,
Iraq, and Afghanistan.6 In these cases, individuals returned who otherwise
would not have, had they known the risks. It remains unclear who has a
responsibility to disclose the risks, if anyone.
In the following sections 1 and 2 I will describe Misinformation Cases.
These cases arise when repatriation facilitators unintentionally provide false
information on conditions in countries of origin. I will argue that, when
certain conditions are met, facilitators are culpable for the resulting mis-
informed repatriation. In Section 3 I will then discuss related Omission
Cases, where facilitators omit information they ought to know, rather than
explicitly misinforming. I will argue that omitting unknown information
is generally wrong in the same types of instances where misinforming is
wrong. In Section 4 I will describe Relevancy Cases, where facilitators
fail to warn about the risks of repatriating, but where refugees claim they
would have accepted the oﬀer to repatriate regardless. In some such cases
facilitators still wrong those they fail to inform. Finally, there is an Intent
Question which cuts across the above three cases. If facilitators are un-
aware they are misinforming refugees, it seems they are not intentionally
misinforming refugees. If there is no intent, perhaps there is no wrong, or
6Arne Strand, Review of Two Societies: Review of the Information, Return
and Reintegration of Iraqi Nationals to Iraq (IRRINI) Program, Chr. Michelson
Institute. http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?4155=between-two-societies-
review-of-the-information. See also Helen Carr, Returning `Home': Experiences of
Reintegration for Asylum Seekers and Refugees, British Journal of Social Work (2014):
117 and Martha Walsh, Richard Black, and Khalid Koser, Repatriation from the Eu-
ropean Union to Bosnia Herzegovino: The Role of Information,in (eds.) Richard Black
and Khalid Koser, The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Recon-
struction, USA: Berghahn Books: 121; Anisseh Van England-Nouri, Repatriation of
Afghan and Iraqi Refugees from Iran, International Journal on Multicultural Societies
10(2)(2008):144-169.
92
a lesser wrong. I shall argue that, most of the time, this is not the case.
Before I begin, a brief note on my approach.
I shall primarily focus on establishing whether NGOs and oﬃcials are
culpable for misinformed repatriation. I shall assume that an individual is
culpable if two conditions are met. Firstly, they have failed to fulﬁl various
duties. Second, they have intent, in that they are aware of their actions,7
have control over their actions, and use this control to bring about certain
desired aims.8 In Sections 1-3, my focus will be on establishing when the
ﬁrst condition has been met: when facilitators have failed to fulﬁl any duties
to ﬁnd information. I shall generally assume the intent condition is met,
and only in Section 4 do I consider the objection that, even if facilitators
failed to fulﬁl their duties, they did not intend such failures, and so were
not culpable.
Though I focus on cases involving misinformation, coercion is highly
relevant to my discussion. I wish to explore whether, when it is morally
impermissible to coerce someone into accepting a service, then there is also
an obligation to ﬁnd information on the possible consequences of the ser-
vice. Of course, there is great disagreement in immigration ethics as to
when coercion is permissible, and so there may by extension be disagree-
ment as to when information must be found and disclosed. Some believe
states should only avoid deporting those ﬂeeing persecution, others believe
states should avoid deporting anyone whose life will be at risk, and still
others believe that states should never deport anyone.9 As in the last
7K. Setiya, Reasons Without Rationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press
2007: 24.
8Holly Smith, Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance, Criminal Law and Phi-
losophy 5(2)(2011):115-146, especially p. 14.
9These are just some of the possible stances. See Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and
Politics of Asylum, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004; Javier Hidalgo, Resistance to
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chapter, I will assume that states should not deport anyone who is ﬂeeing
life-threatening circumstances, so long as states have the capacity to ac-
cept such individuals. As before, my general theory on misinformation is
compatible with other theories, including the stance that only those ﬂeeing
persecution deserve protection, and the stance that nobody should be de-
ported. My focus is not on when coercion is wrong but whether, if coercion
is wrong because of the risks refugees will face, then information must be
disclosed on these risks prior to repatriation.
4.1 Misinformation
Misinformation Cases arise when an NGO or oﬃcial fails to gather a suf-
ﬁcient amount of data to determine the risks of repatriation. As a result,
they provide inaccurate information to refugees, and refugees come to be-
lieve a falsehood they otherwise would not believe, leading them to accept
repatriation they otherwise would not accept.
Such was the case in 1997 when the German government told Bosnian
refugees that they would receive housing, employment, and other services
upon return, none of which materialized.10 In 2003 UNHCR told Afghan
refugees living in Iran that it was safe to return, and refugees returned in
light of this information, immediately facing violent attacks on the bor-
Unjust Immigration Restrictions, (Forthcoming) Journal of Political Philosophy; David
Miller, Immigration: The Case for Its Limits in (eds.) A. Cohen and C. Wellman.
Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2005:
193206.
10Martha Walsh, Richard Black, and Khalid Koser, Repatriation from the European
Union to Bosnia Herzegovino: The Role of Information,in (eds.) Richard Black and
Khalid Koser, The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction,
USA: Berghahn Books: 121.
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der.11 A year later the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in
Norway told Iraqi refugees that there were income-generating activities in
Iraq. They returned as a result, and found few job opportunities, many
lacking food and shelter a year later.12 In Israel, the Ministry of Interior set
up a repatriation program in 2012, helping roughly 6,000 asylum seekers
repatriate either to Sudan and Eritrea, or accept resettlement to Rwanda or
Uganda. Here, too, refugees were provided inaccurate information, many
displaced after departing the country.13
One reason refugees may have little information prior to repatriation
is that they have never lived in their countries of origin as adults. Such
was the case when OBI helped South Sudanese return from Israel. Of
those I interviewed, seven subjects were from Unity State in South Sudan.
They had last been in Unity State as small children decades prior, and
failed to ﬁnd information on the risks of returning. While it was public
knowledge that approximately 140,000 had been displaced the year they
returned in 2012,14 an estimated death toll has never been publicized.15 I
also interviewed twenty-three subjects who returned to Upper Nile, three
to Abyei, and one to Warap State. All were returning to areas where tens of
11Anisseh Van England-Nouri, Repatriation of Afghan and Iraqi Refugees from Iran,
International Journal on Multicultural Societies 10(2)(2008):144-169.
12Arne Strand, Review of Two Societies: Review of the Information, Return
and Reintegration of Iraqi Nationals to Iraq (IRRINI) Program, Chr. Michelson
Institute. http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?4155=between-two-societies-
review-of-the-information.
13Galia Sabar and Elizabeth Tsurkov, Israel's Policies Towards Asylum Seekers, 2002-
2014, Istituto Aﬀari Internazionali Working Paper, 15 May 2015.
14BBC, Sudan's South Kordofan: `Huge Suﬀering from Bombs. 14/6/11
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13767146.
15Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, South Su-
dan: Casualties and Victim Assistance http://www.the-
monitor.org/custom/index.php/region_proﬁles/print_theme/2342#_ftn3; BBC,
South Sudan proﬁle http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14019202.
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thousands had been displaced a year prior, and at least hundreds had been
killed, but the precise number of displaced and killed remained unknown.16
Ten returning were from Jonglei, an area with slightly more complete data,
but still sparse. One estimate states that 200,000 were displaced in Jonglei,
and at least 2,700 civilians killed in 2011 to 2012, but the precise number
of deaths was never conﬁrmed.17 Seven returnees were from the town of
Akobo in Jonglei, where between 250 and 1,000 civilians were killed between
2011 and 2012, but the precise number never conﬁrmed. Importantly, the
total populations of Jonglei or Akobo have never been accurately counted
in a reliable census, so an individual refugee could not have known the odds
of being killed after returning.18
It was not just information on mortality rates that was missing. The
World Bank and the International Labour Organization oﬀer no unemploy-
ment statistics on South Sudan,19 and Médecins Sans Frontières cannot
provide precise statistics on the location of health clinics in South Sudan.
I asked subjects why they returned, given the unknown risks. Most
responded that it was precisely because they did not know the risks that
they returned. As Vanessa explains:
16Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global
Overview 2012: People Internally Displaced by Conﬂict and Violence  South Sudan,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/517fb0526.html; IOM South Sudan Annual Report 2012
https://www.iom.int/ﬁles/live/sites/iom/ﬁles/Country/docs/IOM_South_Sudan_Annual_%20
Report_2012.pdf; South Sudan: Cattle Raid in Warap State `kills 74'
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-16786869.
17Humanitarian Practice Network, Judith McCallum and Alfred Okech, Drivers of
Conﬂict in Jonglei State Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 57 (May 2013).
18According to the Sudanese 2008 consensus, the population was 1.2 million, but this
has been disputed. See website of the South Sudanese National Disarmament, Demobi-
lization, and Reintegration Commission: http://www.ssddrc.org/states/jonglei.html.
19World Bank, Unemployment, total (% of total labour force)
(modelled ILO estimate), downloaded on 15 June 2015 from
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS.
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I was in prison for six months in Israel. I didn't like it. If I don't
know what it's like in South Sudan, but I know I hated prison
in Israel, I would prefer to go to South Sudan. . . it might have
been worse, but it might have been better.20
Vanessa is from the Dinka tribe, but grew up among Nuer, and speaks
the languages of both tribes ﬂuently. Two years after her return, Dinka
militias came to her home, believing she was Nuer. She ﬂed, returning
two days later to ﬁnd her furniture and clothes stolen. When we come
home, she explains, people on the street look at us. They don't ask
questions. They don't know what tribe I'm from. Today, she does not
regret returning, but others do, wishing they had stayed in Israel, even if
this meant being detained, as they felt life in South Sudan was far more
diﬃcult than they expected.
When the OBI director began organizing returns, she was aware that
some might be uninformed. She felt the same when helping Sudanese
refugees ﬂy to Juba, and then onwards to Khartoum and Darfur in Sudan.
The government of Sudan has a policy of detaining and executing those
who have been to Israel, and many may not have been aware of how likely
this risk was. The OBI director also felt that she should not be the agent
determining who knew about risks, as she had a conﬂict of interest: She
wanted to impress donors by demonstrating that a large number of refugees
were returning, and this may have impacted her ability to objectively de-
termine informed consent. She hired HIAS instead. As noted in the last
chapter, HIAS had a history of lobbying for refugee rights, and so OBI
felt it could be trusted to critically evaluate if a refugee knew little about
South Sudan or Sudan. HIAS interviewed each refugee, and if it felt that
20interview with Vanessa, Juba, 25 December 2013.
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a refugee knew little about their rights in Israel, and little about South
Sudan or Sudan, it would tell this to OBI, who would then refuse to help
them repatriate.21
This policy was ultimately ineﬀective, as HIAS staﬀ appeared to know
little about South Sudan or Sudan, and so largely failed to determine if
individuals were uninformed about the risks of returning. The staﬀ's train-
ing manual has only a very short page on the history of South Sudan and
Sudan, and some information seems to lack any sources. For example, the
manual states, Although South Sudan...might not have the same services
as we have in Israel, their family is a signiﬁcant factor for positive men-
tal health. It was not clear this was the case. Many I interviewed after
return found their extended family unhelpful, and often emotionally harm-
ful, largely ignoring them on the road and in their homes. The manual
also states, Many applicants might not be aware of the entire situation
in Sudan. Instead, they might only know about the circumstances in their
village. This is OK. In reality, information about urban centres was es-
sential for refugees returning, as many villages lacked basic services and
employment.
To learn about the extent and content of misinformation, I asked all
subjects what information they recalled having prior to their return, how
they had this knowledge, and whether they felt the information was true
after returning. I then coded interviews for general categories of misinfor-
mation and the sources of this information.
The table on page 100 describes the ﬁndings from these interviews. The
Y-rows describe diﬀerent pieces of information provided to refugees, and the
X-rows describe the sources of this information, including the police, NGOs,
21HIAS Interview Form provided by HIAS in December 2012.
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the media, and other sources. As noted, thirty-six of 126 respondents recall
being told they would be detained indeﬁnitely if they stayed, when this was
unlikely for small children and mothers.22 Sixty-eight subjects recall being
told that South Sudan was a safe country. Almost a third were told this
by government oﬃcials, but nine said they were told this by OBI or a UN
oﬃcial, who never mentioned continuous internal ethnic-based ﬁghting.23
When interviewing subjects, I was aware that some respondents may
be misrepresenting what they were told prior to returning, because they
were disappointed with their return. While this was a possibility, it is
likely that most were telling the truth, as those who were satisﬁed with
their return recalled being told very similar misinformation to those who
were disappointed with their return. Furthermore, to conﬁrm the accuracy
of responses, I also interviewed repatriation facilitators themselves, asking
staﬀ members what they recall telling refugees prior to returning. Though
most recall saying nothing, in line with the policy of asking refugees to ﬁnd
information themselves, the OBI director recalled telling parents that their
children would be able to access free healthcare, available in secondary
towns.24 This was possibly the most problematic of the misinformation,
22Interview with Sigal Rosen, Tel Aviv, 9 December 2012.
23Jared Ferrie, More Than 200 Die in South Sudan Tribal Feud, Oﬃcial Says,
CNN, 12/3/12, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/12/world/africa/south-
sudan-violence/; Al Jazeera, `Hundreds dead' in South Sudan cattle raids, 22 August
2011; http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/08/201182220946583842.html;
See, for example, South Sudan: Violence against healthcare.
1 July 2014. http://www.msf.fr/actualite/publications/south-sudan-
conﬂict-violence-against-healthcare; Small Arms Survey, Fighting for
Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile, November 2011.
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/ﬁleadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-18-
Armed-insurgencies-Greater-Upper-Nile.pdf; Patients and Families Killed Outside
of MSF Compound. 29 November 2007. http://www.msf.org/article/patients-and-
family-members-killed-inside-msf-compound; Una McCauley. Separated Children in
South Sudan, Forced Migration Review 24 (2005).
24Interview with OBI Director, Jerusalem, 6 October 2010.
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as post-return illnesses were the most likely cause of death in the ﬁrst
two years. Of the roughly 500 South Sudanese children who repatriated
from Israel, aid organizations in Israel reported that at least seven died of
malaria within the ﬁrst three months, and at least twenty-two by the ﬁrst
year's end.25 Of the forty-eight children whose conditions I could conﬁrm,
three died from illnesses, representing over 6% of my sample. The actual
total percentage is most likely higher, given that I was unable to reach the
most remote areas with even poorer healthcare.
In addition to misinformation about healthcare, OBI would also misin-
form refugees about security, food, housing, and jobs, informing them that
all four were available. By 2014, I learned of one returnee killed in crossﬁre
during the war, and four killed because of their ethnicity, including two
children shot at gunpoint, aged three and ﬁve. There were most likely
more I never heard about, due to survivorship bias in my sample. Dis-
placement was also common, and of the 134 returnees whose conditions I
could conﬁrm,26 thirty-two were of the Nuer ethnic group, and all from this
group had ﬂed militias from the Dinka ethnic group. We might suppose
that the war was unpredictable ahead of time, but twenty-four of these
individuals suﬀered less from the war than the general poverty in South
Sudan, having no income or family support before ﬂeeing to IDP camps.
All lived oﬀ one meal per day, mostly consisting of corn meal, failing to
obtain the basic nutrients necessary for survival according to World Health
25Dimi Reider, Israeli Children Deported to South Sudan Succumb to Malaria,
972 Mag, 8/10/12, available at: http://972mag.com/israeli-children-deported-to-
south-sudan-succumb-to-malaria/57287/; Yuval Goren, (Hebrew) `Aid organizations:
Over 22 refugees expelled to South Sudan die within the ﬁrst year,' 5/6/12.
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/477/197.html.
26These included the 126 subjects who I interviewed.
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Organization standards.27 As of 2014, thirty-seven individuals were still
living in South Sudan, and not displaced, but nineteen had no income, and
also lacked food security. Twenty-ﬁve subjects had left South Sudan, and
only two of these individuals had an income. The remaining were without
basic medical care or food security.
For comparison, I also conducted interviews with individuals who re-
turned, or were about to return, to Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Togo, Colom-
bia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Their return had been partly facilitated
by IOM, which provided me their contact details.28 As with South Su-
danese who returned, I asked respondents what they recall being told prior
to returning, who told them this information, and whether this information
seemed true after they returned. I then coded the interviews for the types
of misinformation, the sources of information, and post-return conditions.
When comparing the data from all groups, including South Sudanese re-
turnees, I found that those groups which faced the poorest information prior
to returning also faced the most risks after returning. As noted in Table
4.2 on page 104, a large number of South Sudanese were misinformed prior
to returning, and a large number died or were living in extreme poverty
after returning. Those returning to Ethiopia, Nigeria, Guinea, Togo, and
Colombia were slightly less likely to be misinformed, and less at risk of
displacement and being killed. Those returning to Thailand were never
misinformed, and never displaced or killed. Due to the small sample, there
is a limit to how much we can conclude from this comparison, but even
27See a list of recent guidelines from the World Health Organization, as well as datasets
on food security by country: http://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/en/.
28IOM worked alongside a local NGO called the Centre for International Migration
and Integration (CIMI). Interview with CIMI Director, Jerusalem, 22 September 2011;
Interview with CIMI employee 1, Jerusalem, 23 September 2011; Interview with CIMI
employee 2, Berlin, 3 March 2011.
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within South Sudan there was a similar correlation between poor infor-
mation and the risks faced after returning. Those returning with more
information, especially from family members who had never left South Su-
dan, were the least likely to be displaced or without a job once they arrived
in their home towns or villages.
It is not clear why South Sudanese were less informed, but one obvious
reason is that they were returning to a more volatile country compared to
than those returning to other countries. Due to this volatility, it would
have been diﬃcult in 2011 to predict the future of South Sudan, and so
diﬃcult to gain accurate information. However, as noted above, most of
the respondents were misinformed not about unexpected events, such as
war, but about general poverty, food insecurity, and lack of healthcare, all
ongoing in 2011.
A more likely explanation for why South Sudanese were less informed is
that there was less available information on South Sudan, precisely because
it was risky to conduct research in the country. Even in my own research, I
was was far less likely to visit unsafe and remote areas, such as Bor, where
ethnic cleansing was especially widespread in 2011 and 2012, limiting my
research to the capital and safer secondary towns.
Given that refugees often did return with inaccurate information, it
remains unclear if repatriation facilitators ought to have found more infor-
mation. We might suppose refugees should be the agents responsible for
gathering information. But perhaps NGOs and oﬃcials have some respon-
sibilities themselves. Whether they do depends on a number of considera-
tions.
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Table 4.2: Misinformation and post-return conditions
South
Su-
danese
134
Nigeria,
Guinea,
Ethiopia,
Togo,
Colom-
bia
15
Thailand
and
the
Philip-
pines
15
Misinformation
about country-of
origin
68 2 0
Internal displace-
ment after return
32 0 0
Displacement to
other countries
25 2 0
Death from illness 3 0 0
Death from vio-
lence
5 0 0
Lack of food and
medical care
62 4 0
Yet to return 0 7 0
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4.2 The Duty to Know
Whether facilitators have a duty to know about risks is dependent, ﬁrstly,
on costs. If ﬁnding information is costless, then NGOs and oﬃcials ought
to ﬁnd this information. This is somewhat obvious, and outside the scope
of the diﬃcult cases described, but important to state, as NGOs like OBI
could have easily disclosed public data on health statistics and education
in South Sudan.29 When information is somewhat more diﬃcult to obtain,
NGOs and the UN may still have a duty of care, and so ought to ﬁnd
information. As argued in the previous chapter, NGOs and the UN were
created precisely to help vulnerable populations, and so should do more
than what is costless. Governments may similarly have a special duty to
protect refugees, and this may entail ﬁnding more information on the risks
of returning.
But governments and organizations may claim to have no such duty, and
merely a responsibility to protect those who choose to stay. In such cases
there may be three additional considerations. The ﬁrst two are relatively
weak, while the ﬁnal is strong.
The ﬁrst consideration concerns harm. Some argue that, if one is able to
ﬁnd information and does not, and this causes harm, then one is culpable
for the resultant harm.30 If I buy ﬁsh from a store that buys from a
producer that uses slave labour, and my buying the ﬁsh reinforces slavery,
29Andrew Green, Healthcare in South Sudan at a Crossroads, The Lancet
379(9826)(2012); Giorgio Cometto, Gyuri Fritsche and Egbert Sondorp, Health
sector recovery in early post-conﬂict environments: experience from south-
ern Sudan, Disasters 34(4)(2010):885-909; Tim Brown, `South Sudan Educa-
tion Emergency,' Forced Migration Review (supplement): 20-21. Available at
http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/ﬁles/FMRdownloads/en/FMRpdfs/EducationSupplement/13.pdf.
30Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Second edition, London: Macmillan 2005:
53-54.
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and I could have found this out, then I am partly blameworthy for my
ignorance.31 NGO or oﬃcials may similarly be causing harm through their
ignorance, misinforming refugees and causing them to repatriate to unsafe
countries.
But it is not clear that we are culpable whenever we fail to ﬁnd infor-
mation we are able to ﬁnd, if it is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd the information. If I
purchase ﬁsh, I may have a duty to read available research on labor condi-
tions in foreign countries, but it is not clear I must ﬂy to these countries in
the absence of full data. It is not enough to establish that misinformation
causes harm, but whether we have a duty to ﬁnd information to prevent
harm.
There is another consideration, which I also believe is of little help.
In the broader philosophical literature on consent, it is largely presumed
that, if information is costly and there is no duty of care, then agents
still have a duty to disclose relevant information they know.32 If I am
selling you my car, and I know it has faulty breaks, I should tell you this,
because I have access to this information and you do not. In the cases of
repatriation, though there is no asymmetry of information  all know little
about countries of origin  there is an asymmetry in the ability to obtain
new information. Governments, and often NGOs, have greater resources
than refugees, and are more able to ﬁnd information in areas that are
diﬃcult to reach.
This consideration may be relevant, but it would require demonstrating
31Christina Stringer, D. Hugh Whittaker and Glenn Simmons, New Zealand's Tur-
bulent Waters: the use of forced labour in the ﬁshing industry, Global Networks
16(1)(2016)3-24.
32Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer,Preface to a Theory of Consent Transactions:
Beyond Valid Consent in (ed) Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer, The Ethics of
Consent: Theory and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, p. 79-106: 96.
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that agents really do have greater duties to ﬁnd information when it is easier
for them to ﬁnd information. It is not clear that they do. If I am a car
mechanic selling you a car, and could run a test that you are not able to
run, it would seem unfair to claim I have a duty to run this test, while
another car owner, who is not a mechanic, would have no such duty when
selling you their car. Even if asymmetric knowledge is a reason to disclose
information one knows, it does not follow that asymmetric ability to obtain
knowledge creates a duty to know.
There is a more plausible and ﬁnal consideration.
We often have duties to know which are unrelated to informed consent.
Drivers, for example, have duties to avoid running others over, creating a
duty to look in their rear-view mirror to know if anyone is behind them.33
Similarly, drivers may have duties to inspect their car breaks annually, to
ensure they do not run anyone over. Sometimes, when we have a duty to
know information, this information happens to be information that, had
we known it, we would need to disclose in a subsequent transaction. If I
have my car inspected and learn the breaks are faulty, and I want to sell
you my car, I should tell you about the faulty breaks. It is not that I
must know about the breaks to tell you. Rather, I must know about the
breaks because I have a duty to not run anyone over, and once I know
this information, I have a duty to disclose it in a subsequent sale.34 If am
negligent, and fail to have my breaks inspected, and then sell you my car
without telling you about the breaks, it seems I am partly blameworthy for
33Holly Smith, The Subjective Moral Duty to Inform Oneself before Acting, Ethics
125(1)(2014):11-38.
34It is not that I have duty to know about the breaks in order to tell you; I had a
duty to know and, by chance, this information is the sort that I should disclose if I know
about it.
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your decision to buy my car without full information. It would seem a poor
excuse to tell you, I didn't know about the breaks! if I had a previous
duty to know about the breaks.
We may apply similar reasoning to repatriation. States in general have
duties to know about ethnic cleansing, famines, and genocides in foreign
countries, derived from their Responsibility to Protect others from great
harm, as outlined in the 2005 UN World Summit.35 States also must know
about suﬀering in other countries to help alleviate global inequalities, at
least to an extent. If governments have duties to know this information, and
have a duty to disclose what they know, then we may blame governments
for failing to tell refugees about the risks. For, though they did not know
about the risks, they ought to have known about the risks, due to their
other duties.
A government ministry in charge of immigration may also have duties
to know about countries of origin in order to establish who is a refugee
amongst those who do not wish to return. Ignorance about South Sudan,
for example, may have lead the Israeli Ministry of Interior to unjustly reject
asylum claims. If the ministry fails to ﬁnd information that is necessary
to fulﬁl these duties to ensure a fair asylum process, their ignorance may
be a poor excuse for their failure to disclose risks to refugees who want to
return. For, they ought to have known, for reasons related to their other
duties.
To clarify this point: I am not arguing that we have a duty to know
information derived from our duties to ensure informed consent. For, it is
35United Nations, The Responsibility to Protect, Outcome Document of
the 2005 United Nations World Summit, A/RES/60/1, para. 138-140,
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml.
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unclear when we have a duty to ensure informed consent, when ensuring
accurate information is costly. Rather, I am arguing that, when we have
duties to know derived from other duties, unrelated to informed consent,
then we ought to disclose this knowledge when it will help ensure informed
consent. If we don't have this information, we are acting wrongly towards
those we fail to inform.
Furthermore, I am not arguing that we should disclose all information
we have a duty to know to anyone who wants this information. If my jealous
neighbour asks about the breaks of my Lamborghini, but has no interest in
buying it, I have not wronged her when I incorrectly but unknowingly tell
her the breaks are perfect. For, were I to know about the faulty breaks, I
would have no duty to tell my neighbour about them. Rather, my argument
is that, when we have a duty to disclose information we know to a particular
person, it is not an excuse to say we didn't know, if we ought to have known.
This reasoning implies that there are limits to information that must
be sought. State oﬃcials may have no duty to know about ethnic cleansing
abroad if such research would place their own lives at risk, and so do
not wrong refugees if they fail to inform them. However, in such cases, if
oﬃcials are to provide information at all, they should provide it with a clear
disclaimer, informing refugees that there is insuﬃcient information to know
the full risks of return, because it is too dangerous to conduct research in
refugees' home countries. And when ﬁnding information is merely diﬃcult,
but not life-threatening, there remains a duty to ﬁnd information, and so
misinforming is wrong.
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4.3 Omission
This leaves open the question of whether it is permissible to not provide
any information at all. This question became relevant in 2008, when the
Norwegian government helped Iraqi nationals repatriate, never warning
them of the risks, such as the challenges of securing food and shelter after
returning.36 A similar case arose in 2010 when the government of Den-
mark helped Iraqi refugees repatriate, also never disclosing risks.37 More
recently, the UK government helped refugees return to Sierra Leone with-
out disclosing the risks of homelessness, common after return, and never
warned refugees returning to Sri Lanka about security concerns, with many
arrested, detained, and tortured after returning.38
In Israel, refugees were never informed that they could not re-enter
Israel once they left, as OBI staﬀ assumed they knew this.39 OBI and
HIAS also assumed refugees had information from family members about
South Sudan, or from their own memories. For this reason, HIAS never
disclosed information about violence in Unity State, Jonglei, and other
36Arne Strand, Review of Two Societies: Review of the Information, Return
and Reintegration of Iraqi Nationals to Iraq (IRRINI) Program, Chr. Michelson
Institute. http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?4155=between-two-societies-
review-of-the-information.
37Maria Helene Bak Riiskjaer, Circular repatriation: The unsuccessful return and
reintegration with refugee status in Denmark, Research Paper 165, New Issues in
Refugee Research, p. 7.
38Helen Carr, Returning Home: Experiences of Reintegration for Asylum Seekers
and Refugees, British Journal of Social Work 44(1)(2014): 1-17
39Interview with HIAS and OBI employee, Tel Aviv, 28 April 2012.
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areas,40 or information on healthcare and food insecurity.41
It was not completely unreasonable that HIAS assumed refugees could
rely on their families for information. Amongst those I interviewed, family
members were the best sources of information compared to other sources,
such as the media, government oﬃcials, and NGOs. Of the nine I inter-
viewed who found full employment after returning, eight had been told by
family members that there were jobs. However, it was also the case that,
of the nineteen who were told by family that there were jobs, eleven found
no employment, and lacked reliable shelter. Though families were the best
sources information, they were still not very good sources in absolute terms.
Before addressing whether it is obligatory to disclose risks, it is worth
noting that it seems clearly preferable that agents disclose risks, if they
already have a duty to ﬁnd information on these risks. Information can be
costly to obtain, but often free to disclose. When governments have duties
to know about certain conditions in other countries, it seems preferable that
they disclose this information to refugees, given that the act of disclosing
is costless.
But even if is preferable to disclose information, NGOs and govern-
40Jared Ferrie, More Than 200 Die in South Sudan Tribal Feud, Oﬃcial Says,
CNN, 12/3/12, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/12/world/africa/south-
sudan-violence/; Al Jazeera, `Hundreds dead' in South Sudan cattle raids, 22 August
2011; http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/08/201182220946583842.html;
See, for example, South Sudan: Violence against healthcare.
1/7/14, available at http://www.msf.fr/actualite/publications/south-sudan-
conﬂict-violence-against-healthcare; Small Arms Survey, Fighting for
Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile, November 2011.
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/ﬁleadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-18-
Armed-insurgencies-Greater-Upper-Nile.pdf; Patients and Families Killed Outside of
MSF Compound. 29/11/07, available at http://www.msf.org/article/patients-and-
family-members-killed-inside-msf-compound; Una McCauley. Separated Children in
South Sudan, Forced Migration Review 24 (2005).
41Training manual provided by HIAS in December 2012.
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ment may argue that omitting information is still permissible, or at least
less wrong compared to misinforming.42 To defend this claim, they might
appeal to two arguments. Both, I argue, are relatively weak.
The ﬁrst reason relates to causation. We might suppose that acts are
wrong, or especially wrong, if they are both necessary and suﬃcient for a
harmful outcome. If an agent misinforms a recipient of a service, rather
than merely omits information, then the recipient is likely to believe a false-
hood she did not believe before, and so the misinformation was necessary
for the false belief, and also suﬃcient if this misinformation alone explains
why the recipient held the false belief. Furthermore, if the recipient would
not have accepted the risky service had she not been misinformed, and this
misinformation was her only reason for accepting the risky service, then the
misinformation was also necessary and suﬃcient for the decision to accept
the risky service. In contrast, if a recipient already holds a false belief,
and a service provider merely omits information that would have corrected
this false belief, then this act of omission would not be suﬃcient for the
recipient's false belief; other factors, such the recipient's other poor sources
of information, were also necessary.
I do not believe this distinction is sound, because the act of misinforming
is also not suﬃcient for the resultant false belief. If a recipient is misin-
formed, one reason they believe this misinformation is because they are not
provided alternative information to correct this misinformation. As such,
the resultant false belief is the result of both the false information provided
by the service providers, in addition to information omissions from other
sources. Misinformation, in this sense, can be similar to omitting informa-
42James Edwin Mahone, Kant and Maria von Herbert: Reticence vs. Deception,
Philosophy 81(2006): 417-444.
112
tion. Just as information omissions only lead to false beliefs when there is
misinformation from another source, misinformation only leads to a false
belief when there are information omissions from another source. Omit-
ting information, as such, can be causally responsible in a similar manner
to misinforming.
There is a second reason omitting information may be less wrong. It
may be that a positive act is worse than a negative act, and the for-
mer worse than the latter. Killing, it is often claimed, is a positive act,
and worse than letting a person die, a negative act. Perhaps omitting
information is a negative act and so a lesser wrong.
To consider if this is true, we must have plausible deﬁnitions of pos-
itive and negative acts. Some argue that positive acts are more causally
related to upshots,43 but, as noted above, acts of omission can have the
same causal impact as positive acts.44 A more plausible deﬁnition of the
positive/negative distinction has been proposed by Jonathan Bennett, who
argues that an agent's act is positive if most of the other actions she could
have taken would not have lead to the upshot, and an act is negative if
most of the actions an agent could have taken would have still lead to the
upshot. If a doctor injects arsenic into a healthy patient, most of the other
things she could have done  stayed at home, gone for a stroll, read a book,
danced a jig, and so forth  would not have lead to the patient dying. As
such, she committed a positive act. In contrast, if the doctor failed to treat
an ill patient, then most of the acts she could have done  also stayed at
43Daniel Callahan, Killing and Allowing to Die, The Hastings Center Report Volume
19(1989).
44Frances Howard-Snyder, Doing vs. Allowing Harm, in (ed) Edward
N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition)
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/doing-allowing/>.
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home, gone for a stroll, and so forth  would still have lead to the patient
dying.45
Some have critiqued this conceptualization, raising a counter-example:
Martha is preparing to assassinate a man named Victor by shooting him.
Martha knows that a second assassin is waiting across the street and will
kill Victor if she doesn't. She could kill the second assassin, and let Victor
live, but she doesn't, instead shooting Victor. Bennett's theory would seem
to implausibly hold that Martha merely let Victor die in a negative act,
because most of the other acts she could have done  read a book, danced
a jig, and so forth  would had lead to the same upshot of Victor dying,
this time from the second assassin.46
I do not believe this counter-example, and other similar cases of pre-
emption, necessarily undermine Bennett's theory. Though there are many
other actions Martha could commit that would lead to the upshot of Victor
dying  read a book, danced a jig, and so forth  there are not many other
actions she could commit that would lead to the increased probability, in
her mind, of Victor dying. For, when she pulled the trigger, she could not
have known, 100%, that the second assassin would necessarily have pulled
45Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998. Bennett
ultimately concludes that his conceptual distinction does not provide a good normative
distinction. Though it seems to match our intuitions about which acts are positive, and
so more wrong, the distinction seems arbitrary. It is arbitrary whether most of the other
things we could have done would still have led to a harmful upshot. But I believe that
his distinction may have normative weight. Bennett seems to assume that, if we do not
have what seems like a good reason for viewing a distinction as important, than it is
unimportant, even if it seems intuitively to be important. As I noted in Chapter 2, where
I set out my methodology, we often revise principles to ensure they are consistent with
our intuitions. We should perhaps ensure positive and negative acts are distinguished
because that is the only way our principles can be consistent with our intuitions.
46Frances Howard-Snyder, Doing vs. Allowing Harm, in (ed.) Edward
N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doing-allowing/index.html#note-18.
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the trigger had she not. In this sense, had she not pulled the trigger, and
instead gone for a stroll, read a book, or danced a jig, then the upshot
would have been diﬀerent in her mind. It would have been a world with a
lower probability of Victor dying. Similarly, if misinforming the recipient
of a service increases the subjective probability that the recipient will be
misinformed, then misinformation is similarly a positive act, because most
of the acts the misinformer could have done  walked, read, danced, and so
forth  would not have lead to the perceived increased probability of the
recipient holding a false belief. In contrast, if an agent omits information,
then most of the other acts she could have done would have still lead to
the same probability of a misinformed recipient.
While Bennett's distinction helps explain why positive acts may be
worse than negative acts, it does not establish that misinformation is nec-
essarily worse than omitting information. In some cases, omitting infor-
mation can be a positive act, and so as wrong as misinforming. HIAS
kept records of the interviews it conducted, which the NGO provided to
me. There are moments in the transcripts where a refugee says she is re-
turning to South Sudan to access education, and moments where HIAS
says nothing in response, failing to tell the refugee that they will unlikely
have access to education. This moment of silence may be interpreted as
a communicative act, signalling to the refugee that her beliefs are correct.
Had the NGO not sat in silence and listened attentively, and instead never
spoken to a refugee at all, then a given refugee may have sought out further
information. If this true, then HIAS's silence at that particular moment
was a positive act: Most of the acts HIAS could have done instead, in-
cluding gone for a walk or danced a jig, would not have led to the upshot
of an increased probability of a false belief. Attentive and silent listening
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can be a form of information omission that serves as a positive act, and as
egregious as active misinforming.
There is a ﬁnal reason that positive acts may be worse than negative
acts. Many negative acts seem less wrong because negative acts tend to
be much harder to avoid compared to positive acts.47 It can be very dif-
ﬁcult to avoid the negative act of failing to treat a patient  that would
require treating the patient  but very easy to avoid the positive act of
injecting arsenic into a patient  that would require merely keeping the
arsenic at home. Because it is often demanding to ask that people refrain
from all sorts of negative acts  such as sending money to people in need
 then we often use negative acts as a proxy for what people are gener-
ally permitted to do, or for acts that are not as wrong. The same can
be said regarding omitting information. It can be relatively easy to avoid
misinforming someone. We can simply not open our mouths. In contrast,
it can be diﬃcult to avoid omitting accurate information, as this requires
actively ﬁnding information and disclosing it. For this reason, we may view
omitting information as less wrong.
Though the positive-negative distinction does often correlate with the
hard/easy distinction, it does not always correlate.48 Positive acts are
sometimes as easy to perform, or almost as easy, as negative acts. When
HIAS failed to tell refugees that there was widespread ethnic-based killings
in Unity State and Jonglei, it could have easily changed its actions by
searching the internet for death toll in Unity State and death toll in
Jonglei, relaying this information without great eﬀort. Importantly, even if
negative acts are not as wrong as positive acts, they can still be wrong. We
47Bennett 1998 ibid: 101-102
48Bennett 1998 ibid: 102.
116
can be blameworthy for the negative act that, though costly to save, would
be a cost expected of us to bear, given our unique position, or our earlier
commitment to help. If governments and NGOs ought to have information,
and ought to disclose information they know, then we expect them to bare
the costs of ﬁnding information and disclosing it. If they don't, they may
be acting wrongly, even if slightly less wrongly than actively misinforming.
4.4 Relevancy
Until now, the examples I raised concerned NGOs or oﬃcials who misin-
formed, or failed to inform, and this lead refugees to return who would
have otherwise stayed. There are instances where refugees would have ac-
cepted repatriation even if they had not been misinformed. In such cases,
the misinformation turned out to be irrelevant, and so it is not clear if an
NGO or oﬃcial committed a wrong.
Consider the case of Stephen, a father of three who was approached by
OBI in 2012. The organization told him it was safe in South Sudan, but he
knew this was not the case, having lived in South Sudan relatively recently.
He wanted to return despite the risks, and so accepted OBI's assistance,
boarding a ﬂight for Juba with his wife and children in 2012, hoping to
start a business when he landed. Within a year he had established a small
cleaning and maintenance company, which earned enough to support his
family. On December 14th, 2013, Stephen went to work managing cleaners
at the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement's (SPLM) annual congress.
Towards the evening, members of the Presidential Guard opened ﬁre on
each other, and Stephen dropped to the ground, crawled to the entrance,
and ran home. The next morning, peering out his window at sunrise, he
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saw eleven small children, and two young men, taken out of their houses
by soldiers, lined up, and shot dead. He told his wife and three children
to exit with him through their back door, and they ran, arriving at the
UN's Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp, where they remained as of
2014.49
Even after ﬂeeing to the camp, Stephen said that OBI's poor knowledge
of South Sudan did not bother him, because he himself knew the risks, and
returned regardless. He does not regret his choice50 and so, perhaps by
chance, OBI did no wrong, or a lesser wrong.
Consider, also, the case of Yasmin. Unlike Stephen, she had no accurate
information when she returned, and upon reaching her home village in
Aweil she was surprised and disappointed to ﬁnd no reliable clean water,
no free education, and no safety for her children. She says that she would
have returned even if she had been given more information. She runs a
restaurant today, and is happy to be close to her family.51
In both of these cases, there is a question concerning relevancy. On
the one hand, we might believe that OBI's failure to give both returnees
accurate information meant it failed to ensure they gave their informed
consent. Even if Stephen and Yasmin would have returned regardless, OBI
did not know this, and so should have worked harder to ﬁnd and disclose
information about the risks. But though it seems OBI should have acted
diﬀerently, we might believe in moral luck: Stephen happened to know
about the risks, and Yasmin happened to not care. By chance OBI did no
wrong, because neither Stephen or Yasmin returned due to misinformation.
49Interview with Stephen, Juba, 6 January 2014; conﬁrmed in interviews with other
witnesses.
50ibid.
51Interview with Yasmin, Aweil, 30 March 2012.
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They returned for other reasons  Stephen to start a business, and Yasmin
to be close to her family. Though they were misinformed by OBI, they
gave their informed consent.
Even if we believe in moral luck, there are reasons to believe that Yas-
min, in particular, failed to give her informed consent. She says today she
would have returned, but this may partially be because she cannot turn
back time, and so feels she may as well be happy with her decision. Had
Yasmin been told information while still in Israel, she may not have re-
turned even if, today, she says she would have returned. For, in general,
we often form preferences for our current conditions which we cannot es-
cape.52 As such, our current preferences for our past actions are not good
indicators of whether we would have consented in the past, had we been
better informed. This is less of a concern for Stephen, because we know
that he would have returned even if OBI had given him more information,
because he had this information before return, and still returned.
Let us say, though, that we trust Yasmin. She says she would have
returned had she been better informed, and her words should be taken at
face value. She really did miss her family, and this would have given her
a decisive reason to return even if she had been given more information.
If this is true, we might claim that she was not wronged. For, though
she did not give her actual consent, she gave her hypothetical consent.
In general, hypothetical consent is often suﬃcient for an intervetion to be
permissible. A coma patient is not wronged if they undergo treatment, so
52In general, when our options are constrained, we may prefer the options we have
because we have little other choice. See Joseph Fishkin, Bottlenecks: A New Theory of
Equal Opportunity Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014: 16. We also often take steps
to aﬃrm our past choices, feeling this will make our lives go better than if we lived with
regret. See R. Jay Wallace, The View from Here: On Aﬃrmation, Attachment, and the
Limits of Regret Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013: 66.
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long as they likely would have consented to the treatment had they capacity
and full information.53 Similarly, citizens are not wronged, some claim, if
governments use some levels of coercion, so long as citizens would have
consented to such coercion, had they been fully informed and suﬃciently
rational.54 Even if actual consent is preferable, hypothetical consent still
indicates a lesser wrong, or no wrong, because at least the intervention
promoted the aims and desires of those who would have consented. Yasmin
did not consent, but repatriation promoted her desire to be close to her
family, and so she experienced a lesser wrong, or no wrong at all.
There are two reasons why this reasoning fails. The ﬁrst is that hypo-
thetical consent does not lessen a wrong if actual consent is possible. This
is because, without actual consent, the recipient lacks control over her
choices. If an individual lacks information on the risks of various choices,
then she is not truly aware of what these choices are, and so cannot de-
liberate on what is best for her, and so cannot truly control the way her
life unfolds. It is wrong to deny another person control over their lives
even if we know they would have chosen the same life regardless. Were
we to deny them control, then we would disrespect them, treating them as
53Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, The Philosophical Quar-
terly 37(1987): 139.
54Diﬀerent theorists raise diﬀerent counterfactuals. For Rawls, the relevant question
is what citizens would consent to, if they were both rational, with capacity, and with
information on general human economics and psychology, but under a veil of ignorance
about their particular position in society. In Just War Theory, the use of hypothetical
consent has also been evoked. For example, Jeﬀ McMahan has argued that, when states
decide whether to engage in humanitarian interventions in foreign countries, they must
obtain the consent of the victims and, when this is not possible, they must consider what
the victims would likely consent to, were we able to ask them. See John Rawls, A Theory
of Justice, New York: Oxford University Press 1971 and Jeﬀ McMahan, Humanitarian
Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality, in (eds.) N. Ann Davis, Richard Keshen,
and Jeﬀ McMahan, Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan
Glover, New York: Oxford University Press 2010.
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humans not worthy of making a choice for themselves. In a useful example
illustrating this point, Daniel Groll imagines a patient telling a doctor that
she does not consent to life-saving surgery. The doctor then thinks for a
few hours, returns to the patient, and tells him, After thorough delibera-
tion, I have taken into account what you told me, and concluded that I will
not perform the surgery. Such an attitude seems wrongly paternalistic,
even if the doctor is helping the patient achieve her desires and aims.55 A
similar phenomenon is occurring when we rely on hypothetical consent to
determine wrongdoing in cases of misinformation.
Some may reject this line of reasoning, believing that recipients of ser-
vices do not truly lack control over their choices if these choices are consis-
tent with their desires and aims. At the very least, they have some control,
and so a lesser wrong has occurred. Even if we accept this as true, and
hold that hypothetical consent indicates no wrong or a lesser wrong, there
is reason to believe that Yasmin did not even give her hypothetical consent.
When considering if a person would hypothetically consent, it is nec-
essary to establish an appropriate counterfactual. To do this, we must
consider what it is we value. I assume we value information, which is why
we ask what a person would have consented to, had they been informed.
But if we value information, we don't only value information on services
oﬀered to us. We also value information on the character of the service
provider. When I consent to surgery, I want to know both about the risks
of the surgery, and to know my surgeon is honest and informed about the
risks herself. If my surgeon tells me an operation has no risks, and af-
ter the operation I learn that it actually entailed signiﬁcant risks, I would
feel wronged. I would think, Had I known the surgeon was providing
55Daniel Groll, Paternalism, Respect, and the Will, Ethics 122(4)(2012): 692-720.
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me misinformation, I would have chosen a diﬀerent surgeon who was more
forthcoming about these risks, even if I still would have chosen to undergo
the same operation.
If so, then the relevant counterfactual in hypothetical consent is not a
world where a person is informed by others; it is a world where a person is
both informed and aware others are misinforming them. This counterfac-
tual better captures the full range of information we value: the information
on the risks of the service itself, and information on the type of agent the
service provider is. We care about the type of agent the service provider
is because we want to know if they are negligent about fulﬁlling the re-
sponsibilities of their position, as this can help us determine how much
we trust them, and how competent they are. This can also help us deter-
mine how much we want to support them by endorsing their services. If I
know a surgeon is not disclosing risks, I would want to signal to others the
incompetence of the surgeon by not consenting to her providing surgery.
Even if refugees would have returned had they been fully informed, this
does not mean they would have returned through a particular NGO or
government oﬃcial, had they known that this NGO or oﬃcial was misin-
forming them. Indeed, some refugees refused to return via OBI precisely
because they were upset about the misinformation provided by OBI, and
the fact that OBI omitted risks. A man name Bok, frustrated by OBI's
powerpoint slides, paid for his own ﬂight and managed his own logistics.
He did not want to support an NGO that failed to warn about risks, and
did not trust the NGO to have his best interests in mind.56
In Stephen's case, we needn't ask what he would have done had he
known he was misinformed. In reality, he knew he was being misinformed,
56Discussion with Bok, Juba, 1 January 2013.
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and this did not bother him enough to refuse OBI's services. In Yasmin's
case, we do not know if she would have returned, had she known that OBI
was misinforming her. She may say today that she would have returned,
but we cannot know what she would have truly done at the time. We must
take her memories at face value for this consideration as well. And the
more we rely on memories, the less we are certain that information really
was irrelevant.
In general, we cannot travel back in time to a counterfactual world and
see how refugees would act, had they been given accurate information. As
such, it is diﬃcult to establish what information was irrelevant. To be
safe, NGOs and government oﬃcials should change their policies to ensure
information is available to all refugees, and should be held accountable for
failing to disclose information, even if the risks seem irrelevant. For, more
generally, it is diﬃcult to establish what an individual would do if they had
both known the risks and knew their service provider did not know these
risks. The more precise the counter-factual, the more diﬃcult to imagine
precisely what would have happened, and the less we can know if there was
hypothetical consent.
4.5 Intent
When NGOs and oﬃcials speak with refugees, they rarely know they are
misinforming or omitting information. If they are not aware of their ac-
tions, and awareness is a necessary condition for intent, they did not in-
tend to misinform. If intent is necessary for blameworthiness, they are not
blameworthy for misinforming.
This is not to claim that all agree that intent is important. According
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to some theorists, one can be blamed for lacking morally important desires
or motives if this leads to acts with harmful outcomes, even if one is not
aware one is causing harmful outcomes.57 If I lack compassion for the
poor, and fail to think about their plight, and so fail to help them, I may
be blameworthy for my failure to help them, even if I am not aware that
I fail to help them. Similarly, if oﬃcials fail to inform refugees of the risks
because they lack a desire to help refugees, they may be blameworthy for
failing to have the desire to help refugees, and so blameworthy for failing
to inform refugees. This would be true even if they are not aware they are
misinforming and not aware that they lack important virtuous desires.
Others argue that the only condition for blameworthiness is foreseeabil-
ity, or what a reasonable person could foresee. Foreseeability refers to the
likelihood that one's actions will causally contribute to a harmful upshot,
regardless of whether one intended this upshot.58 NGOs and oﬃcials are
blameworthy in this sense, if it is true that a reasonable person could fore-
see that failing to ﬁnd information would increase the probability of an
uninformed repatriation.
But there are a range of deontological theories that view intent as either
necessary for blameworthiness, or a property that increases blameworthi-
ness. To have intent, two conditions must be fulﬁlled. First, one must be
in control of one's actions.59 To be in control, one must be aware of what
57Holly Smith, Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance, Criminal Law and Phi-
losophy 5(2)(2011): 115-146; Michael Slote, Morals from Motives, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2001.
58For versions of this approach, see Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1998 and Frank Jackson, What Eﬀects? in (ed.) Jonathan Dancy,
Reading Parﬁt, Blackwell Wiley 1997.
59Neal Tognazzini and D. Justin Coates, Blame, in (ed) Edward N.
Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/blame/.
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one is doing. If one is not aware of what information is true, then one is
not aware one is misinforming or omitting information. Second, to have
intent one must have a particular aim in mind.60 If one intends to omit
information, then one chooses to keep one's mouth closed with the aim of
never uttering this information. It is not clear NGOs or oﬃcials had any
such thoughts when keeping their mouths closed, and so had no intent.
Such was seemingly the case when HIAS misinformed or failed to inform
refugees. The NGO was not aware it was misinforming or omitting infor-
mation, and so not in control of its actions, or having any particular aim in
its actions. This was also the case when UNHCR helped Afghan refugees
in Iran return home in the 2000s. After returning refugees faced regular
attacks from warlords, drug dealers, and Taliban resurgent groups,61 but
the UN agency was not aware of this, because it never interviewed those
who returned.62 Subsequent refugees who wanted to return were told by
UNHCR that it was safe, or never told any information at all, because the
agency was not aware of the risks until the late 2000s. Similarly, when
the German government gave misinformation to Bosnian refugees in the
1990s, the government did not know it was misinforming them because, as
a matter of policy, it did not conduct post-return evaluations. Even if mis-
informing and omitting information is wrong without intent, it seems worse
with it, a form of deception or recklessness, rather than a mere oversight.63
60Holly Smith, The Subjective Moral Duty to Inform Oneself before Acting, Ethics
125(1)(2014): 14.
61Anisseh Van Engeland-Nourai, "Repatriation of Afghan and Iraqi Refugees from
Iran: When Home is No Longer Home," International Journal on Multicultural Societies
10(2008)(2): 158.
62Helen Morris and Michael Salomons, Diﬃcult Decisions: A review of UNHCR's
engagement with Assisted Voluntary Return programs, UNHCR Policy Development
and Evaluation Services July 2013.
63James Edwin Mahone, The Deﬁnitions of Lying and Deception,
in (ed.) Edward N. Zalta, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2015,
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In the above instances, it may be true that misinformation is uninten-
tional, but there may still be wrongful intent. Sometimes an unintentional
act can be blameworthy because it is the result of an earlier intentional act.
A doctor may unintentionally fail to tell a patient about the risks of an op-
eration, because he is not aware of these risks, but he may be unaware of
the risks because, earlier, he intentionally failed to read the latest medical
journals. In such cases, the doctor is blameworthy because, earlier, he had
a duty to read the latest medical journals and intentionally failed to.64
There is some evidence that repatriation from Israel involved similar
earlier intent. The director of HIAS, when asked why he never disclosed
risks, responded that he was not aware there were risks to disclose, because
he never conducted research on South Sudan, assuming refugees already
had suﬃcient information.65 His later action of unintentionally omitting
risks can be traced back to his earlier intentional act of not ﬁnding out
about these risks. The government also founded a repatriation program
in 2012 and, as noted, by 2015 it had helped over 6,000 refugees depart
Israel, facing displacement and poverty after departing.66 The Israeli civil
servant heading the scheme never warned refugees of the risks because
he, too, was not aware that there were any risks to disclose. He was not
aware of these risks because he never bothered to learn about them, and
he intentionally never bothered to learn about them, feeling this would
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lying-deﬁnition/; Holly Smith, Negligence in
(ed.) Hugh LaFollette, The International Encyclopaedia of Ethics, Wiley-Blackwell
2013.
64Holly Smith, Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance, Criminal Law and Phi-
losophy 5(2)(2011):115-146.
65Interview with Director of HIAS-Israel, Jerusalem, 11 December 2012.
66None of those resettled gained refugee status, from the best of our knowledge. See
Galia Sabar and Elizabeth Tsurkov, Israel's Policies Towards Asylum Seekers, 2002-
2014, Istituto Aﬀari Internazionali Working Paper, 15 May 2015.
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be patronizing67 to refugees, who were capable of ﬁnding information
themselves. As with HIAS, he unintentionally omitted information because
he had earlier intentionally never found information.
We might claim that it is not enough to consider if an act can be traced
back to an intentional earlier act. It matters what, precisely, the earlier
intent was. If the earlier act of failing to ﬁnd information was done with
good or neutral intentions, then the act was not quite so wrong, and so
the subsequent omitting information not quite so blameworthy. We might
suppose that HIAS and the civil servant both had only good intentions,
as neither had the aim of encouraging unsafe returns. The HIAS director
only failed to ﬁnd information out of a belief that refugees were capable
of ﬁnding information themselves. The civil servant only failed to ﬁnd
information to avoid being patronizing.
But there are reasons to believe that both these intentions can be traced
back to even earlier wrongful intentions. The HIAS director may have
believed refugees had their own information, but he still chose to never
validate this belief. The director did not just intentionally neglect to ﬁnd
information on South Sudan; he intentionally failed to ﬁnd out if his belief
about refugees' knowledge was correct. And we do not know why the
HIAS director intentionally failed to ﬁnd out if his belief about refugees'
knowledge was correct. It may be that his intentions were to encourage
return. It so, then his ultimate intentions were wrongful.
Unlike the HIAS director, the civil servant's intentions were not based
on any failure to ﬁnd out about refugees' knowledge. Many refugees really
may have felt patronized if they learned that the government was gathering
information on their country, rather than relying on refugees' own knowl-
67Interview with AVR oﬃcial, Tel Aviv, 7 August 2013.
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edge. As such, we may think the civil servant's intentions were not based
on a false belief, and so he cannot be blamed for intentionally failing to
ﬁnd out if any belief about refugees' knowledge was correct. But even if
his reasons were to avoid being patronizing, reasons can be derived from
other reasons. The civil servant perhaps chose to avoid being patronizing
so that more would be misinformed, so that more would return. If so, then
his ultimate intention was not to avoid being patronizing, but to encourage
unsafe returns.
The above analysis is limited by the fact that we cannot know the
intentions of other agents. It is impossible to read the minds of NGO
employees and civil servants to learn about the reasons for their actions.
Nonetheless, we can still ﬁnd evidence of wrongful intent, if not decisive
certainty. The policy of the Israeli government, as of 2014, was to promote
civil servants based on how many refugees returned under their watch. As
such, the civil servant had an interest in more refugees repatriating, to meet
his annual targets. OBI similarly had such an interest, to impress donors
who expected their donations to contribute to repatriation. HIAS may
have seemed more neutral, but it received money from OBI for its work,
and may have felt pressure from OBI to claim a refugee was informed to
meet OBI's targets. Even if we cannot know the intentions of staﬀ members
and civil servants, we can at least conclude that there should be no annual
targets that must be met, removing one reason to misinform, and so one
reason to intentionally misinform.
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4.6 Conclusion
When the director of OBI travelled throughout South Sudan and took pho-
tographs along the way, she could have read independent reports on the
country, and interviewed more refugees who had already returned. Had she
done this, she could have told refugees in Israel that there were few clinics,
schools, or reliable policemen and soldiers in South Sudan. Instead, she
assured her audience that the South Sudanese government was prepared
to help them, and that all was stable. When service providers like OBI
unknowingly provide false information, they may be acting impermissible,
even if they do not know they are misinforming. For, as an organization
created to help vulnerable populations, it ought to work hard to ﬁnd infor-
mation.
This much is obvious. What is less obvious is whether repatriation
facilitators have duties to ﬁnd information when they claim to have no
special duties towards the refugees they help return.
I argued that, when agents have no duties to ﬁnd information to ensure
informed consent, they must still disclose relevant information they already
know. And in some cases, they ought to already know information, because
this information is relevant for their other duties, unrelated to informed
consent. If I have a duty to not run anyone over, and this creates a duty
to inspect my breaks, and I don't, and sell you my car without informing
you of the breaks, I have wronged you. For, the information I omitted was
the sort I would have needed to disclose had I known it, and I ought to
have known it. If states have general duties to help prevent poverty and
atrocities abroad, and have a duty to determine who is a refugee, then they
have a duty to gather information on poverty, atrocities and persecution
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abroad. If states have a duty to know about such conditions, then failing
to know about them is a poor excuse for failing to warn refugees about to
return.
In some cases, refugees are misinformed, return, but say they would have
returned even if they had been better informed. In such cases, we might
suppose facilitators have not wronged refugees, because the misinformation
was irrelevant. To determine relevancy in informed consent, it is not enough
to consider if recipients of a service would have consented had they been
informed; we must consider if the recipients would have consented, had
they known they were being misinformed at the time of the service. This
is because, when we consent to a high-risk service, we have a right to
know if the service providers are ignorant of key facts, to know if we trust
them. Information is not only useful to provide facts about a service, but
to provide facts about the provider of the service, including her knowledge
and competency.
Some refugees may claim they would have returned even if they knew
they were misinformed prior to repatriating. But these refugee may be
happy with their decision because they cannot change it. If they failed to
give their valid consent prior to returning, their return should be viewed
as possibly involuntary even if, by chance, they do not mind today.
In many such cases, NGOs and oﬃcials do not known they are misin-
forming when they misinform. They may still be intentionally failing to
ﬁnd information. Even when these intentions seem pure, such as an NGO
that assumes refugees are already aware of the risks, this assumption  that
refugees are aware of the risks  is also based on false information. If NGOs
and oﬃcials intentionally fail to ﬁnd out how knowledgeable refugees re-
ally are, because they wish to encourage repatriation, then their ultimate
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intentions are wrongful.
To avoid misinformed consent, repatriation facilitators should institute
a number of policy changes. First, they should ensure that resources are
available for more accurate research on the potential consequences of repa-
triation. This would entail learning about the conditions of refugees who
have already returned. Today, the UN explicitly states that it lacks the
capacity to conduct such post-return research.68 This may be because the
current budget is earmarked for repatriation itself, paying for the transport
of hundreds of thousands of refugees annually. Funds should be shifted from
maximizing the number who return, towards maximizing the information
available before return. The UN and NGOs should interview a substantial
sample of past returnees, selected as randomly as possible, to determine
how many were likely displaced, killed, or unable to access basic necessities
after repatriating.
Such research should not only include a large number of subjects, but
should account for survivorship bias. It is not enough to call refugees and
interview those who answer their cell phones, because those who are killed
will never answer, and those who have ﬂed less likely to, having left to
a diﬀerent country with a diﬀerent cell phone, or an IDP camp without
electricity to charge their phones. To counteract such bias, facilitators
should interview friends and family members of those who returned, to ﬁnd
out if they have been killed. Facilitators should also interview returnees
without cell phone access in rural areas and refugee camps, ensuring that
those who ﬂed are included in the sample. The ﬁndings from such research
68Helen Morris and Michael Salomons, Diﬃcult Decisions: A review of UNHCR's
engagement with Assisted Voluntary Return programs, UNHCR Policy Development
and Evaluation Services July 2013.
131
should then be clearly communicated to refugees considering returning.
In communicating such ﬁndings, repatriation facilitators should also
clarify the limitations of their research, including survivorship bias that is
diﬃcult to completely mitigate. For example, if NGOs explain that 2% of
returnees in a sample were killed, they should explain that the mortality
rate amongst this sample is likely lower than amongst the total population
of returnees. In addition to communicating bias in sampling, facilitators
should also avoid bias in communication. Today, when NGOs provide
information on their websites, they publish success stories, accompanied
with photographs of smiling returnees.69 NGOs rarely describe in detail
the conditions of those less successful, instead using vague phrases such as,
People in Afghanistan have reported concerns about security.70 To en-
courage refugees to consider all information, NGOs should resist including
only photographs of successful refugees, and should include personal sto-
ries and statistics on those who were displaced or killed. More generally,
facilitators should spend more time warning refugees of potential problems,
rather than opportunities. Given that repatriation is irreversible and po-
tentially unsafe, precaution should be the primary goal, ensuring refugees
are aware of what may happen to them if they go back.
One of the reasons that facilitators fail to ﬁnd information may be that
they have an interest in more returning. In general, agents ﬁnding informa-
tion on risky services should not be the same agents who have an interest
in encouraging the promotion of these services. This approach is already,
at least in theory, applied in medicine, with most countries demanding that
69Refugee Action, Stories of Return, www.choices-avr.org.uk; IOM, Assisted Vol-
untary Return and Reintegration: At a glance, 2015.
70Refugee Action, Afghanistan, www.choices-avr.org.uk.
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independent researchers determine if medication is safe, ensuring these re-
searchers have no interest in maximizing the sale the medication under
trial. The same approach should be adopted for repatriation. Civil ser-
vants tasked with ﬁnding information on the risks of returning should not
be promoted based on how many refugees they return, nor should NGOs
receive grants based on how many return. If there is to be any method of
promotion or support, it should be based on how satisﬁed and informed
refugees feel after returning.
Despite hundreds of thousands of refugees repatriating annually, none
of the above policies have been implemented. As a result, many return and
soon regret doing so, ﬁnding themselves again displaced, without asylum,
or without basic food and clean water. Just as preventing coerced returns
is essential, so is ensuring informed returns.
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Chapter 5
Regret
As Mol boarded his ﬁght in 2012, he was fully informed about the risks, but
by 2013, he regretted taking them. That year, nine days before Christmas,
six armed men followed him home. As he reached his front gate to his Juba
home, they approached him from the side.
What tribe are you? they asked him.
Why are you asking me? he responded.
One of them grabbed him, but he managed to pull away, and ran to a
UN Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp.1
Twenty-nine years earlier, Mol was a young boy studying in an elemen-
tary school in Maiwut, a small town in southern Sudan. One morning,
militias arrived at his school, he ﬂed out the back door, took a bus to
Khartoum, a train to Wadi Halfa, and a boat to Egypt, eventually crossing
over into Israel as an adult, where he was given temporary protection from
deportation, but no work visa. Though he managed to survive by ﬁnding
a job on the black market in Tel Aviv, in 2012 immigration authorities
1Interview with Mol, Juba, 30 December 2013.
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warned him that he would be detained if he did not repatriate to South
Sudan. He asked OBI for help returning. Staﬀ members warned him that
there was widespread food insecurity and ethnic violence in South Sudan,
and that most past returnees regretted their choice to return, and he likely
would as well.2 He insisted that he still wished to return, and the NGO
provided him with a free ﬂight and $1,500.
He landed in Juba soon after, opened a small tea shop, made a decent
income, and was happy with his decision to return until, nine days before
Christmas, he was again displaced. His IDP camp lies near a military
base, where soldiers occasionally ﬁre at camp residents. He has no access
to food, as the camp provides no food aid for adults, and he fears venturing
outside because his ethnicity is clear from the tribal Nuer scars on his fore-
head. When I visited him, latrines in the camp were overﬂowing, dysentery
spreading, and Medicines Sans Frontiers evacuating.3 Today, if Mol could,
he would go back in time, reject the help of the NGO, and instead live in
Israel, even if this meant living in detention.
Should OBI have helped Mol repatriate, given that his regret was likely?
More generally: Do we have reason to deny someone a service, if they
will likely regret accepting this service?
When I write reason I refer to a fact that gives Agent A a normative
pro-tanto reason to deny a service to Agent B. When I write service I
refer to an irreversible oﬀer provided by Agent A to Agent B involving
2Thousands of civilians had been killed between 2011 and 2012 because they were
Dinka, Nuer, Barri, or Shilluk, depending on the region one was in. See Human Rights
Watch, Southern Sudan: Abuses on Both Sides of Upper Nile Clashes, 19/4/2011,
available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/19/southern-sudan-abuses-both-sides-
upper-nile-clashes; Mollie Gerver, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the
Repatriation of Refuges, Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 31(1)(2014): 1-13.
3After I left in January 2014, they returned.
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resources, actions, or opportunities, where A uses no force on B, and where
A's intentions in providing the service are to enhance B's autonomy or,
at least, not undermine such autonomy. I am not interested in whether
forced intervention is justiﬁed to prevent regret, but whether voluntary
oﬀers should be denied to prevent regret.
This issue, pertinent for repatriation, is relevant for a range of scenarios.
A hospital may ﬁnd that most patients regret accepting a given treatment.
An abortion clinic may learn that most women regret receiving an abortion.
A philosophy department may learn that most students regret enrolling in
a PhD program. In these cases and many more, it is often possible to
predict that future recipients of a service will feel similar regret. It remains
unclear what the moral status if this future regret is.
We might suppose that regret is never itself a relevant reason to deny
a service; when we predict an individual will feel regret, we are predicting
they will experience painful or welfare-reducing outcomes, and it is these
outcomes alone that give us reason to deny a service. Surely Mol's fu-
ture displacement and poverty was reason enough to deny him repatriation
assistance. In the following Section 1 I refute this claim: Regret can be
an independent reason to deny a service, separate from reasons related to
painful or welfare-reducing outcomes, even when one feels regret because
of these outcomes. I raise the case of Mol precisely to demonstrate this
point.
Though I shall claim that regret is sometimes a reason to deny a service,
it is not always a reason. Many women regret having abortions, but this
does not seem like a reason to deny an abortion.4 Indeed, no country in the
4Kate Greasley, Abortion and Regret, Journal of Medical Ethics 38(2012): 705-711.
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world  with the exception of the United States5  denies abortions solely
based on predicting a woman's future regret. In Section 2 I will argue that
regret is only a reason to deny a service if four conditions are met, and these
conditions are not met in most life choices. In section 3 I will address cases
where individuals will likely regret accepting an oﬀer but, if they reject
the oﬀer, they will likely regret this choice as well. In such cases, it is not
clear how service providers, including repatriation facilitators, ought to act.
In Section 4 I will address cases where there is insuﬃcient information to
know whether recipients will likely regret accepting a service, and so it is
not clear whether the service should be oﬀered.
Before I begin, a brief description of what I mean by regret.
Regret, as I deﬁne it, is a state of mind in which one no longer en-
dorses one's earlier choices, preferring the outcome of an alternative choice
rather than the one chosen. We can predict such regret as likely when the
vast majority of past recipients of a service regret their choice, and there
is reason to believe that this regret will likely arise in the future. If, for
example, 80% of past recipients of a choice wish they had chosen other-
wise, because they prefer the life they would have likely lived, and future
recipients hold similar characteristics to past recipients, then we can often
predict that there is an 80% chance that any given recipient will later feel
similar regret. My focus is on the moral status of this likely future regret.
I limit my discussion to future regret that is a response to an outcome
of a choice. I do not address cases where one will likely regret their choice
but not the outcome, such as a soldier regretting killing an innocent civilian
to save two innocent lives, feeling this was morally impermissible, but not
5Maya Manian, `The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-
Making,' Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy 16(2009): 223-292.
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regretting the outcome due to the lives saved. I also put aside cases where
one regrets a state of aﬀairs but not a choice, as when I say it is regrettable I
never became friends with Alanis Morissette, despite never having a choice
in the matter.
In addressing regrettable choices, my focus is on invariant regret: It
never subsides, lasting the remainder of one's life. However, I do include
cases where an individual, though forever feeling regret, feels no distress
about their regret, at least after some time has passed. It is simply that, if
they could, they would travel back in time and change their earlier choice,
feeling the counterfactual life they would live would be preferable to the
life they live now.
Finally, I limit my analysis to choices that are with valid and informed
consent. I put aside cases of forced interventions to prevent future regret,
or regret arising from incapacity and lack of information.6 Recipients, in all
of my examples, are fully aware of the risks, and even the risks of regretting
their choices.
Why would an individual make a choice they know they will likely re-
gret? One reason is that the potential pay-oﬀs are substantial, as with
the lottery. Another reason is that recipients cannot quite imagine what
it would actually feel like experiencing this regret, and so take the plunge,
later wishing they had not. Individuals also accept oﬀers that take ex-
tended amounts of time such that, for every day that lapses, accepting the
service is rational and regret unlikely. I might accept a box of ﬁne choco-
lates everyday, because one box on one day will have minimal harm, and
6Alan Wertheimer and Franklin Miller, Payments for Research Participation: A
Coercive Oﬀer? Journal of Medical Ethics 34(2008): 389-392; Holly Smith, Non-tracing
Cases of Culpable Ignorance, Criminal Law and Philosophy 5(2011): 115-146.
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give me joy as I bite into each praline, until I later suﬀer from the health
complications, regretting my accumulative decisions.7
Finally, a person may accept a service they know they will regret if, at
the time they make a decision, they have certain preferences which give
them reason to accept the service, even though they know their future
preferences will change. I might accept tequila at 8:00pm, knowing I will
regret it tomorrow, because at 8:00pm I prefer drinking tequila and regret-
ting it tomorrow to not drinking tequila and feeling no regret tomorrow.
Tomorrow, of course, my preferences will change. It is perhaps unclear if
my accepting the tequila is rational, or whether feeling regret tomorrow is
rational.8 Regardless, we often make such decisions and feel such regret. It
remains unclear when others should deny us services to prevent this regret
from transpiring.
Because I address cases with valid consent, I limit my discussion to
cases where a service provider uses no coercion. I include, however, cases
where a third party uses coercion, so long as the service provider does not.
As in Chapter 3, I assume Mol's consent to repatriate was valid for OBI
even though he was coerced by the Israeli government into repatriating,
assuming that OBI did everything possible to prevent his coercion, and its
assistance did not causally contribute to government coercion. His consent
was valid in the sense that, amongst the choices put before him, returning
was preferable to staying, and OBI could do little else other than oﬀer him
7Warren Quin's example of the self-torturer is a similar case of rational regret. See
Warren Quinn, The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer, in Morality and Action, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1993: 198.
8For a related discussion on the rationality of similar decisions, see Michael Bratman,
Toxin, Temptation, and Stability of Intention, in (ed.) Jules L. Coleman, Rational
Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1998: 59-83.
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repatriation. As in cases without coercion, it was nonetheless also the case
that his regret would be likely, and it is not clear what the moral status of
this regret was.
Some might suppose that, because Mol was choosing between two very
objectionable options, then he did not truly feel regret about his choice. He
only regretted the state of aﬀairs in Israel where he was forced to choose
between detention and unsafe repatriation.
While it is true he regretted the state of aﬀairs in Israel where he had
only two choices, he also regretted the one choice he did make. More gen-
erally, one can regret a state of aﬀairs and the choice made within this
state of aﬀairs. A patient diagnosed with cancer can later regret having
had to choose between death and life-extending treatment, while still re-
gretting accepting the life-extending treatment because of its painful side
eﬀects. This regret for a single choice is important: In many tragic or
unjust scenarios, third parties must decide whether to oﬀer an additional
objectionable choice, likely to be regretted, or do nothing at all, constrain-
ing choices now.
5.1 Regret as a reason
I propose the following claim: If we can predict that a person will regret
accepting our service, but would feel no regret had they rejected our service,
preventing regret is sometimes a reason to deny the service.
I shall not argue that regret is always a reason to deny a service; in the
next section it will be clear that strict conditions are required, and these
conditions are rarely met. For now, I wish to simply defend the claim that
regret is sometimes a reason to deny a service.
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My claim can be derived from two broad values. First, there seems
to be a general value, all else being equal, in helping individuals live lives
they prefer living. If an individual will later regret their decision to accept
a service, and this regret will extend into the remainder of their lives, then
we can help them live the life they prefer by denying the service. It is true
that future preferences are diﬃcult to establish. But when predictions of
future regret are strong and invariant, this future regret ought, at times,
to take priority over current short-term preferences.
There is a second value that underpins my general claim. Preventing
regret can enhance autonomy, often described as the being the author of
one's life.9 A person can never be entirely the author of one's life, given
that we cannot travel back in time and change earlier decisions we made.
Given this limitation, we sometimes have reason to prevent others from
being in a state of aﬀairs where they want to travel back in time, and
cannot. We therefore sometimes have a reason to deny a service that leads
to likely regret. This is not to claim that, when we help a person make a
decision they will regret, we are morally responsible for this regret. The
recipient may very well have no complaint towards us, and we may have no
reason to feel remorse about our oﬀer. Nonetheless, we still have reason to
deny the oﬀer when regret is likely. This is because we often have reason
to deny oﬀers because of outcomes, even if we will not be responsible for
the outcomes. If my friend asks me to burn her money, so she can be less
materialistic, I am not responsible if she later wishes she had the money
for a meditation retreat, but I still have a good reason to avoid burning
the money if I can predict this outcome is likely. Future regret is a reason
to deny an option even if we are not responsible for the future regret.
9Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988: 370.
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I take the above claim to be a relatively modest one. I am not claiming
that regret is a particularly weighty consideration, or that it cannot be
outweighed by other considerations, or even that regret is always a reason.
Rather, I merely claim it is sometimes a pro-tanto reason, and only when
strict conditions are met, to be described in the next section. Though this
claim is relatively modest, it may seem to be susceptible to two objections.
The ﬁrst is what I call the Future Preferences Objection. It comes in two
forms. The ﬁrst is related to reasons. Some argue that we have little reason
to determine what we provide others based on their future preferences. This
is because we have little reason in our own lives to make choices based on
our future preferences. This is because our future preferences are not our
current preferences, and so what we have reason to want later is not what
we have reason to want now. This argument is often made by appealing
to an example from Derek Parﬁt, involving a fourteen-year-old girl who
decides to conceive, even though she is extremely ill-prepared to do so.
She knows that, once her child is born, she will love her child, and feel
it is preferable the child was born. The child, of course, will feel this as
well.10 Neither will regret the decision. This prediction of future non-
regret, it is argued, seems like a poor reason for the girl to conceive at such
a young age. Though she will later have reasons to be happy with her past
decisions, these reasons arise from an attachment she does not have prior
to conceiving. Future preferences for past actions are often poor reasons
for these actions at the current time.11 And, as such, we should not deny
10Derek Parﬁt, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1984: 357-61.
11R. Jay Wallace, Justiﬁcation, regret, and moral complaint: looking forward and
looking backward on (and in) human life in (eds.) U Heuer and G Lang, Luck, Value and
Commitment: Themes from the ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford: Oxford University
Press 2012; Kate Greasley, Abortion and Regret, Journal of Medical Ethics 38(2012):
705-711.
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services to others based on predicting their future preferences.12
I am not certain that the fourteen year old's future aﬃrmation about
giving birth gives her no reason to conceive. She may simply have other
reasons to not conceive which supersede this reason: It is better to create
a world with children raised by mature parents, able to oﬀer suﬃcient
resources and care.13 But even if one believes that the fourteen year old has
no reason at all to conceive, it may still be the case that future regret gives
her a reason to not conceive. More generally, even if future aﬃrmation
for past actions is irrelevant for how we act at the current time, future
regret may remain relevant for how we ought not act at the current time.
Imagine a second girl who, unlike the original, knows she will not love
her child in the future, and knows she will regret having the child, later
wishing she could go back in time and never give birth. This second girl
has a very strong additional reason not to conceive, precisely because of her
future regret. Even if we would not help a fourteen year old girl conceive
regardless of her future regret, future regret seems like an additional reason
to not help, on top of the other reasons.
There is a second version of the Future Preferences Objection, related
to autonomy. Autonomy is protected, according to a range of theorists,
if one is the author of one's life, and one is the author of one's life even
if one's preferences change, and even if this change leads to subsequent
regret. For autonomy to be protected, it must merely be the case that one
has the mental abilities to form intentions of a suﬃciently complex kind,
12Elizabeth Harman, `I'll be Glad I did it' Reasoning and the Signiﬁcance of Future
Desires, Philosophical Perspectives 23, Ethics, (2009): 177-199.
13R. Jay Wallace, The View from Here: On Aﬃrmation, Attachment, and the Limits
of Regret, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013: 96-108.
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and plan their execution.14 Some of these plans will be regrettable, but
they are autonomous nonetheless. If an eighteen year old makes a choice
that impacts her life at thirty, such as getting a tatoo, she can still lead
an autonomous life, so long as her preferences and choices at eighteen are
made with full capacity and information.15
This claim, however, merely demonstrates that autonomy can be upheld
even if regret is likely; regret is compatible with autonomy in some cases. It
may still be true that in other cases autonomy can be undermined because
of regret. Had the eighteen year old consented to a full-body tattoo that
constrained her ability to access employment in the future, then denying
the tattoo seems to uphold autonomy more than providing the tattoo. And
even if one is not convinced that autonomy is better upheld by denying the
tattoo, there is still value in fulﬁlling future preferences to not have quite
so many tattoos, and so reason to consider future regret in what we provide
others.
There is a second broad objection to my claim, which I call the Other
Reasons Objection. In cases where a person feels regret, we might suppose
they are feeling regret about some change in their life, whether it be a
reduction in welfare, freedom, happiness, or preferences to not have full-
body tattoos. It is these facts that give reasons to deny the service. Regret
creates no additional reason to deny the service.
There are three versions of this objection. The ﬁrst draws upon the
principle of autonomy. In general, one condition for autonomy is that
14Raz 1988 ibid: 372.
15Raz 1988 ibid: 371; Richard Arneson, Autonomy and Preference Formation, in
(eds.) Jules L. Coleman and Allen Buchanan, In Harms Way: Essays in Honour of Joel
Feinberg, New York: Cambridge University Press 1994: 42-75.
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one has suﬃcient welfare and an adequate range of options.16 It is wrong,
therefore, to provide services that reduce welfare or the number of options.17
In cases where we intuitively feel that regret is a reason to deny a service,
our intuitions are responding to the reduction in welfare or options. Mol
should not have been provided repatriation because doing so would result
in him ﬂeeing to an IDP camp, or risk his life outside the camp. His
autonomy, some might argue, was undermined for this reason alone, rather
than because of the regret he felt.
In some cases, this reasoning holds. But in cases where a person's
autonomy will be constrained regardless of whether they accept a service,
regret may remain a deciding factor. Mol was choosing between detention
in Israel, unable to travel more than a mile, or returning to South Sudan,
able to travel but risking his life. In such a case, we cannot claim that Mol's
autonomy was undermined from returning relative to leaving, because his
autonomy was undermined either way. In such a case, his future regret tips
the balance against helping with his return, creating a reason that would
otherwise not exist. A similar claim regarding regret arises in instances
where, though a service undermines autonomy, an individual is willing to
forgo her autonomy to reach an important goal, such as a refugee who is
returning to help reconstruct her country, even if displacement is likely.
In such an instance, future regret may be an autonomy-based reason to
deny the repatriation, when assisting with repatriation would otherwise be
permissible.
Some may insist that, in the case of Mol, life in an enclosed camp in
Israel was objectively better for him than life in an IDP camp in South
16Raz 1988 ibid: 373.
17Raz 1988 ibid: 408.
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Sudan, protecting his welfare and autonomy more than if he returned.
This was reason enough to deny his return, regardless of regret. Even if
one accepts this conclusion for Mol, there are tens of thousands of other
refugees who live in insecurity and poverty in a country of asylum, and
choose to return to a country of origin with roughly the same levels of
insecurity and poverty. Between 1982 and 1984 the government of Djibouti
both denied refugees work visas and also reduced their rations, leading
many to return to Ethiopia, where they faced similar levels of poverty and
security.18 More recently, Burundian refugees faced a choice between living
in camps in Tanzania, where they often lacked basic necessities and security,
or returning to Burundi where they faced similar poverty and insecurity.19
For these and other refugees, given the similar conditions in both host and
home country, we cannot claim that reductions in welfare and autonomy
explain why return is wrong. If we feel that it is wrong to assist with return
when regret is likely, it seems the regret itself explains this intuition.
There are other cases where the same intuition seems to arise. Imagine
helping monks join a monastery they cannot easily leave, because they lack
any profession or social support outside of the monastery. If they wanted to
join and never regret their choice, it seems no one has wronged them despite
the undermining of freedom and the reduction in welfare. In contrast, if
monks in an order consistently regretted their choice, this would seem one
reason to discontinue recruiting new monks. Forgoing future freedom seems
18Jeﬀ Crisp, The Politics of Repatriation: Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti, 1977-1983,
Review of African Political Economy 30(1984).
19US Department of State IDIQ Task Force Order No. SAWMMA13F2592, Field
Evaluation of Local Integration of Former Refugees of Tanzania. See p. iii for sum-
mary of ﬁndings; See, also a report from Refugee International, cited by the IRIN news
agency, on strict conﬁnement to camps.http://www.irinnews.org/report/49519/east-
africa-special-report-on-repatriation-of-burundian-refugees.
146
more problematic if future regret is strong. A similar claim can be made
regarding physical harm. Though future physical harm is often reason
enough to deny a service  it is probably wrong to buy someone heroin
regardless of regret  sometimes physical harm is an insuﬃcient reason
to deny a service unless we can also predict regret. A coach who assists
athletes to compete in high-intensity and high-risk sports may have a good
reason to discontinue the service if most regret competing, but perhaps not
if most are happy they competed despite broken bones and concussions.
A hospital that provides life-extending treatment to patients may have an
additional reason to discontinue the treatment if most patients feel regret
due to the painful side eﬀects, but not if most feel no regret.
Some may argue that these examples do not demonstrate that regret is
an independent reason to deny a service. They demonstrate the following:
We have paternalistic reasons to deny various services, such as unsafe sports
or painful treatment, and these paternalistic reasons are overturned in cases
where the recipients will later aﬃrm their decision to accept a given service.
It is future aﬃrmation that creates a reason to give a service, rather than
future regret creating a reason to deny a service.
In some cases, this is true. It may be that for some athletes, refugees,
or monks, we have reason enough to deny a service due to the harm it will
cause unless recipients will later aﬃrm their decision despite this harm.
But in cases where we have competing considerations to both give and
deny the service, regret may be the deciding factor against its implementa-
tion. When refugees are facing extremely constrained options in a refugee
camp, but are at least safe, but will face extreme insecurity upon arriv-
ing, but at least will be free, we may be uncertain as to whether to assist
them in returning. The likely regret can tilt the balance against providing
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repatriation.
There is a second variety of the Other Reasons Objection. Some might
claim that, though we have reason to deny a service when regret is likely,
the regret is not an independent reason to deny a service. When individuals
feel regret, they regret something that has happened, such as losing their
freedom, or security, or subjective happiness. Regret is just the additional
psychological response to such outcomes, rather than an independent con-
sideration. To establish if regret is a reason, some might claim, we must
consider cases where there is regret without any of the painful outcomes
that tend to be associated with regret. In other words, a truly interesting
thesis on regret would pull apart regret from other considerations, and this
is only possible when considering cases where a person feels regret despite
their life going better. The case of the athletes and refugees are not cases of
such regret, as it seems the future injury or insecurity they will face  a ma-
jor welfare harm  explain the reason for their regret, and this underlying
reason is what is relevant.
I do not believe, however, that we can only establish if regret creates
an additional reason to deny a service by isolating it from other properties,
such as welfare harms. This is because, more generally, I do not believe we
can only establish if a property creates a reason for action by isolating it
from other properties. A property can constitute a reason in itself even if it
only arises when interacting with other properties, as noted in Chapter 2.
If I promise to lend Katie my pen I have a reason to lend her my pen, even
if this reason is contingent on other properties, such as her caring about
borrowing my pen, or being eﬀected by borrowing my pen.20
20F.M. Kamm demonstrates this point in her discussion on whether distance matters
for determining if we have a duty to safe a person's life. To consider if distance matters,
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While regret is usually a feeling that arises in response to certain wel-
fare harms, or constrained freedom, it is still sometimes a reason separate
from these outcomes. To prove that regret is a reason separate from these
outcomes, I needn't isolate regret from these outcomes, but these outcomes
from regret. This is possible by comparing pairs of cases where freedom,
welfare, and happiness are identical for two individuals, where regret is
present for one individual and not the other. If we compare two athletes,
two refugees, and two patients, and the ﬁrst of each pair will experience
both regret and a reduction in welfare after a service, and the second will
experience no regret but the same welfare reduction after the service, it
seems we have reason to deny the oﬀer to the ﬁrst and not the second.
Regret is a reason to deny an oﬀer, even if it is contingent on the existence
of certain other properties.
There is a ﬁnal version of the Other Reasons Objection, derived from
an argument by Krister Bykvist. We are often faced with choices, Bykvist
notes, that we know we will regret, but which we also know will make us
she argues, it is not enough to consider cases where distance is the only relevant property,
such as a case where we can press a button and save the life at no cost to ourselves. In
such cases, it seems clear distance does not matter. Rather, we must consider if distance
ever matters. We might consider, for example, two cases where we must work hard to
save a life, but one life is right by us, and the other is across the globe. We might conclude
that, when saving a life is very hard, then distance does matter. See F.M. Kamm, Does
Distance Matter Morally to the Duty to Rescue? Law and Philosophy 19(6)(2000):655-
681. Shelly Kagen demonstrates this point with another example. Imagine we wish to
establish whether we have a distinct reason to avoid causing someone harm, as opposed
to letting someone experience harm. We compare two cases: In one I push a guilty
aggressor into a pit, causing him harm, and in another I let her fall into the pit, letting
her experience harm. Many people hold the intuition that both are comparable, and
equally permissible. This does not demonstrate, however, that there is no distinction
between causing harm and allowing harm. It merely demonstrates that, in instances
of self-defence, causing harm is no worse than allowing harm. It may still be the case
that, when the person we are harming is innocent, then causing harm is worse than
doing harm. The property of innocence may be a necessary condition for us to have
a distinct reason to avoid causing harm. As such, we sometimes have reason to avoid
causing harm. See Shelly Kagen, The Additive Fallacy, Ethics 99(1)(1988): 18.
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happier. Imagine I have a choice to either stay single or get married. If I
stay single, I will be happy, but will regret my choice, feeling marriage was
preferable. If I marry, I will be miserable, but not regret my choice, still
feeling marriage was preferable. It seems that the future regret I will feel
as a single person is not a good reason to get married, because I will be
more miserable as a married person. Instead, Bykvist argues, we ought to
consider how strongly we will later want our future state of aﬀairs, and not
whether we will prefer this state aﬀairs to the life we could have lived. If
I will be happier as a single person I have reasons to stay single, even if I
will prefer being married and so regret not having married.21 If Bykvist is
correct, then we can similarly claim that, when oﬀering services to others,
their future attitudes about their circumstances are what matter, rather
than future attitudes about the life they could have lived, had they chosen
diﬀerently.
Bykvist's example is helpful for demonstrating that future regret is
often a very poor consideration for how we ought to act now. Nonetheless,
it does not demonstrate that future regret is no reason it all. It merely
demonstrates that, when we will be miserable with a choice, this future
misery creates a counterveiling reason to avoid this choice. It remains the
case that, when we are faced with two choices with equal predicted misery,
or equal predicted happiness, then future regret may be a reason in how
we ought to proceed. Similarly, when we can predict that another will feel
regret when accepting a service, but equally miserable or happy either way,
this likely regret is sometimes a reason to deny a service.
If future regret is sometimes a reason to deny service, this has an im-
portant implication. It implies that, if a person will likely develop adaptive
21Krister Bykvist, Prudence for Changing Selves, Utilitas 18(3)(2006): 264- 283.
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preferences to avoid feeling regret, then we have one less reason to deny a
service. Similarly, if there was a magical pill that a recipient could swallow
to rid herself of the regret, then we would have one less reason to deny a
service. This is an implication I am willing to accept. If Mol wanted to
return to South Sudan to rebuild his country, and we could predict that
he would adapt his preferences, or swallow a magical pill, then there would
be one less reason to deny repatriation assistance.
Importantly, one may accept this implication without holding that
adaptive preferences make a harmful service right. If an individual is living
a safe life, we should often deny a service that will endanger their life even
if the person will learn to prefer this life. I am merely claiming that, if
regret is likely, this future regret is an additional reason to deny a service
compared to an individual who will feel no regret because of adaptive pref-
erences. And this future regret can create decisive reasons against a service
in cases where an individual will face harm regardless of what we do.
Until now, I have merely claimed that regret is sometimes a reason to
deny a service. It clearly is not always a reason. If we found that some
women were likely to feel regret about having had an abortion, but other
women would likely feel no regret, it would seem wrong to deny an abortion
to the former but not the latter. As such, we must consider the conditions
that make it the case that future regret is a reason to deny a service, and
conditions where regret is no such reason at all.
5.2 Four Jointly Suﬃcient Conditions
There are four conditions that would make regret a reason to deny a service.
When all four conditions are met, we know that we have a pro-tanto reason
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to deny a service, to be weighed against other competing reasons to provide
the service. When there are no competing reasons, then the regret is a
decisive reason to deny the service.
The ﬁrst condition is that the future regret will be what Kate Greasely
calls all-things-considered regret. In the context of abortion, for a woman
to feel such regret, she would need to consider all life events that resulted
from the decision to have an abortion, such as the job she has and the
relationships she built, and compare these to every event that would have
happened, had she decided diﬀerently, such as the job she would not have,
and the relationships she would not build. Greasely argues that, whenever
we make a choice in life, we usually cannot know if the life we are living
now would be very similar or very diﬀerent than the life we would live, had
we decided diﬀerently. Without knowing how life would be diﬀerent, we
would struggle to know if we regret our past choices. She concludes that,
if we rarely know if we regret our past choices, then it is usually wrong for
others to deny us a choice, based on future regret.22
Though Greasely is correct to argue that it is diﬃcult to know if one
feels all-things-considered regret, it is still possible. In rare cases, a person
feels that all possible lives they could have lived, had they chosen diﬀerently,
would have been better than the best possible life they can now live, as a
result of the choice they made.23 If we can predict such regret is likely, and
will continue over the course of one's life, perhaps we have reason to deny
a service.
In the case of Mol repatriating, such regret was likely. Nearly all who
22Kate Greasley, Abortion and Regret, Journal of Medical Ethics 38(2012): 705-711.
23When I write better I mean preferable. When I write best possible life I mean
most preferable possible life. I shall use the words better and best in these senses
for the remainder of the chapter.
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had returned imagined the very worst life they could have in Israel, in-
cluding in detention, and felt this would have been better than the best
life they could now imagine living in South Sudan. Those who returned
accurately thought, I would now have food, shelter and medical care if I
had not repatriated, and these necessities are now more valuable for me
than the freedom I gained from return. If most refugees who return feel
this way, despite being aware of the risks at the time of departure, this
regret seems to be one reason to discontinue repatriation services, and Mol
should have possibly been denied assistance.
This ﬁrst condition, however, is not suﬃcient for regret to be such a
reason. Imagine a woman who feels all-things-considered regret at having
an abortion, feeling that the best life she can now live really is worse than
the worst life she could have lived. While she may feel regret, she does not
necessarily feel regret about having had the option to have an abortion. We
often want services to control our lives, and retrospectively are happy we
had this control, even if we regret the way we use this control. If so, then
for regret to be a reason, a second condition must be met: An individual
must regret both their past choice to accept a service, and wish this service
had never been available at all. If they could, they would go back in time
and somehow destroy access to the service.
I believe this condition is not met when women regret having an abor-
tion, as it is doubtful individuals wish they had been blocked from having
access to the abortion completely, even if they regret their own decision.
Mol, in contrast, does wish today that OBI had never given him the option
of returning, and had never set up the repatriation program at all.
These ﬁrst two conditions are also not suﬃcient. For, they could in
theory be met when a woman regrets having an abortion, and many may
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ﬁnd it counter-intuitive to claim that, if we could predict this ahead of
time, this would create a reason to deny the abortion. Less controversially,
nearly everyone would feel a woman has a right to contraceptives, even
if we could somehow predict her future all-things-considered regret about
never having had children, wishing she never had the opportunity to use
contraceptives.
For regret to be a reason to deny a service, a third condition must be
met. The regret must be the result of the choice to accept the oﬀer, and
not from any other earlier or subsequent choices. If a woman were to have
an abortion, reach menopause, and then feel all-things-considered regret at
not having had children, the woman would be regretting both the abortion
and also earlier and subsequently not having had children. As such, when
others help fulﬁl a woman's choices, they are not contributing a great deal
to any subsequent feeling of regret the woman may have. She would be
doing a large part of the work, making a series of choices throughout her
life that would lead to an outcome which, in retrospect, will make her wish
she had chosen otherwise on multiple occasions.
In some cases, all three conditions are met. Imagine a segment of the
population, despite leading the healthiest of lives, is diagnosed with cancer,
and they undergo treatment to extend their lives by two years, leading to
painful side eﬀects and all-things-considered regret. Most feel the worst
possible outcome without the treatment would have been better than the
best outcome with it. In such cases, the doctor providing the treatment
would be contributing a great deal to the regret felt. Consider, also, the
case Mol. Before he returned to South Sudan, while he was still living in
Israel, he could not apply for refugee status, and so was forced to work on
the black market, during which he would be eventually arrested. He had
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only two choices: live a life in detention, or repatriate. When he returned,
his only source of income was the money he returned with, his only option
of employment was to start a business, and the only place he could live was
Juba, as he would have struggled to ﬁnd suﬃcient customers in secondary
towns. He was then forced to ﬂee to an IDP camp. In a life of few services,
repatriation was the only choice that resulted in the outcome of regret.
And it is this choice alone that was made possible by OBI. As such, he
received help to make a choice that was largely responsible for the regret
he felt.
This is not always the case with repatriation. Unlike Mol, some refugees
can apply for refugee status, but choose not to. Had they applied, and
gained refugee status, they would have gained residency and possibly citi-
zenship. Had they gained citizenship, they could have left and re-entered
the host country fairly easily. Had they repatriated after this, their repa-
triation would be reversible, and less regrettable. If in reality they chose
to not apply for refugee status and also chose to repatriate, their regret
would be from a series of choices, and not just repatriation. Helping with
repatriation in such cases is not as ethically problematic. Repatriation is
contributing to only one of many choices that, in combination, leads to the
regret felt.24
We have, as such, three suﬃcient conditions that would seem to create
24Of course, if someone has few choices in life, like Mol, we might feel that others
should expand their range of choices, and not simply deny a service because of the
regret felt from the service. For example, a UN oﬃcial should not think, Refugees
have few options, so I will not help with return, because they will regret their decision
from repatriation alone. Instead, the UN oﬃcial should try to expand refugees' options
by assisting them in obtaining refugee status. But if this fails, and the oﬃcial starts
facilitating return, she should stop if the vast majority feel all-things-considered regret
from the choice to return alone. More generally: Even if we should help others have
more options, it is still preferable to deny an option, if this option alone will lead to
regret.
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a reason to deny a service based on future regret: The regret must be all-
things-considered; there must be a wish that the service had never been
available at all; and the regret must not be from other choices made prior to
and after receiving the service. But claiming these conditions are suﬃcient
may still conﬂict with many people's intuitions about some cases we might
imagine. Consider a woman who regrets the choice to abort the foetus
from a particular man on one particular night. She feels no other life choice
would have been enough to change the feeling that her life would have been
preferable had she never been given an abortion. This regret fulﬁls the three
conditions: It is all-things-considered; it exists alongside a wish that the
service had never been available; and it is not from earlier and subsequent
choices. It would seem wrong to deny abortions or contraceptives if this
regret was pervasive, so long as women were aware of the risks of later
regret.
Consider, similarly, some simple lotteries. At age ten I spent ﬁfty cents
on a rae ticket to win a stuﬀed animal. I lost. I am fairly certain my
life would have turned out the same had I not entered this rae, but it
would have been slightly better, as I would have ﬁfty extra cents. So the
best possible life I could live from the rae  my actual life without ﬁfty
cents  turned out worse than the best possible life I would have lived
had I not played the rae  my actual life but ﬁfty cents richer. This all-
things-considered regret is from the one choice to enter the rae, and no
others, and a part of me wishes I had never entered the rae, in addition
to regretting my own choice. If such regret is pervasive, this seems like a
poor reason to discontinue raes.
To address such counter-examples, we must add a fourth necessary con-
dition. The regret must be for a service that is epistemtically transforma-
156
tive.25
According to L.A. Paul, an epistemtically transformative experience
arises if one gains knowledge that would be impossible to gain without the
experience. All experiences are epistemically transformative to an extent.
The apple I ate this morning tasted slightly diﬀerent than other apples I
have eaten, and so I could not have known ahead of time what the apple
would taste like. Some choices are slightly more transformative, such as
eating a durian fruit for the ﬁrst time. Some choices entail such an extreme
transformation that nearly all of life changes, or all of life seems to change
as a result of a new piece of knowledge.26 A woman who has seen only black
and white, and suddenly experiences the color red, would experience such
a transformation,27 as would a soldier enlisting, a deaf individual gaining
hearing, and a parent having a child for the ﬁrst time. Before making such
a choice there is an insurmountable information-constraint, as there is no
way to know how one will react to their choice until after they have made
it.28 In such cases, we cannot make an entirely informed choice, but we can
consider how much we value new experiences and discoveries for their own
sake, as distinct from the subjective goodness or badness of the outcomes.
Because we each value new experiences to a diﬀerent degree, only we can
decide what we ought to do.29
Based on the above analysis, third parties should generally not deny ser-
vices based on their epistemtically transformative character. Nonetheless,
special reasons to deny such services arise if regret is likely.
25L.A. Paul, Transformative Choice in Transformative Experience, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2014: 1-51.
26Paul 2014 ibid: 1-51
27Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32(1982): 12736.
28Paul 2014 ibid: 115.
29Paul 2014 ibid: 115-123.
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If individuals will likely regret a choice, then they will later fail to live
the life they want to live, and be unable to change their earlier decisions.
Given this likely outcome, we have reasons to ensure recipients are espe-
cially well-informed about the choices they are about to make. Just as
we have a higher standard of informed consent for high-risk services, such
as surgery or military enlistment, we should have a higher standard of in-
formed consent for high-regret services, such as some forms of medical and
repatriation services. A higher standard of informed consent requires an
especially clear understanding of what can be expected from the service.
Such a clear understanding is impossible for services that are epistemically
transformative, as they are impossible to comprehend ahead of time. This
impossibility creates one reason to deny the service, a reason that would
not exist with regrettable oﬀers that are not epistemically transformative.30
Not every regrettable service is epistemtically transformative in the
strong sense that, prior to the service, nearly all of life seems diﬀerent.
I do not believe abortions are the types of choices that are epistemtically
transformative in this strong sense, where individuals are stepping into an
entirely new way of seeing life, as with having children, repatriating, or
seeing red for the ﬁrst time. Even if one regrets the choice to have an abor-
tion, this does not lead to a major increase in experiences that are new, nor
is this likely to lead women to view life as entirely diﬀerent, in every way.
A woman, before having an abortion, knows that after the abortion she
can continue to live in the same neighbourhood, go to the same shop, read
30No such reason to deny the service would arise with epistemically transformative
oﬀers that are not regrettable or harmful, such as introducing someone to the color red
for the ﬁrst time. This is because, if there is little regret, and no harm, there is less
of a need for a high level of informed consent, and so the epistemtically transformative
nature of the service is less problematic.
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the same books, call her mother, and allocate roughly the same amount of
time to whatever activities she has been pursuing prior to the abortion. As
such, while women may struggle to predict their future regret, they will be
more capable of making such a prediction compared to women making a
choice that will transform far more in life.
In contrast, some regrettable choices are epistemtically transformative.
Mol's choice to repatriate lead to far more new experiences that he could
not have experienced ahead of time. While in Israel, he could call his
friends, eat three meals a day, read on his phone, or go to a doctor if
he was feeling ill. Even in detention in Israel these services would be
open to him. Today, he can decide who to request food from, where in
the IDP camp to walk down, when to leave the camp grounds, and what
newspapers to look at from those strewn around the streets of Juba. These
experiences are not necessarily worse, but they are diﬀerent and, as such,
he would have struggled before return to accurately imagine how he would
emotionally react after return. When individuals take a plunge into an
entirely unknown life, their choices are less than fully informed, creating a
reason to deny the service when regret is likely.
There are other choices in life that are epistemically transformative.
Some women agree to serve as surrogates. Surrogates are aware that many
women feel a strong connection to the infant they give birth to, and pain at
giving this child to her biological parents. These facts concerning childbirth
are diﬃcult to comprehend until one has actually given birth. Because
childbirth may be epistemically transformative, involving a feeling that
is only understood until one has felt childbirth, then we would have one
reason to deny surrogacy if most women regretted being surrogates, and
this regret extended into the remainder of their lives. More speciﬁcally, we
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have a pro-tanto reason to ensure that surrogates are never forced to give
up the infant they give birth to, to prevent regret from transpiring, given
that a high level of informed consent is impossible.
Now, we might imagine a case where a woman has an abortion and all
four conditions are met. A woman may be emotionally distraught about
her choice, and each experience she has feels entirely diﬀerent as a result,
in a very transformative way. Sometimes, we are surprised how much a
single change eﬀects us, even when everything else stays the same. It may
be comparable to suddenly seeing red for the ﬁrst time: Each experience
is diﬀerent, even if all other properties stay the same. Indeed, sometimes
it is precisely the fact that everything is the same that makes a choice so
painful, as everything seems to bring back memories of what life was like
before the choice. We might similarly imagine a woman who, as a result of
having an abortion, is looked at diﬀerently by her community, or forced to
leave, such that nearly every experience in her world is diﬀerent, and she
feels all-things-considered regret as a result.
If we did, in fact, learn that the vast majority of women felt such all-
things considered regret, and lived a life where all seemed entirely diﬀerent,
then I believe this very well may be a reason to deny an abortion service.
However, if we still feel it is important to provide such family planning,
then our knowledge of likely regret could simply create a reason to ensure
that abortion and contraceptive services did not change most experiences
about people's lives. We ought, for example, to ensure that women receive
suﬃcient counselling prior to having an abortion, and therapy after an
abortion, to ensure that they can continue to live fulﬁlling lives after their
abortions. We ought to also ensure that family planning services are com-
pletely discrete, such that a woman's entire external world needn't change
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as a result of her choice. If we cannot ensure such therapy and privacy, and
regret really is widespread, then this is a reason to deny the service.
Even if future regret is a reason to deny a service, there may still be
countervailing reasons to accept the service. In the case of abortion, we
may feel more disturbed about a woman forced to have a child compared to
a woman who regrets not having had one. We may also wish to prioritize
the minority who will not regret their choice, even at the expense of the
majority who will. This might be the case if those who will not regret their
choice are the worst oﬀ, and more in need of the change provided by the
service. This might also be the case if those who will not regret their choice
are the best oﬀ but will help the worst oﬀ as a result of their choice. Some
refugees who repatriated from Israel started their own businesses, felt no
regret, and employed other South Sudanese nationals who would otherwise
have no employment. Such beneﬁts may justify continuing repatriation
services. And in all cases, we may feel that regret is not a decisive reason
to deny a service if, in the distant future, the recipients will ultimately feel
no regret. This future satisfaction may create a countervailing reason to
support the service, even if regret in the interim period is likely.
But when there are no countervailing considerations, then all-things-
considered regret may be a decisive reason to discontinue a service if the
regret is from the service alone, the recipient will wish it were never of-
fered, and it leads to a life entirely unimaginable compared to the life left
behind. Similarly, regret may be a trump reason, a decisive reason to
deny a service if there are two sets of competing reasons, neither decisive
on their own. Such is the case in repatriation when refugees want to return
to avoid detention, but will face risks in doing so. When these two com-
peting considerations arise, future regret can be a decisive reason against
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assistance if the four conditions are met.
Until now, I have limited my discussion to instances where an individual
will feel regret in addition to lower levels of welfare and freedom. I believe
that regret might even be a reason to deny a service if all four conditions
are met and welfare or freedom will be improved. Imagine a refugee who
repatriates to Gambella in Ethiopia, never having tasted Ethiopian food
or Ethiopian espresso, never having lived in a hot tropical climate, never
having slept under a mosquito net, and never having worked as an inter-
preter, his new profession upon arrival. His life is not unpleasant, and he
is subjectively happier than before, but he regrets his choice, a choice he
could not have imagined prior to repatriating. I believe we would have a
reason to deny repatriation if most felt such all-things-considered regret at
having had this option to repatriate. This is because, if regret is likely, we
ought to demand a higher level of informed consent, impossible to obtain
with epistemically transformative decisions.
We might even imagine refugees who are not repatriating, but instead
accepting resettlement to Canada, later feeling all-things-conisidered regret
in Canada, fulﬁlling all four conditions. If such future regret was felt by
the vast majority of those who were resettled, and we could predict that
this regret would continue, there would be one reason to discontinue the
resettlement program. If we feel there is value in helping individuals live
the lives they prefer living, we ought to account for the likelihood that,
in the future, individuals will not prefer living in Canada, and will want
to reverse their earlier decision. We might still conclude that safety in
Canada is more important than preventing regret; but regret ought to be
one pro-tanto consideration.
A similar conclusion ought to be reached regarding a service that helps
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individuals join a life-transforming religious order that changes a range of
life experiences, where all-things-considered regret is likely. Regret is a
reason to deny such a service, even if life is better in terms of objective
welfare and freedom. Similarly, we might learn that types of gambling
change nearly all of life in a way that is impossible to comprehend ahead of
time. Even if most do not ﬁnd their welfare or options signiﬁcantly reduced,
there may still be a reason to discontinue certain types of epistemically
transformative gambling if all-things-considered regret is likely.
Some may reject these last claims, and argue that regret is only a reason
to deny a service if life is not improved. If so, then a ﬁfth condition might be
added: Regret is only a reason to deny a service if life will not be improved
by the service. We might even conclude that regret is only a reason to deny
a service if life will become worse, in terms of welfare, as a result of the
service. But even with this ﬁfth condition, regret is still a reason to deny a
service, separate from the reductions in welfare. If we were to compare two
individuals who would likely feel regret, and one would experience regret
and a reduction in welfare, and the second would experience no regret and
the same reduction in welfare, there would be a reason to deny the service
to the ﬁrst and not the second.
5.3 Regret Either Way
Even if we accept that regret is a legitimate reason to deny a service in
some cases, this does not provide a solution for what I call Regret Either
Way Cases. These cases occur when a population accepts a service, and
most regret their choice, but those who decline the service also regret de-
clining it. Therefore, both continuing and discontinuing the service will
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lead individuals to feel their preferences have not been met at a later point
in time.
For example, when the Israeli government completed a mass detention
centre for asylum seekers in 2013,31 thousands were detained or denied work
visas, leading thousands to return, some with the help of NGOs. Though
many regretted their choice to return, those who stayed in Israel regretted
staying, feeling they were wasting their youth in a cold detention cell in
the middle of a desert in Israel,32 or homeless in Tel Aviv. In such cases, it
is not clear if NGOs should have continued helping with return.
Some might claim that it is irrational to feel regret either way. It is
either true that the best outcome in Israel would be worse for a given refugee
than the worst outcome in South Sudan, or true that the best outcome in
South Sudan would be worse than the worst outcome in Israel. How could
both possibly be true? I believe they can. As humans, our preferences and
opinions change depending on what we are experiencing. As such, we may
later wish we had chosen the opposite of what we chose, precisely because
we chose it. For example, some people get married because they cannot
imagine life without their partner being better than life with them. After
several years of experiencing life with their married spouse, they start to
feel that the worst life without their partner would be better than the best
life with them. If they get divorced, they may again change their mind,
pining for their ex-spouse precisely because they are gone, again feeling
that the worst life with their ex-spouse would be better than the best life
31Ruvi Ziegler, No Asylum `For Inﬁltrators': The Legal Predicament of Eritrean and
Sudanese Nationals in Israel, Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Law 29(2)(2015):
172-191.
32Ilan Lior, Prison service conﬁscates heaters from asylum seekers detained in Holot,
Haaretz 10/1/15; Gideon Levy and Alex Levac, Seekers ﬁnd asylum with crammed
rooms and no heat, Haaretz 1/2/14.
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without them. While marriage is reversible  allowing a person to marry
and divorce multiple times  many choice pairs are not. When a person
must decide which of two irreversible choices to choose, they may face
genuine angst and indecision, knowing that future all-things-considered
regret is inevitable. When we are tasked with helping others reach one of
two likely regrettable ends, it similarly unclear what we ought to do.
In such cases, we might appeal to other considerations. If refugees will
face detention if they stay, in addition to regretting their choice, then return
should be facilitated, because at least they will be free. Or, alternatively, if
refugees will face persecution if they return, in addition to regretting their
choice, then return should be not facilitated, because at least they will be
safe. But this is unhelpful if refugees will face detention if they stay and
lack safety if they return, regretting both outcomes.
To consider what ought to be done in such cases, the fourteen-year old
girl may again be of help.
In many ways, her case is similar to a Regret Either Way Case. It is,
more speciﬁcally, a No Regret Either Way Case. She will have no regrets if
she conceives, but also no regrets if she does not conceive. For, if she does
not conceive, she can still later conceive, and be happy she had this later
child. To determine if she has a decisive reason to conceive, she should
compare the extent that she later will be satisﬁed with one choice over
another. I assume she will be more satisﬁed if she does not conceive. For,
at a later time, she can still conceive, love this child just as much, give her
child more, and have a more fulﬁlling life for herself. Similarly, if a person
will regret either choice, they should consider which choice will lead to less
regret, and choose this choice for themselves. They will still regret their
choice later, wishing they had chosen otherwise, but at least this wish will
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be less forceful than if they had chosen the alternative.
Similarly, service providers have a reason to discontinue a service if they
can predict that those who accept the service will regret accepting it more
than rejecting it. Or, alternatively, providers should discontinue a service
if more who accept the service regret their choice compared to those who
reject the service.
When making such a comparison, it is not enough to simply compare
those who accepted the service and those who rejected it. It may be that
those who rejected the service were less likely to regret rejecting it compared
to those who accepted it because they wanted it less. If everyone were to be
denied the service in light of this data, many who were denied the service
may be less satisﬁed than if they were provided the service. For example,
if most refugees who stay are satisﬁed with their choice compared to those
who left, this may be because they wanted to stay more than those who
left. Were an NGO to deny repatriation in light of this data, many who
are forced to stay may feel their preferences are less satisﬁed than if given
the choice to return.
A better way to make predictions about future regret would be to ran-
domly divide all who want to accept the service into two groups: those will
immediately be given the service, and those who will not be given it, at
least not in the near future. If those who randomly received the service
regret it more than those who randomly could not receive the service, this
is strong evidence that the service leads to greater regret than not giving
the service. If, on the other hand, a very large number of those who did not
receive the service wish they had received it, even years later, while fewer
who received the service now regret receiving it, then there are reasons to
continue the service.
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In the context of repatriation, an NGO could provide repatriation to
only some refugees who say they wish to return, and not others. After
two years, the NGO could then ask those who returned if they regret their
choice, and ask those who did not return if they still wish they had returned.
If more feel all-things-considered regret from returning compared to those
who stayed  and the four necessary conditions are fulﬁlled  this is a
strong reason to discontinue repatriation. This reasoning could be applied
to other spheres. In medicine, Random Control Trials (RCTs) already
compare outcomes. The goals of RCTs are to see if those who receive
a pill with the active ingredient tend to experience better outcomes and
fewer side eﬀects than those who receive a sugar pill. Regret seems to be
a pertinent side-eﬀect to know about, and could be added to the standard
questions subjects are asked when taking part in RCTs.
Some may feel that it would be unfair to randomly select who is provided
assistance, and who is not. But it is important to emphasize that nobody
will be forced to accept assistance. I would never suggest that some refugees
be forcibly repatriated, just to see if they will later regret repatriating.
What I suggest is merely that, of those who want a service, some wait a
speciﬁed time period before receiving it, to see the outcome of others who
have accepted the service. If those refugees who returned overwhelmingly
regret their choice, but those who stayed regret staying less, this is a good
reason to discontinue repatriation.
Some might still feel it is wrong to force some refugees to stay in de-
tention, rather than help all repatriate who wish to. Others may feel it is
wrong to provide repatriation to some, who will then likely live in poverty
and insecurity in South Sudan, rather than relative security in Israel.
A similar problem exists with RCTs, where a random percentage of a
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sample will receive a pill with just sugar, rather than an active ingredient.
Such random selections may be frustrating for patients, who may prefer a
pill with an active ingredient. But if preference satisfaction matters, and
trials can establish what pill better fulﬁls future preferences, then trials
may be justiﬁed. In repatriation, and other life-altering choices, it is not
clear which service is helpful from the perspective of future preferences,
because the experiences before the service are so radically diﬀerent than
those after the service. Randomly being denied the service may be fair,
and so such policies permissible.
Some may argue that autonomous individuals ought to be the agents
who choose what services they receive, even if regret is likely. But randomly
providing the service to some, and not others, may enhance autonomy in
the long run. A truly autonomous choice requires a minimal threshold
of information, and there is often a lack of information on services that
drastically alter life, including a lack of information about likely regret.
Randomly selecting some to receive the service can increase information
on both the outcomes of the service, and the likelihood of future regret,
further justifying such selections.
5.4 Uncertainty
There are Uncertainty Cases which cut through cases involving regret and
regret either way. Often, agents who provide a service cannot contact past
recipients of the service to determine if they regret their choices. It is not
clear if a service should be continued in such instances. For example, the
UN may be unable to contact those who have migrated to other countries
after repatriating. More worryingly, those who most regret repatriating
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may be the most diﬃcult to contact, because they have been killed, or ﬂed
to another country, or do not have access to a cell phone in an IDP camp.
It is not clear if repatriation should be provided for future refugees, if the
UN cannot predict the extent that past refugees regret their decisions to
return.
In such cases, we might turn to other considerations. One consideration
is related to the irreversibility of a choice. Sometimes, providing a service
is irreversible, while denying the service is not.33 The fourteen year old girl
is one such case. If she conceives now, she cannot later un-conceive. If she
does not conceive now, she can later conceive. This asymmetry may be
one extra reason for her to not conceive at age fourteen, and one reason to
not help her conceive. Importantly, this would hold true even if we knew
nothing about the girl's personal future preferences, and the extent that she
would later regret her choice to conceive. Similarly, refugees repatriating to
South Sudan could not live in Israel later, but if they had stayed in Israel
they could still repatriate later, providing one reason to deny repatriation
when regret is impossible to predict.
Such a policy, unfortunately, would create another irreversible state
of aﬀairs, forcing refugees to stay, possibly in detention or destitution.
Rather than refusing to provide them with repatriation, facilitators could
merely nudge refugees to reject their services, and encourage refugees to
stay, rather than return. This can be instituted by forcing refugees to
wait a speciﬁed amount of time, or by emphasizing the extreme dangers of
return and the advantages of staying.
33In Parﬁt's example of such a choice, you must decide whether to prevent a person
from committing suicide. One reason to prevent them is that, if they are forced to live
now, the can still commit suicide later, but if they commit suicide now, they cannot live
later. See Derek Parﬁt, On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011: 197.
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The idea of nudging individuals to accept a reversible decision over an
irreversible one seems intuitively appealing for spheres outside of repatri-
ation. It has been argued by Wang et al that, when a person posts on
Facebook or Twitter, they are posting a largely irreversible post, as others
can share the post and re-tweet, such that the original author can no longer
delete the post. Some posts are life-altering, involving an oﬀensive joke or
an incriminating photo, undermining a person's career, friendship network,
and self-perception. Because of this risk, Wang et al suggest that users be
ﬁrst asked if they are certain they wish to post a comment.34 While the
authors emphasise that this policy is justiﬁed to mitigate regret, I believe
the reason it mitigates regret is that, if users post now they cannot reverse
the act, but if they do not post now they can always post later.
While only nudging is justiﬁed in most cases, completely denying the
service may be justiﬁed if service providers can predict that, in the future,
their services will become reversible. In such cases, service providers should
wait until this day arrives before helping. Consider the case of Theodore,
a South Sudanese refugee who arrived in Israel in 2007. Had he returned
during his ﬁrst few years in Israel, he would be unable to re-enter Israel,
as he lacked residency status. NGOs knew that, in the future, he would
likely gain residency status, as he was in a relationship with an Israel
national, with whom he had a child.35 Once he gained this status, he
would be able to enter and exit Israel at will, and repatriating would no
longer be an irreversible choice. NGOs should refuse to help refugees like
Theodore repatriate until they gain residency status, and returning is no
34See Wang et al, From Facebook Regrets to Facebook Privacy Nudges, Ohio State
Law Journal 74(2013): 1308-1334.
35Interview with Theodore, Jerusalem, 17 July 2014.
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longer irreversible. Under such a policy, recipients of a service would be
able to avoid the all-things-considered regret that comes from irreversible
decisions, while still accessing the service at a later time.
In many cases, irreversible choices will likely remain irreversible. There
will never be a day, I hope, where someone can conceive and have a child,
and later go back in time and un-conceive her. Nor will it ever be possible
to post on Facebook or Twitter and wipe the post clean from all websites,
computer screen, and the minds of social media users. In such cases, we
cannot wait until the choices become reversible, because they never will.
The irreversible nature of the choice is not a reason to deny it, even if regret
is possible.
5.5 Conclusion
When an individual consents to a service, we might provide it, believing
it is her choice to make. But a choice at one time can conﬂict with a
preference at another. Mol later felt that the worst possible outcome in
Israel would have been better than the best outcome in South Sudan. We
might suppose he was simply unlucky, and that circumstances might have
transpired diﬀerently for him. But the UN reports at the time warned of
likely violence and poverty, and past returnees had expressed similar regret
to what Mol felt. When such regret for a life-altering choice is extremely
prevalent, and the result of the particular service alone, then regret is one
reason to discontinue the service.
In cases where someone will likely feel all-things-considered regret from
both receiving a service and not receiving it, the service should only be
denied if those who regret receiving it are more numerous than those who
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regret not receiving it. When there is insuﬃcient information to know this,
we should not deny the service, instead merely discouraging potential re-
cipients from accepting an irreversible service which they can always accept
later. When the service is irreversible now but will become reversible in
the future, we should not merely discourage recipients from accepting the
service, but deny it completely, until a later point in time when it becomes
reversible.
Perhaps the conditions I set are rarely met, or rarely met outside of
refugee repatriation, and so of little signiﬁcance in the vast majority of
services provided. But there is value in realizing why, in most cases, we do
not consider regret a legitimate consideration. Rarely does any given choice
we make lead directly to the regret we feel. It is more likely part of a web of
complex decision making, with the particular choice to accept a service only
one factor in the ultimate feeling that we wish we had chosen otherwise.
And rarely do we really know, after a choice, that our lives would be better
had we chosen diﬀerently. Exploring rare cases of all-things-considered
regret is helpful precisely because they are exceptional, emphasizing why
regret, as a general rule, is not a particularly good consideration for the
choices we make, nor a good consideration for the choices we provide others.
Though regret is not usually a legitimate consideration, there remain
a range of cases where regret is relevant, requiring us to re-evaluate the
types of services provided, and when they are provided. Soldiers may feel
all-things-considered regret from the single choice to enlist, and their lives
may be diﬀerent than those they left behind. Athletes engaging in extreme
sports may feel similarly, as may patients undergoing certain treatments,
even if the treatments help patients in other ways. Refugees may later
wish they could turn back the clock and reject help returning, even if
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this meant living a life in detention, or without legal status. If regret is
a relevant consideration for how we treat others, then soldier, athletes,
patients, and refugees should be asked if they wish they had never been
oﬀered a service in the ﬁrst place. Most forms of regret will not be all-
things-considered, and most will be from a series of choices. But some
forms of regret may be similar to what Mol felt. We should know about
such psychological experiences, accounting for the preferences people have
later, when assisting them now.
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Chapter 6
Payments*
In 2007 Sweden oﬀered $7,150 to families who agreed to return to Afghanistan.1
A year later, the Ghanaian government, working with the UN, gave refugees
$100 to return to Liberia.2 Soon after, Denmark began oﬀering $18,700 to
anyone returning to Iraq, Iran, and Somalia.3 In 2010 the British National
Party, in an election campaign, promised to give $78,000 to migrants or
refugee who agreed to leave the country. The BNP was never elected, but
in 2011 the UK government handed over $3,500 in cash to families who
agreed to return to Zimbabwe.4 More recently, Australian Prime Minster
Tony Abbott proposed paying asylum seekers $10,000 to go back to their
*This chapter is based on a manuscript that has been accepted subject to major revi-
sions in Political Studies.
1UNHCR, Sweden, Afghanistan, UNHCR sign deal on voluntary return of Afghans,
23/6/07, http://www.unhcr.org/468bb4542.html.
2Naohiko Omata, `Repatriation is Not for Everyone': The life and livelihoods of
former refugees in Liberia, New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR Working Papers
213, 2011.
3The Telegraph, Denmark oﬀers immigrants ¿12,000 to return home, 10/11/09.
4Frances Webber, How Voluntary are Voluntary Returns? Race and Class
52(4)(2011): 98-107.
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countries of origin,5 and in 2013 the Israeli government began giving $3,500
to thousands of asylum seekers who agreed to repatriate. Those who re-
fused to repatriate from Israel were given a slightly diﬀerent oﬀer: $3,500
to accept a one-way ticket to Uganda, Rwanda, or Ethiopia, where they
would be unable to obtain any legal status. In all six of these cases, and
many more,6 a large proportion of those returning were refugees, or owed
protection on humanitarian grounds.7
It is not clear if such payments are morally permissible. One might
think that even if forcing refugees to leave is wrong, paying someone to
leave is not, because it is a voluntary transaction. But payments often
encourage extremely unsafe returns, and are often accepted involuntarily
when refugees agree to return to avoid detention or deportation.
Such payments are not new,8 but there are few studies describing them,
and no analysis as to whether they are morally permissible. This chapter
provides such analysis, describing three types of cases concerning payments,
5SarahWhyte, Abbott oﬀers asylum seekers $10K to go home, The Sydney Morning
Herald 21/6/14.
6Maria Helene Bak Riiskjaer and Tilde Nielsson, Circular Migration: The unsuc-
cessful return and reintegration of Iraqis with refugee status in Denmark, Research
Paper No. 165 2008; Richard Black, Michael Collyer, and Will Somerville, Pay-to-go
Schemes and other Non-coercive Return Programs: Is Scale Possible? Improving US
and EU Immigration Systems, www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/pay-to-goprograms.pdf.
7For a description of this minimal standard, of those who have a claim to residency,
see Javier Hidalgo, Resistance to Unjust Immigration Restrictions, The Journal of
Political Philosophy 23(4)(2015): 450-470 As noted in the previous chapters, both those
supportive of more open borders, and those supportive of closed borders, tend to agree
that forced return is unjust if those returning would lack basic necessities. See David
Miller, Immigration: The Case for Its Limits in (eds.) A. Cohen and C. Wellman
Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2005: 193
206; Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The case for open borders. Review of Politics
49 (1987): 251-73; Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2004.
8George Stoessinger, The Refugee and the World Community, Minneapolis: Min-
neapolis University Press 1963: 68-71 and 202; Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore,
Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, Cornell: Cornell
University Press 2004: 106.
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and what ought to be done in each case. In the following section I will ad-
dress what ought to be done in Motivation Cases. When governments
provide payments, we might think the payments are wrong, because they
motivate refugees to partake in risky repatriation. But though refugees are
motivated to take risks, perhaps this is not wrong, if their choice is volun-
tary and they prefer to take these risks, given the money they can gain.
I argue that such payments are only morally permissible if refugees can
again access the host country after returning, such that their return does
not substantially undermine their future safety. In Section 2 I address Co-
ercion Cases. Refugees are often returning involuntarily, because they are
unjustly forced into detention. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
eager to help, provide money to refugees who return. If refugees are ac-
cepting money to return under coercive background conditions, it is not
clear if NGOs should be providing such money. Consistent with Chapter
3, I argue that they should provide such funds if refugees will likely face in-
deﬁnite detention regardless, and if providing payments does not causally
contribute to government coercion. In Section 3 I address an objection
that cuts across the ﬁrst two cases. It may be that, regardless of whether
refugees are in detention or returning freely, they have a right to funds to
repatriate, to ensure they have the choice to return with some resources. I
argue that payments may, indeed, be justiﬁed for this reason, but only in
cases where the funds are substantial enough to ensure long-term safety.
Before addressing the above claims, a number of clariﬁcations. As be-
fore, I assume that survival migrants  those ﬂeeing hunger or lack of
healthcare  are refugees who deserve protection, if states have the capac-
ity to accept them. As before, one can accept my general conclusions about
payments, but reject my speciﬁc conclusions about who states should not
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deport. I aim to merely consider whether, if you believe it is wrong to
deport someone because of conditions in their countries of origin, it is also
wrong to pay them to return to their countries of origin.
The case of Israel is especially useful for exploring payments, but not be-
cause oﬃcials acted very diﬀerently from an ethical perspective. Rather, it
is useful because the Israeli government openly publicized a wealth of data
on this topic, detailing the number who returned each month, the extent of
detention, and the amount of money provided to individuals between 2012
and 2013. This data  which includes return to Sudan and Eritrea  pro-
vides limited evidence that money motivated return, raising the question
of whether such money should be provided. Furthermore, I have origi-
nal data I gathered in interviews with refugees who, after given money to
leave, agreed to return to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and South Sudan, or
accept resettlement to another East African country. These interviews pro-
vided valuable information on the conditions under which payments were
provided, raising unique scenarios that pose especially diﬃcult questions.
Though I present original data from Israel, I shall demonstrate that the
case of Israel is not entirely diﬀerent from other repatriation programs. As
such, my descriptions raise questions likely found in other countries that
pay refugees to repatriate.
6.1 Motivation
Motivation Cases occur when states oﬀer refugees full protection, and moti-
vate them to decline this protection, providing money on the condition that
they repatriate. It is unclear if states are ethically permitted to provide
such payments.
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Consider, for example, the case of Gatluak, who ﬂed southern Sudan
as a young boy during the Second Sudanese Civil War in the 1980s. As an
adult he eventually took a boat to Egypt and crossed into Israel with the
help of smugglers. In Israel the government never assessed his claim that
he was a refugee, but provided him a temporary visa as part of general
protection granted to all southern Sudanese refugees. He was happy with
his life in Israel, as he was free to work in a hotel, could access medical
care, and experienced no coercive pressure to leave. When South Sudan
became an independent country in 2011 Gatluak feared returning due to his
ethnic identity, and because he lacked family networks to ensure basic food
security after returning. He changed his mind in 2012, returning when the
Ministry of Interior told him he could receive $1,500 upon reaching Juba.
Six months after his return, he was living on a concrete patio outside a
police station in Juba, without shelter, savings, job skills, family, or daily
meals. When I visited him that year, strangers were providing him limited
food, medicine, and water. He did not know how long their charity would
last, and had no access to state services.9 I was unable to reach him
when the South Sudanese Civil War broke out in 2013. Based on my
interviews with other former refugees who returned, he was likely displaced,
and possibly killed.
We might suppose that, in Gatluak's case, the Israeli government did
not truly provide him protection, because they refused to assess his claims
and the claims of other asylum seekers. We might also suppose that, in this
case, we cannot be certain that those returning were genuine refugees, pre-
cisely because their claims were never assessed. But Motivation Cases also
arise in cases where states do assess all claims, are certain that individuals
9Interview with Gatluak, Juba, 15 March 2012.
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are refugees, and provide full residency rights, also providing money to en-
courage repatriation. In the 1990s Australia recognized tens of thousands of
Afghan asylum seekers as refugees, providing them access to social services,
work visas, and healthcare, later oﬀering each family $10,000 to repatriate
in 2002, leading 3,400 refugees to return, their fate never monitored by the
government, but likely leading to the deaths of at least some.10 Similarly, in
the 1990s the German government assessed the claims of all Bosnian asylum
seekers, and recognized them as refugees, later using monetary incentives
to motivate them to repatriate to a country where they ultimately strug-
gled from extreme poverty and discrimination.11 Sweden, when providing
payments to Afghan refugees, similarly assessed their claims and provided
them refugee status before paying them to repatriate.12 In all of these
cases, states were oﬀering protection, but also paying refugees to decline
such protection. It is not clear if such policies are ethically permitted.
The UN's oﬃcial position is that such policies can be legitimate if con-
ditions have substantially improved in refugees' countries of origin.13 The
UN also endorses cash payments when, though conditions remain unsafe,
there is evidence that conditions are improving, and refugees' status will
soon be revoked, as when the UN provided $100 to refugees returning from
10Fethi Mansouri and Sally Percival Wood, Exploring the Australia-Middle East
Connection, in (ed.) Fethi Mansouri, Australia and the Middle East: A Front-Line
Relationship, London: Tauris Academic Studies 2011: 9.
11Ulrike von Lersner, Thomas Elbert and Frank Neuner, Mental health of refugees
following state-sponsored repatriation from Germany, BMC Psychiatry 8(88)(2008).
12UNHCR, Sweden, Afghanistan, UNHCR sign deal on voluntary return of Afghans,
23 June 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/468bb4542.html.
13Helen Morris and Machiel Salomons, Diﬃcult decisions: A review of UNHCR's
engagement with Assisted Voluntary Return programmes, United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees Policy Development and Evaluation Service 2013; Katherine
Haver, Felicien Hatungimana, and Vicky Tennant, Money matters: An evaluation of
the use of cash grants in UNHCR's voluntary repatriation and reintegration programme
in Burundi, Policy Development and Evaluation Service 2009.
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Ghana to Liberia in 2008. However, the UN remains silent on cases where
return is clearly unsafe and will remain unsafe, and governments still wish
to encourage return, using no coercion, and monetary incentives alone.
Furthermore, even in cases where conditions have improved, it remains un-
clear whether motivating return is ethical, if conditions are still suﬃciently
dangerous as to warrant continued protection.
Before considering when such monetary incentives are ethical, it is
worth establishing if there is any empirical evidence that money motivates
return. In the cases noted, refugees may be responding only to fear of fu-
ture detention, or a belief that conditions have improved in their countries
of origin. If money itself does not motivate return, there are no Motivation
Cases.
Data from Israel provides limited evidence that money was, at the very
least, strongly correlated with decisions to return in this case, even when
detention rates were relatively low, and conditions in countries of origin
remained the same. By analysing Israeli labour statistics and interviews
with civil servants, I found that, in months where refugees were paid more
money to leave, more refugees agreed to return, even when the detention
rates were the same as in other months, and conditions in countries of origin
remained the same.14 For example, in October 2013, the government paid
all asylum seekers $1,500 if they left the country, and also began detaining
asylum seekers. 180 left. While the number dropped in November, when
the High Court of Justice ordered that asylum seekers be released, from
the beginning of December the government passed new legislation to detain
refugees, and also increased the grant money to $3,500, such that detention
policies were similar to October, but the payments greater. That December
14See Appendix C.
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295 returned compared to October's 180, a signiﬁcant increase.
There was also evidence that the government used money to encourage
return precisely when detaining refugees became legally diﬃcult. In March
2013, the UN and Israeli High Court of Justice pressured the government
to stop detaining refugees and, that same month, the government increased
the payments from $100 to $1,500. Between March and August 2013 the
government found other ways to detain refugees, using a series of by-laws to
circumvent the court's instructions, also never raising the payments. The
High Court ordered the end of these by-laws in September, requiring the
government to once again release refugees, and the government soon began
talks to increase the payments again. When the government stalled and
never actually released any refugees, the High Court forced the government
to release refugees in October, and the Prime Minister rapidly approved an
increase in payments from $1,500 to $5,000.15 Throughout this two year
period, the government also seemed to increase payments in response to
refugees' unwillingness to return, issuing a type of market-sensitive pay-
ment scheme, providing only $100 in 2012, raising it to $1,500 when few
returned, and ﬁnally providing $3,500 when it saw a dip in repatriation
rates.
The above does not prove that money motivated return, as other un-
known variables  such as the rate of policing, or refugees' subjective pref-
erences  may also explain the variation in return rates. Nonetheless, this
provides supporting evidence that money motivated return, and similar ev-
idence was found in studies on repatriation from Pakistan to Afghanistan,
where refugees were provided $100 to repatriate;16 from Tanzania to Bu-
15Ilan Lior, Israel to Oﬀer African Migrants $5,000 to Leave, Haaretz 30/10/13
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.555218.
16Eric Davin, Viani Gonzalez, and Nassim Majidi, UNHCR's Voluntary Repatriation
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rundi, where refugees were provided $41 to repatriate;17 and from the UK
to Zimbabwe, where refugees were paid $3,500 to repatriate.18 In all of
these cases, there were positive correlations between payments and return
rates, and governments stated that payments were designed to motivate
return.
If money does motivate return, and is intended to, is it morally per-
missible? To answer this question, we might ﬁrst determine whether, when
refugees accept money to return, their choice is truly voluntary. To consider
this, we must establish what we mean when we claim a choice is voluntary.
In general, there is a broad consensus that three criteria must be met
for a choice to be voluntary. Individuals must be fully informed and with
full capacity when making a decision;19 they mustn't be coerced into their
decisions; and they must have at least one alternative that ensures an
acceptable level of welfare.20 For an example where the last condition is
not met, imagine a a starving person accepting a job at slave wages. Their
choice is involuntary, as both working and not working involve unacceptably
low levels of welfare. Refugees are similarly involuntarily repatriating when
choosing between malnutrition in a refugee camp and an unsafe return.21
Program: Evaluation of the Impact of the Cash Grant, Oﬃce of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kabul 2009.
17Katherine Haver, Felicien Hatungimana, and Vicky Tennant, Money matters: An
evaluation of the use of cash grants in UNHCR's voluntary repatriation and reintegration
programme in Burundi, Policy Development and Evaluation Service 2009: 6.
18Frances Webber, How Voluntary are Voluntary Returns? Race and Class
52(4)(2011): 98-107.
19Allen Wertheimer and Franklin Miller, Payments for Research Participation: A
Coercive Oﬀer? Journal of Medical Ethics 34(2008): 389-392.
20Katy Long, The Point of No Return: Refugees, Rights, and Repatriation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2013: 159-161; Mikhail Valdman, A Theory of Wrongful Ex-
ploitation, Philosophers' Imprint, 9(6)(2009): 114; Jonathan Wolﬀ and Avner De-
Shalit, Disadvantage Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007: 78.
21Long 2013 ibid: 161-163.
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Though choices are not voluntary when both the choice and alternatives
are unacceptable, I assume that a single choice can be voluntary if this
choice is acceptable and all alternatives are not. Katy Long has persuasively
demonstrated this point, using the example of a person who has no choice
but to accept a low-paying job they feel is fulﬁlling, and which meets their
basic welfare needs.22 The person's choice, she contends, seems voluntary
because they have one acceptable option. Following Long's reasoning, a
choice is also voluntary if one is leaving behind a life with an acceptably
high level of welfare, and choosing a life without these basic necessities,
such as a businesswoman voluntarily choosing to quit her pleasant and
well-paying job and move to a desert island. Her choice seems voluntary
because she has at least one acceptable alternative.
Based in the above criteria, refugees who accept money and return are
doing so voluntarily if they are returning to a country where their lives will
be safe and their conditions reasonably acceptable or if, though returning is
unsafe, they have the option of staying in the host country with reasonably
acceptable conditions, including full social services and rights. In the case
of Israel, these conditions were arguably met for Gatluak, though not for
all refugees in the country, as I will describe in the next section. These
conditions were also met for refugees returning from Germany to Bosnia
in the 1990, and from Australia and Sweden to Afghanistan in 2002 and
2007.
Therefore, the minimal conditions for voluntariness can be met with
payment schemes. But even if returns are voluntary, there is another reason
to believe the payments are unethical. In general, voluntary oﬀers can be
morally impermissible if they demean the recipients of the oﬀers, or create
22Long 2013 ibid: 162-163
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negative externalities for others.23 When governments directly pay refugees
to repatriate, this may reinforce the stereotype that refugees are unwanted
members of society, whose exit is worth whatever money the government is
willing to pay them to leave. Payments also send a demeaning message to
refugees: We do not want you so much, the payments imply, that we are
willing to sacriﬁce money so that you repatriate. The greater the money
oﬀered, the stronger this message. For this reason, the British Nationalist
Party  a fringe party and openly xenophobic  was willing to spend $78,000
for each asylum seeker or refugee who returned, far more than any other
party or country in the world. Refugees have no alternative but to be
exposed to this demeaning treatment, whether they accept the money or
not.
I believe this is a strong reason to deny payments some of the time.
When the government pays only African refugees to leave, as part of a
racist immigration policy, the payments are impermissible because of their
demeaning nature alone. I shall elaborate on this reasoning in Chapter
8. However, when all refugees are paid to leave, and there is no racist
intention, I do not believe the demeaning nature of the payments creates a
decisive reason against their provision. Refugees can turn down the oﬀer,
and send a strong counter-message back: We want to stay so much that
we are willing to reject your money in order to stay. The greater the
money oﬀered, the stronger this counter-message. Rejecting payments can
strengthen the expressed commitment of refugees to stay, publicizing how
dangerous it is to leave.
23Deborah Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of
Markets Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010; Anne Phillips, Our Bodies, Whose
Property? Princeton: Princeton University Press 2013.
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There is a second, stronger reason to believe payments are impermissi-
ble. In general, oﬀers are impermissible if they involve great physical harm.
For example, if I agree to lend you money, and you agree to give up your
right hand if you do not pay me back, no judge should uphold the agree-
ment, and force you to give your right hand if you cannot pay me back. In
contract law, judges do not uphold such unconscionable contracts partly
because it is wrong for the state to encourage self-harm,24 given that states
were created partly to protect citizens and residents within their territo-
ries. Were the government to encourage self-harming activity, then the
state would also be forcing citizens to pay taxes into a system that makes
such encouragement possible, and there is a limit to what the state should
force citizens to do.25 Self-harming contracts are also involuntary in one
sense: When an individual accepts money on the condition that they ac-
cept possible harm in the future, then their future selves will be forced to
accept this harm. There is a limit to the harm our future selves should be
forced to accept, even in light of previous consent.
Payments to repatriate are types of unconscionable contracts. In Is-
rael, refugees arrive at the oﬃce of a civil servant, sign on a dotted line,
receive $1,500 in an envelope, their legal status is revoked, and they board a
ﬂight. If they attempt to re-enter the country, they will likely be deported,
because they had earlier received money to forgo any future protection.26
Throughout this process, refugees are encouraged to risk their lives, rather
than continue to accept protection, and the public is forced to pay taxes
into a system that enforces this contract with detrimental consequences.
24Seana Valentine Shiﬀrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommo-
dation, Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs 29(3)(2000): 205-250.
25Shiﬀrin ibid.
26Interview with Assisted Voluntary Return oﬃcial, Tel Aviv, 7 August 2013.
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We might claim that, in the case of Israel, it was not payments that
were wrong, but the enforcement of the agreement. If refugees who tried to
re-enter Israeli territory were deported, then this was a form of refoulement,
the illegal forced removal of a refugee according to international law. The
problem is not the payments, we might contend, but the wrongful rejection
of genuine refugee claims. However, even in cases where refugees are merely
paid to repatriate, but not blocked from re-entering, they may still face
immediate danger after return, and be unable to apply for a visa, ﬂy back
to the safe country, and again apply for refugee status. When civil war
broke out in South Sudan, almost half of my respondents ﬂed to an IDP
camp, and could not leave the camp safely, because of their Nuer ethnic
identity. They also lacked money to pay for a private vehicle to pick them
up, take them swiftly to the airport, and ﬂee the country by air. If the
risks of return are signiﬁcant, then the government is still encouraging self-
harming activity, even if it is merely paying for repatriation, rather than
paying for the revoking of all future refugee rights.
The above reasoning suggests that payments are morally permissible if
an individual will not be at risk if they return. This may be the case for
refugees returning to countries with considerably improved conditions, or
for asylums seekers who have private means of ensuring their protection.
Even if an individual is returning to an unsafe country, payments could
possibly be ethical if returnees had practical and legal mechanisms to later
re-enter the host country to safety if they found themselves again in danger.
This last condition may be realized if the state paid refugees to leave
while also providing re-entry visas, money to return to the host country,
and evacuation services in the event of a crisis after returning, similar to the
evacuation services provided to citizens abroad. The risks to return would
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be limited, and so such payments permissible. A close version of this policy
was implemented in the 1990s, when the governments of Sweden, France
and the United Kingdom provided funds to Bosnian refugees to travel to
Bosnia, where they could easily re-enter these states' territories if they were
unhappy with their return.27 On a more limited scale, UNHCR organized
go-and-see visits for Burundian refugees in Tanzania, providing them
payments to repatriate, along with transport to again re-enter Tanzania if
they wished to.28 Many of these programs did not allow refugees to change
their mind more than once: They could repatriate, re-enter the host country
once, and if they repatriated a second time they were not oﬀered a visa
to again re-enter the host country.29 Nonetheless, we might envision such
a payment scheme involving both the ability to exit and enter the host
country at will, and access to emergency evacuations if necessary. Such
payments would merely incentivize return, without signiﬁcantly sacriﬁcing
refugees' safety.
6.2 Coercion
While the ﬁrst case addresses whether governments should pay refugees
to return, Coercion Cases address extremely non-ideal scenarios where
refugees and asylum seekers will likely face serious risks if they return,
27Richard Black, Return and Reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Missing link or
mistaken priority? SAIS Review, 21(2): 177-199.
28UNHCR, Burundi: repatriation from Tanzania  numbers remaining under
300,000, Brieﬁng Notes, 18 May 2004, Downloaded on 19 September 2015 at
http://www.unhcr.org/40a9e0a21.html.
29Helen Carr, Returning Home: Experiences of Reintegration for Asylum Seekers
and Refugees, British Journal of Social Work 44(1)(2014): 140-156; Khalid Koser The
Return and Reintegration of Rejected Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants, IOM
Migration Research Series 2001.
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but if they stay in their host country they will be detained, destitute,
and likely deported in the future. In such cases, NGOs often have the
resources to provide their own funds to refugees hoping to return, and it
is not clear if they should provide such funds. There is no question that
individuals' choices to return are involuntary, as they are choosing between
two unacceptable alternatives. Nonetheless, perhaps NGOs should pro-
vide payments if refugees and asylum seekers are unlikely to be oﬀered full
rights and protection. It may be better to encourage individuals to return
via a repatriation program than to remain in detention and possibly face
a completely forced deportation, which can be traumatic and violent.
This dilemma was common in Israel, where detention was widespread,
and the government vowed to detain the majority of Eritrean and Sudanese
asylum seekers, including the refugees amongst them. At ﬁrst, the govern-
ment was the only body to provide funds to refugees in detention, and
most NGOs refused to cooperate, feeling refugees were accepting funds
partly because they feared detention or deportation. There is evidence to
this eﬀect found in Labour Statistics. Rates of return would often increase
when detention increased, and decrease when detention decreased, even
when government payments to leave stayed the same.30 For example, in
August 2013 the government passed a new Anti-Inﬁltration Law allow-
ing the Ministry of Interior to arrest refugees and detain them, and 170
returned. When the High Court of Justice nulliﬁed the law in September,
only 89 returned, even though payments remained the same. When no
one was actually released in the beginning of October 2013, the number of
returns increased again, from 89 to 180, even while payments remained the
same as in September.
30See Appendix C.
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Some refugees, though in detention or destitute, were afraid to return,
and remained in detention or homeless. As the Israeli government seemed
unwilling to change its policy, some NGOs eventually oﬀered their own pay-
ments of e800, feeling this was preferable for especially vulnerable refugees.
One of the ﬁrst refugees to receive such funds was Tigisti, her husband Mas-
sawa, and their two children.31 All were included in the 38,000 individuals
whom UNHCR considered likely refugees,32 despite the Israeli government
denying them this status. Though UN oﬃcials were working to resettle
some refugees to North America and Europe, Tigisti did not know if she
would be included in this resettlement. When her husband was detained
in 2013, NGOs tried to help him obtain a visa, but failed. Instead, they
oﬀered to pay the family e3,200 to repatriate. After returning they were
forced to ﬂee to Ethiopia where they gained asylum-seekers status but no
work visas to support themselves.33
Similar cases of coerced returns occurred in Tanzania when, in the mid-
2000s, anti-refugee sentiment increased, prompting the government to con-
ﬁne Burundian refugees to camps, denying them the option of working in
urban areas, forcing many into detention-like conditions. The UN, hoping
to help alleviate these conditions, oﬀered refugees funds to repatriate, even
as evidence grew that they would unlikely ﬁnd food security in Burundi
with the money oﬀered.34 In these and similar cases, it remains unclear if
the UN should provide such funds.
31Interview with Tigisti, Dessie, 8 June 2014; Interview with Massawa, Addis Ababa,
8 June 2014.
32UNHCR, Israel: Subregional operations proﬁle - Middle East, 2015,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4864b6.html.
33Interview with Tigisti, Dessie, 9 June 2014.
34Katherine Haver, Felicien Hatungimana, and Vicky Tennant, Money matters: An
evaluation of the use of cash grants in UNHCR's voluntary repatriation and reintegration
programme in Burundi, Policy Development and Evaluation Service 2009.
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The dilemma becomes more complex when we consider cases of indi-
viduals who are asylum seekers, and yet to prove to the UN or government
that they are refugees. Consider, for example, the case of Daniel. In the
1980s the government of Ethiopia conﬁscated his ancestral land, forcing
him to migrate to Sudan, where he joined a church, found work, and mar-
ried, but faced harassment from authorities. He eventually moved with
his wife to Egypt, where they found work and gave birth to their daugh-
ter, but faced similar harassment from authorities, deciding eventually to
pay smugglers to take them into Israel in 2006. Once there, they found
jobs in hotels, and a school for their daughter. Six years later, in 2012,
Daniel's wife left him, and he raised his daughter on his own for several
months. When anti-immigration protests spread throughout the country,
he was soon detained, and his daughter placed in foster care. Government
oﬃcials pressured him to return, telling him they could pay for his ﬂight
to Ethiopia, using no handcuﬀs, but that he would be forcibly deported
if he declined the oﬀer. He refused for over a year, demanding that he
have access to a Refugee Status Determination process. The government
refused, and he ﬁnally changed his mind when an NGO oﬀered him e800
to return, sponsored by the European Refugee Fund. He returned with
his daughter in 2013, and by 2014 both lacked medical care, food security,
reliable shelter, or access to Daniel's ancestral land. At the end of 2014
Daniel was planning to pay smugglers to cross illegally with his daughter
into Sudan.35
We might at ﬁrst suppose that, in the case of both Tigisti and Daniel,
NGOs should not have provided money for return. Tigisti and her family
were faced with only two unreasonable options, and so their choice was
35Interview with Daniel, Addis Ababa, 10 June 2014.
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involuntary, and so victims of refoulement, the illegal forcing of refugees
back to their countries of origin. Daniel was not necessarily a refugee, but
he was denied the right to apply for refugee status, and so was wrongfully
forced to return before given the right to a Refugee Status Determination
process. If his return was unsafe, he too was faced with only unreasonable
alternatives, and so his choice was also involuntary in this regard.
In response to the above reasoning, NGOs might defend their payments
with the following three arguments. First, as argued in Chapter 3, it is
not wrong to help a person with an involuntary choice, if there is no other
possible choice to provide them. For example, if I am shot by a sniper, and
then run to the hospital, I can give valid consent to a doctor for risky but
life-saving treatment, even though my options have all become unaccept-
able due to the sniper. Refugees may be capable of giving valid consent
to NGOs, even though they are coerced into their choice by the govern-
ment, so long as NGOs themselves use no coercion, and can do little else to
help. This is not to claim that NGOs should simply look the other way as
governments detain refugees; as argued in Chapter 3, NGOs have certain
duties to help vulnerable populations, including the duty to try and stop
government detention of refugees, or at least not causally contribute to this
detention. But if NGOs do everything in their power to try and stop this
government's detention policy, and fail, refugees' consent to return may still
be valid from the perspective of NGOs. Similarly, in cases where refugees
and asylum seekers are denied access to food and shelter, NGOs act rightly
when they provide funds to repatriate, if there is nothing else the NGOs
can do to help. Though recipients of money are involuntarily accepting the
oﬀer, because they have no reasonable alternatives,36 it would be even more
36Mikhail Valdman, A Theory of Wrongful Exploitation, Philosophers' Imprint,
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involuntary for refugees to lack the resources to return. This reasoning has
been expressed by the UN, which states that, though NGOs should try and
assist refugees to obtain their legal rights, if this fails, assisting with return
may be ethical if the life or physical integrity of refugees in the country of
asylum is threatened.37
The above argument, however, is not quite enough to justify the pay-
ments. NGO could make return possible without actively encouraging re-
turn by oﬀering thousands of euros to do so. And though refugees may be
deported, this is not certain, and so encouraging return risks undermining
protection that refugee might have otherwise obtained later.
NGOs may present a second argument in favour of their payments. En-
couraging refugees to return is justiﬁed, because returning is better than
waiting for a possibly violent and traumatic deportation. If Daniel had
stayed in detention, immigration oﬃcials would likely one day open his cell
door, force him and his daughter into a van, drive them to the airport, and
handcuﬀ both to their seats as the plane lifted oﬀ. Deportations throughout
Europe involve psychiatrists forcibly sedating refugees on ﬂights and oﬃ-
cials physically sitting on refugees until they cannot breath, move, or ﬁght
back.38 If deportation is traumatic, it would be better to return without
resistance, and money encourages such non-resistance.
Though payments may encourage a safer return compared to forced de-
portations, there is a reason NGOs should still avoid payments. As noted
9(6)(2009): 114; Jonathan Wolﬀ and Avner DeShalit, Disadvantage, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2007: 78.
37Megan Bradley, Refugee Repatriation: Justice, Responsibility and Redress, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press 2014: 52; Mollie Gerver, Is Preventing Coerced
Repatriation Ethical and Possible? The case of NGO repatriation of South Sudanese in
Israel, International Migration 53(5)(2015): 148-161.
38Liz Fekete, The Deportation Machine: Europe, Asylum, and Human Rights, Race
and Class 47(1)(2005): 64-78.
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in Chapter 3, NGOs should avoid causally contributing to coercive poli-
cies. When humanitarian organizations and agencies encourage refugees to
return from detention, they may encourage the government to detain even
more refugees.
Such a causal phenomenon may have been at play in some of the cases
raised in Chapter 3. In 1994 and 1995, when UNHCR began facilitating
repatriation of Rohingyan refugees from Bangladesh to Burma, they pro-
vided limited aid to the most vulnerable, and various forms of aid upon
return. The Bangladeshi government may have signiﬁcantly increased its
pressure on refugees to return precisely because it knew that aid would be
provided.39 And, in general, if facilitating return frees up places in deten-
tion, as I argued in Chapter 3, then encouraging return would free up cells
even more, causally contributing to the further detaining of refugees.
Such payments may also make petitions against government policies
very diﬃcult, by making it diﬃcult to prove that return is coerced. If
refugees quietly accept cash in an envelope, the public may believe the
choice to return is voluntary and safe, when it is not, and a judge would
never see evidence of forced returns. This may undermine advocacy eﬀorts,
further fuelling detention policies. In contrast, if refugees stay in detention
they send a message to the public that they are afraid to return and, if
they are eventually deported, the public and judicial system will be aware
that they were forced to return.
Payments to repatriate may similarly discourage refugees themselves
from protesting for a change in policy. Activist refugees in Israel, who
strongly opposed payments schemes, would organize hunger strikes in de-
39Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Orga-
nizations in Global Politics, Cornell: Cornell University Press 2004: 106.
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tention, long marches through the desert, and incessant media campaigns
documenting precisely why they left Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, and South
Sudan.40 They focused on encouraging others to lobby the Israeli govern-
ment, so that their claims could be heard. These politically active refugees
felt that repatriation funds undermined legitimate resistance. This phe-
nomenon was especially clear in 2012. That year, a month before the
planned deportation of all South Sudanese nationals in Israel, hundreds of
refugees protested regularly against the deportation. Soon after, represen-
tatives from OBI began oﬀering money to return, explaining to refugees
that deportation was likely.41 The campaign to prevent deportation slowly
died down, as more returned, and fewer remained in detention. As the
campaign died down, the detention rates steadily increased, leaving fewer
behind to protest and encouraging even more to return. As more returned,
more detention cells became available, allowing the government to detain
even more refugees.
More evidence is needed to fully establish whether funds causally con-
tribute to coercive policies in the way described. If they do, then NGOs
should discontinue such payments. Not only will denying payments help
mitigate coercion, but it needn't force refugees to stay in detention or face
a traumatic deportation. Refugees can still avoid such deportation by ac-
quiescing to deportation without money. Immigration authorities informed
Daniel that his ﬂight would be paid for by immigration authorities, and he
could board the ﬂight without handcuﬀs, even if without money. NGOs, in
paying refugees to return, are not substantially increasing refugees' options;
40Illan Lior, Israel to Oﬀer African Migrants $5,000 to Leave, Haaretz 30/10/13
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.555218.
41Interview with Bol, Juba, 21 December 2013; Interview with Nathaniel, Juba, 14
December 2013; Interview with Vanessa, Juba, 25 December 2013.
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they are merely encouraging acquiescence to a silent return, reinforcing the
involuntary nature of returns.
The above reasoning suggests it would be ethical for NGOs to provide
payments in either one of two scenarios. The ﬁrst scenario is where individ-
uals will not be at risk if they return, because they returning to countries
that are now safe, or because they are receiving enough money pay for ba-
sic security and necessities after return. Such a return would be voluntary
because the choice would entail an acceptably high level of welfare upon
return, even if unacceptable detention in the host country.
The second scenario where payments would be permissible is when,
though return is unsafe, refugees will continue to lack rights regardless
of whether they are paid money to repatriate and, in being paid money,
this does not causally contribute to the coercion of others. Money needn't
encourage coercion if the government has unlimited means of coercion. If
the government has enough cells in detention centres to detain all refugees
in the country, encouraging one refugee to return would not free up a cell
to detain a new refugee. The government might also, rather than detain
all, simply deny work visas to all, forcing all into destitution, such that if
one person left, this would have no eﬀect on the overall level of destitution.
I do not believe that either of these scenarios arose in the case of Daniel
or Tigisti. For Daniel, return was not particularly safe and, though in-
deﬁnite detention was a possibility for him, encouraging return would free
up his detention cell, likely leading to the detention of a new refugee or
asylum seeker. The case of Daniel would only have been justiﬁed if there
was enough space in detention to detain all asylum seekers and refugees,
or if he merely faced no work visa, and his return did not encourage the
government to deny visas to more refugees and asylum seekers. Helping
195
him return, in this hypothetical case, would not contribute to the further
coercion of others, and would help him and his daughter avoid a traumatic
deportation or life of destitution in Israel.
In the case of Tigisti, Hewan and their children, return was safe and
there was a strong chance they would eventually secure refugee status, ei-
ther in Israel or another safe country. The UN in Israel already recognized
them as likely refugees and the High Court of Justice had called for ending
indeﬁnite detention of Eritreans. The growing international pressure on
Israel to change its policies also lead some Western governments to accept
a growing number of refugees for resettlement from Israel. Though there
was a possibility that Tigisti and her family would eventually be violently
deported, NGOs should not have encouraged them to acquiesce to return-
ing, given that there was a signiﬁcant chance they would obtain protection
if they stayed. Even if they ultimately would be deported, at least the de-
portation would be public, unlike quietly returning with money. A public
deportation can serve as evidence in a court petition against the govern-
ment's actions, and help contribute to greater protection for others in the
future.
Some may ﬁnd the implications of my last point disturbing. By deny-
ing payments to refugees, NGOs would be creating a scenario where some
refugees will not agree to return and may ultimately face deportation, possi-
bly experiencing police brutality in the process. To deny refugees payments
would seem to be using them as a means, discouraging them from returning
quietly for the purposes of creating a traumatic return, all to help bring
about a change of policy. Encouraging refugees to repatriate, in contrast,
addresses the welfare of refugees as individuals with their own needs, rather
than objects for a larger scheme.
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Though it is true that refusing to give money is for a larger scheme,
it is not true that refusing such money is wrongly using refugees. For, we
generally do not wrongly use others when denying them an option, unless
we have a duty to provide the option. If I refuse to buy another person
cigarettes, out of concern for others who would be harmed from second hand
smoking, I am not using the person as a means, because I have no duty
to buy these cigarettes. Similarly, if NGOs have no duty to pay refugees
to return, then they are not using refugees when refusing to provide them
money to leave.
6.3 Choice
We have, at this point, reached two conclusions: Governments should avoid
payments that encourage return, unless they also provide re-entrance visas;
and NGOs should avoid payments to return to unsafe countries if these
payments contribute to government coercion. These two conclusions imply
that, though payments are often wrong, governments are permitted to allow
refugees to repatriate on their own, even if this means they will be unable
to reach safety. Similarly, though NGOs should often avoid payments, they
should not actively stop refugees from repatriating on their own.
If this is true, some may raise the following reason to provide payments:
If some refugees will return regardless, perhaps it is best to provide money,
as money can expand post-return choices, serving as investments for busi-
nesses, education, and onward transport. Even if refugees would not really
have returned on their own, and are indeed motivated to return because of
money, choices may be enhanced from the money itself, and there is value
in such choice, especially if it also increases post-return welfare compared
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to returning with no money at all.
Consider the case of Bessie. In 2009 she ﬂed an East African country,
went to Egypt, and paid smugglers who promised to take her to Israel. As
she began her journey across the Sinai, she was kidnapped and tortured,
but managed to ﬂee to Israel, where she was given a year of residency,
and a room at a centre for victims of human traﬃcking. She wished to
return to her country of origin with some investment money, a choice that
was made possible when she was oﬀered e800, enough money to help her
survive during the ﬁrst year after repatriation in her home village. She
used the money for rent, school for her children, and to start a chicken
farm. Within several months the chickens she bought died, she lost her
life savings, and now works in a small eatery, with just enough to live on.
She faces regular food insecurity, and regrets she returned. Nonetheless,
she is happy she had the opportunity to leave Israel with money. Though
the money ultimately did not help her reintegrate and access suﬃcient
welfare, she feels it increased the chances she would, giving her one choice
she otherwise would not have.42
The idea that money enhances choices is widely accepted by a number of
repatriation programs, such as the former UK program, called Choices,43
which emphasizes that funds assist refugees to start businesses or receive
job training after return, an option they otherwise would not have. In
Pakistan, the UN similarly emphasized that refugees should have the choice
of returning to Afghanistan with funds, rather than no assistance at all,
even if they faced insecurity after returning.44 The UN made similar claims
42Interview with Bessie, Dessie, 9 June 2014.
43http://www.choices-avr.org.uk.
44E. Davin, V. Gonzalez, and N. Majidi, UNHCR's Voluntary Repatria-
tion Program: Evaluation of the Impact of the Cash Grant, Altai Consult-
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when helping Burundian refugees returning from Tanzania.45
Though money may provide an extra choice, it can also diminish choices
in the long run. If a refugee is unlikely to access suﬃcient welfare after
returning, they will lack various choices associated with welfare, including
the choice to leave a given village, send one's children to school, and access
suﬃcient nutrition. A year after Bessie returned, she lacked the full range
of employment choices open to her in Israel, and the resources to leave her
home village. As a result, she also lacked the resources to ensure she could
access an adequate range of food, shelter, and education for her children.
Similarly, two years after South Sudanese refugees repatriated, most of my
respondents were conﬁned to IDP camps, without the resources to leave.
Their choices were severely constrained compared to their co-nationals in
Israel. If NGOs and governments will be unable or unwilling to send money
to those who have already returned, and those who return will later need
money to access mobility and basic necessities, then funds may encourage
a choice that causally contributes to a state of aﬀairs with fewer choices.
Some may feel that, even if money does encourage a return that dimin-
ishes choices, there is still value in providing return assistance. The value
of choices is that it provides individuals the opportunity to control their
lives, and controlling one's life often means taking risks that may diminish
one's long-term choices. But while it is true that there is value in allowing
a person to control their life, it is not clear that enhancing such control
now, by oﬀering money, is better than enhancing control in the long-run,
ing and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2009, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/4fcf23349.html.
45Katherine Haver, Felicien Hatungimana, and Vicky Tennant, Money matters: An
evaluation of the use of cash grants in UNHCR's voluntary repatriation and reintegration
programme in Burundi, Policy Development and Evaluation Service 2009.
199
by oﬀering no money and encouraging refugees to stay.
This suggests that providing the money may be ethical if it does not
substantially diminish security and welfare and the choices associated with
security and welfare. We might imagine a refugee returning with her hus-
band and four children, and each family member receiving $78,000 each, as
promised by the BNP. Perhaps such funds, totalling almost half a million
dollars, could provide refugees various choices relating to where they live,
what they eat, and where they move. It is nonetheless not enough to claim
any amount of money increases choices. Money can enhance choices at one
point in time, but constrain them at another.
6.4 Conclusion
Immigration control involves not just force, but incentives. One major in-
centive for refugees is the money they receive when agreeing to return home.
If it is wrong for governments to endorse physically unsafe contracts, it is
wrong for governments to provide payments to encourage unsafe repatria-
tion. In cases where the government is detaining refugees or threatening
them with deportation, NGOs should avoid providing payments that con-
tribute to these policies. NGOs should limit their activities to helping those
who will unlikely ever gain asylum, or whose lives will not be at risk if they
return, and whose return does not causally contribute to the detention of
more refugees. While it is true that some payments may enhance choices,
repatriation itself can undermine choices when a country of origin lacks
suﬃcient resources and infrastructure.
Given these conclusions, governments and NGOs should consider chang-
ing their current practices, adopting three major policies.
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First, in cases where return entails signiﬁcant risks, states should only
provide funds to repatriate if they also provide refugees the option of again
living in the host country. This may be instituted by providing refugees res-
idency visas prior to return, or by providing them with special re-admission
agreements, where refugees can return to the host country with the same
legal status they had prior to repatriating. Such a policy was implemented
in France, Germany, and the UK in the 1990s and 2000s, when they pro-
vided funds to Bosnian refugees repatriating, allowing them to re-enter
these countries if they felt their return was unsafe.46 An even stronger pol-
icy would also include evacuation services for refugees who ﬁnd themselves
again displaced after returning, and unable to reach safety. Were refugees
denied such re-admission visas and evacuation services, they may fail to
gain a visa to board a ﬂight to safety, forcing them to pay smugglers,
endangering their lives again. Such was the case when South Sudanese
refugees returned from Israel, again faced persecution, and were forced to
pay smugglers to try reaching Egypt, Sudan, and Israel. Such ﬂeeing itself
entails signiﬁcant risks. In contrast, promising re-admission and evacuation
services would ensure that refugees could access protection, even if paid to
return.
To ensure that repatriation does not lead to long-term destitution and
persecution, states should also conduct post-return research. After a signif-
icant number of refugees and asylum seekers have returned, states should
interview a random sample of such returnees, and conduct an in-depth
study on the mortality rate, rate of displacement, and other risk factors
related to their return. If the vast majority of returnees are living in safety
46Richard Black, Return and Reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Missing link or
mistaken priority? SAIS Review, 21(2): 177-199.
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and security, it may be justiﬁed to provide funds to encourage return with-
out the corresponding promise of allowing later re-entrance. Repatriation
would be far more permanent, but at least safe. However, this policy
must ensure absolute safety for returnees, including access to food security,
healthcare, and reliable protection from the police and military.
In cases where refugees are in detention, and their return is coerced,
NGOs should avoid immediately providing payments for return. They
should ﬁrst do everything possible to try and secure a fair Refugee Sta-
tus Determination process for those in detention, and help them obtain
access to freedom, work visas, and social services. NGOs should only pro-
vide repatriation funds to those whose lives will certainly not be at risk, or
for those likely to face deportation if they stay, and only if this does not
contribute to further deportation, detention or destitution. They should
not provide payments to populations likely to later gain refugee status if
they refuse to repatriate, as was arguably the case with Tigisti, or for those
whose departure will contribute to detaining new refugees, as was arguably
the case with Daniel.
Though NGOs should not provide money for return in these cases, they
may still provide money to those who have already returned. So long as
NGOs do not widely publicize that they are helping refugees and asylum
seekers after return, such assistance needn't encourage repatriation, while
still helping protect returnees in their countries of origin. For example, a
small NGO in Israel, who opposed any repatriation assistance, began pay-
ing for the school fees of children whose families had returned to South
Sudan on their own. Such assistance, because it was relatively limited, and
only provided to those most in need after return, did not have a major
impact on encouraging future repatriation. Indeed, the NGO actively dis-
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couraged South Sudanese from returning, even while assisting those who
insisted on returning on their own. Policies should be focused on post-
return aid as the need arises, rather than pre-return funds to encourage
return.
Though I believe the above would make payments morally permissi-
ble, there remain serious ethical dilemmas. It is not clear if payments are
always morally permissible when provided to migrants returning to safe
countries. At ﬁrst glance, we might suppose they are; even a proponent
of open borders might support such payments, and a proponent of closed
borders may believe them preferable. But such payments still raise ques-
tions. If only some ethnic groups are oﬀered money to leave, such oﬀers
may be wrongfully discriminatory, as I will argue in Chapter 8. We may
also feel uncomfortable with oﬃcials approaching our friends, classmates,
and colleagues, telling them they can have cash if they leave, after hav-
ing established themselves in our neighbourhoods, schools, and businesses.
Payments do not become ethically unproblematic simply because return
is safe. It is just that they are especially problematic when return is un-
safe. NGOs and governments should both avoid encouraging such unsafe
returns, and reconsider their current payment practices.
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Chapter 7
Children
A child is very sick, and her parent refuses to bring her to a hospital. The
child dies. We may blame the parent for being reckless if he placed the child
at greater risk than we deem acceptable. This is not because we believe
the parent has neglected some duty to save the child's life by acquiring the
medical skills and equipment to do so. Rather, the parent has a duty to
be in a particular place, at a particular time, so others can save the child's
life.
A hospital is a very narrow space. We might imagine a broader geo-
graphical location where children have a higher likelihood of being saved
if they are in danger. It may be reckless for a parent to be in a particular
neighbourhood, region, or country, if they are exposing their children to
greater risks than parents are permitted to take. Should parents be able
to live wherever they please? More speciﬁcally, should parents be able to
migrate to any country they wish to?
There are many reasons that parents may choose to live in an unsafe
country, but perhaps the most common is that they are refugees wishing
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to return to the countries they ﬂed from. In some such cases, refugees
are repatriating to countries unsafe for children due to ongoing violence,
insuﬃcient food security, and a lack of public services. Such unsafe repatri-
ation was common when parents returned from Australia to Afghanistan
in 2002,1 from Norway to Iraq in 2008,2 from Sweden to Afghanistan in
2007,3 and from Denmark to Iraq in 2010.4 In all of these cases, parents
left countries with security, free education, and reliable healthcare, travel-
ling to countries without these basic necessities. Though some parents had
savings, many did not. And of those who did, it was not clear how long
their money lasted, nor if it helped.
As noted in previous chapters, when South Sudanese repatriated from
Israel, the country lacked basic food security,5 safety, and healthcare.6 De-
1Fethi Mansouri and Sally Percival Wood, Exploring the Australia-Middle East
Connection, in (ed.) Fethi Mansouri, Australia and the Middle East: A Front-Line
Relationship, London: Tauris Academic Studies 2011: 9.
2Arne Strand, Review of Two Societies: Review of the Information, Return
and Reintegration of Iraqi Nationals to Iraq, (IRRINI) Program. Chr. Michelson
Institute. http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?4155=between-two-societies-
review-of-the-information.
3UNHCR, Sweden, Afghanistan, UNHCR sign deal on voluntary return to
Afghanistan, 23/6/07.
4Helen Carr, Returning `Home': Experiences of Reintegration for Asylum Seekers
and Refugees, British Journal of Social Work (2014): 1-17.
5UNICEF in South Sudan, Summary ﬁnding of Sudan Health Household
Survey (SHHS) 2010 and Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2010, available at
http://www.southsudanembassydc.org/PDFs/others/SHHS%20II%20Report%20Final.pdf;
D. Maxwell, K. Gelsdorf and M. Santschi, Livelihoods, Basic Services, and Social
Protection in South Sudan, Working Paper 1, Secure Livelihoods Research Consor-
tium, Feinstein International Centre, 2012; R. K. Rai, A. A. Ramadhan, and T. H.
Tulchinsky, Prioritizing Maternal and Child Health in Independent South Sudan,
Maternal and Child Health Journal 16(6)(2012): 1139-1142.
6Jared Ferrie, More Than 200 Die in South Sudan Tribal Feud, Oﬃcial Says, CNN,
12/3/12, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/12/world/africa/south-sudan-
violence/; Al Jazeera 'Hundreds dead in South Sudan cattle raids,' 22/8/11, avail-
able at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/08/201182220946583842.html;
MSF, South Sudan: Violence against healthcare,  1 July
2014. http://www.msf.fr/actualite/publications/south-sudan-conﬂict-
violence-against-healthcare; Small Arms Survey, Fighting for Spoils:
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spite the risks, parents returned with their children, wishing to raise them
on their ancestral land, or feeling there were more opportunities in South
Sudan compared to staying in Israel.
One returning family was Mary, Dak, and their two newborn twins
and six year old son. They landed in Juba in the summer of 2012 and
took a taxi to the neighbourhood of Tong Peng, just south-west of the
airport, where friends awaited to host them until they found work. As
weeks passed, Mary and Dak both failed to ﬁnd employment, and were
unable to pay for their children's schooling. In November, when their
youngest son contracted malaria, they sent him to a hospital, using most of
their $3,000 in emergency savings. As the treatment continued, their money
ran out, and their son steadily lost the ability to walk or speak, dying two
months later in February 2013. He was one of twenty-two children known
to have died within the ﬁrst year of return, representing at least 4.4% of the
500 children who returned by 2012.7 At least two more were killed when
civil war broke out in December 2013.8 Of the forty-eight children whose
conditions I could conﬁrm as of July 2014, ﬁve had died of malaria or were
killed, representing over 10% of my sample. I learned of these ﬁve children
from their parents or guardians. If we were to look at all of the children
who returned, including those in especially unsafe areas, and whose parents
and guardians had also died, the percentage would likely be higher than
Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile, November 2011.
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/ﬁleadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-18-
Armed-insurgencies-Greater-Upper-Nile.pdf; Patients and Families Killed Outside of
MSF Compound, 29 November 2007, available at http://www.msf.org/article/patients-
and-family-members-killed-inside-msf-compound; Una McCauley, Separated Children
in South Sudan,  Forced Migration Review 24 (2005).
7Yuval Goren, (Hebrew) Aid organizations: More than 22 refugees expelled to South
Sudan killed this year, Maariv 5/6/13.
8Personal Interview with Matthew, Juba IDP Camp, 4 January 2014.
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10%.
It was not clear if these parents had a right to repatriate to South
Sudan, or whether NGOs should have assisted in their endeavour. For,
more generally, it is not clear if parents have a right to live in any country
they wish to.
The question of parental rights to migrate  including to repatriate  has
been largely overlooked in today's debates on immigration and children's
rights. Many political theorists focus on whom states should not deport,9
not whom states should allow to leave. The few discussions on the right
to emigrate largely focus on adults, with most arguing that adults always
have a right to leave a state.10 Even if they do, it remains unclear if they
have a right to bring their children with them.
To consider the extent of parents' migration rights, I ﬁrst present a very
general theory of parental rights, which I outline in the next section. Par-
ents, I argue, must protect their children's welfare above a given threshold.
When parents fail to protect their children's welfare, states have a right
to intervene. In Section 2 I will then consider what I call a Migration
Question. If parents migrate to a country where they will not have access
to welfare services, such as education and hospitals, it is not clear if states
are permitted to intervene and forcibly stop such migration. Though the
migration will harm children, the harms will take place in another juris-
diction. I argue that states do have a right to stop such migration or, at
9Matthew Lister, Who Are Refugees? Law and Philosophy 32(5)(2013): 645-671;
Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Re-
sponse to Refugees, Cambridge: University Press, Cambridge 2004; David Miller, Im-
migration: The Case for Its Limits in (eds.) A. Cohen and C. Wellman. Contemporary
Debates in Applied Ethics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2005: 193-206.
10Anna Stilz, Is There an Unqualiﬁed Right to Leave? in Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi
(eds.) Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2016.
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the very least, ought to discourage such migration. In Section 3 I address
the Coercion Question. When parents and their children are detained
because they lack the legal right to stay, they may turn to NGOs and UN
agencies for help repatriating or migrating to an unsafe country. It is not
clear if NGOs or the UN should help with such choices. I argue that they
should only help if detention is more dangerous for children compared to
leaving the country.
Before addressing the above arguments, a brief note on my focus and
assumptions.
Throughout this chapter, I will focus on both general migration, where a
parent is moving to a new country where she does not have citizenship, and
repatriation, where a parent is moving back to their country of citizenship.
I do not diﬀerentiate between these two parental choices, as the general
questions I raise cut across both types of cases. As such, I shall primarily
use the term migration to refer to both.
I shall largely focus on migration that is irreversible, describing families
who leave a safe country and cannot easily return to the safe country.
This may be the case when families are banned from re-entering a safe
country after leaving, or when refugees repatriate and are again displaced
or impoverished, unable to ﬁnd the means to re-enter a safe country.
Though I focus primarily on parents leaving a safe country with their
children, my conclusions may have implications beyond families exiting
a state. If children should never be forced to migrate unsafely, a state
could justiﬁably deny entrance on the grounds that it is too dangerous for
children within its territory. We might imagine, for example, that a state
suﬀering from internal strife, poverty, or a natural disaster could refuse to
grant visas to minors. Though I do not address these cases, it is possible
208
that states ought to take such measures, based on the arguments I put
forth.
I also do not address whether parents have a duty to ﬂee dangerous
countries for the sake of their children. Perhaps parents who can ﬂee at
absolutely no cost or risk have a duty to do so. A state could also require
that parents evacuate their children from the state's territory, and ﬁnd pro-
tection abroad. However, ﬂeeing will almost never be costless in the real
world, and there will rarely be a scenario where a safe State A agrees to
accept the parents and children of another dangerous State B, with permis-
sion from State B. There have, historically, been mass population transfers,
but these have caused extreme suﬀering to those being transferred, and in-
clude many considerations that are beyond the scope of my discussion.11
As such, I limit my analysis to cases where a parent wishes to leave a safe
state with their child, and consider whether preventing their migration is
just.
7.1 Parental Rights
To establish a general theory of parental rights, let us start with a consen-
sus: Across the literature and across cultures, most hold that parents have
some rights to decide where their children live, what they eat, where they
go to school, and what languages they speak. This is partly because, if
parents have such authority, they can more easily care for their children,
ensuring they have basic food and shelter, and various moral and inferential
reasoning skills. This is also because parents' rights matter, and parental
11For an empirical overview of such population transfers, see Chaim D. Kaufmann,
When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth
Century, International Security 23(2): 120-156.
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rights to share their culture and way of life ought to be respected.12
There is also a general consensus that parents have a right to raise
their own biological children.13 Were the state to pry away children from
competent parents, or ban them from having any relationship with their
children, the psychological distress a parent felt would be signiﬁcant, and
so such state interference should be avoided, unless a parent's care falls
below a minimal acceptable threshold.14
A minimal threshold of care, I assume, ensures children lead healthy
lives and gain the skills to reason, form reciprocal relationships,15 and
function in the society they are residing in. While there are debates as
to why children should gain these capacities  some claim these capacities
protect welfare, others claim they protect children's ability to make au-
tonomous decisions16  there is a consensus that children have a right to
12David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood, 2nd ed., London and New York:
Routledge 2004; Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the
Moral Basis of the Family, Ethics 91(1980): 6-19, 14.
13Such a principle may also better protect children. Historically, when states have
denied parents authority over their children, prying them from their arms and giving
them to supposedly better parents, the results have at times been detrimental, with chil-
dren experiencing greater incarceration, drug addiction, and anti-social behaviour. See
Australian Human Rights Commission, Bringing Them Home: Report of the National
Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their
Families, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Report, April 1997.
14Joseph Millum, How Do We Acquire Parental Rights? Social Theory and Practice
36(1) (2010): 112-132, Norvin Richards, The Ethics of Parenthood, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2010); Edgar Page, Parental Rights, Journal of Applied Philosophy
1(2)1984: 187-203; Matthew Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing, Oxford
University Press 2006.
15Martha Nussbaum, Liberty and Conscience: In Defence of America's Tradition of
Religious Equality, New York, New York: Basic Books 2008; Amy Guttman, Democratic
Education, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
16Samantha Brennan, Children's Choices or Children's Interests: Which do their
Rights Protect? in (eds.) David Archard and Colin M. MacLeod, The Moral and
Political Status of Children, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002; Eamonn Callan,
Autonomy, Child Rearing, and Good Lives in ibid: 118-140; Shelley Burtt, What
Children Really Need: Toward a Critical Theory of Family Structure, in ibid: 231-252;
Matthew Clayton, Anti-Perfectionist Childrearing, in (ed) Alexander Begattini and
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obtain these capacities and that parents should avoid preventing children
from obtaining them.
Perhaps one of the most central of these capacities is the skill to function
within an economy, allowing children to later access resources to survive,
and the self-respect that comes with employment. However, it is not clear
whether children must merely have the capacities to function within the
economy which they will live, or to function within any economy anywhere.
Swift and Brighhouse seem to suggest the former, raising the example of no-
madic tribespeople in sub-Saharan African, who can function within their
economy without a high level of literacy,17 and so can respect children's
rights even if the children never learn to read. Others have argued, simi-
larly, that parents have the right to raise their children to function within
their own culture's economy, on the grounds that a liberal state ought to
tolerate the practices of minorities who value traditional ways of life.18 On
this conception of children's rights, parents must merely raise their children
to function within their own economy.
However, children may be forced to live within a particular economy
precisely because they only gained skills to function within this economy.
If a young girl does not gain a high level of literacy because she is living
in a rural nomadic tribe, then the reason she lives in her economy may be
because she has not gained a level of literacy to function elsewhere. Indeed,
if all children everywhere were denied literacy and numeracy, and grew up
into adults who formed verbal-based economies, then they too may be able
Colin Macleod, The Nature of Children's Wellbeing, Netherlands: Springer 2015.
17Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Re-
lationships, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014: 60.
18Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights? Political Theory 20(1992):
117; William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, Ethics 105(3)(1995): 529.
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to function in their own economy without having gained a high level of
literacy. This tells us nothing about what sort of economy children ought
to be able to function in as adults.
It seems that children ought to be able to function in an economy that
can, at the very least, provide them a safe life, likely to live until the av-
erage global life expectancy of seventy years, and likely to have a life they
feel is worth living. I take this as the minimal threshold not because this
is suﬃcient, but because there is a universal acceptance that this is nec-
essary. Education can often help children obtain these goals. It provides
ﬂuency in reading and writing that is often essential for communicating
with colleagues and customers across distances, and it provides numeracy
that is often essential for keeping track of transactions, revenue, and prof-
its. While none of this ensures employment or a pleasant life, it increases
the chances of both compared to no education at all. This reasoning is
accepted by nearly all states today, which aim to ensure that all children
attend school. Even children who live a nomadic or subsistence lifestyle
are normally required to gain a suﬃcient level of literacy so that, once they
become adults, they can access other job markets in the event that their
traditional economies fail.19
7.2 The Migration Question
Though all states strive to provide education, healthcare, and security,
many states fail. When parents wish to migrate to such states with their
19John Aluko Orodho, Peter Ndirangu Waweru, Kennedy Nyambeche Getange, and
Justus Mbae Miriti, Progress towards attainment of Education for All (EFA) among
Nomadic Pastoralist: Do Home-based Variables make a Diﬀerence in Kenya? Research
on Humanities and Social Sciences 5(18)(2013): 54-68.
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children, there is a Migration Question. We might at ﬁrst suppose that
parents have no right to migrate if this entails harms we do not allow
parents to inﬂict on their children domestically. If failing to bring a child
to school or a hospital would deem a parent reckless, then moving to a
country without reliable schools or hospitals would deem a parent reckless.
But we might also suppose that, if a parent is leaving the state with their
children, they are not harming their children within the state. Just as
states do not send policemen to foreign countries to force parents to act a
certain ways towards their children, states should not prevent parents from
emigrating to countries where children will lack certain necessities. To
prevent a parent from emigrating, especially a parent who has citizenship
in a foreign country, would interfere in the jurisdiction of another state.
I shall accept the premise that states should not interfere in the safety
and welfare concerns of a foreign country, except in extreme cases. If a
country has poor hospitals and education, that is not suﬃcient grounds for
foreign interventions and so, we might suppose, is not suﬃcient grounds for
preventing a parent from moving to this country. But there are a number
of reasons that preventing emigration would not involve such foreign inter-
ference. Emigration is, in many ways, a domestic act. The act of planning
to emigrate includes paying for ﬂights and arranging travel documentation,
all of which take place locally. Just as parents have no right to plan an act
that will place their children at risk, such as planning to marry oﬀ their
child before she is sixteen, and planning to abuse her, parents have no right
to plan to move to a country where their children will likely be harmed.
We might claim that planning an act is not as wrong as the actual act,
and the actual act of migration takes place outside of the state's jurisdic-
tion. But in many ways the act of migration does takes place domestically.
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Migrating involves not just arriving in a foreign country, but boarding a
bus, or arriving at the airport, sitting down in the departure lounge, board-
ing the ﬂight, and sitting down in a seat, all of which take place without
leaving the state. Just as the act of theft involves not just placing money
in a bag, but breaking, entering, and picking up the money, the act of
migrating involves not just arriving in a foreign country, but everything
prior that is necessary to arrive in the foreign country. Even the moment
an individual's body passes over a border may be considered within the
jurisdiction of the state, in the sense that borders are shared by states, and
so within their jurisdiction. If parents have no right to act recklessly within
the state, and migration takes place within a state, then parents have no
right to recklessly migrate.
Some may argue that geography is not as relevant as the legal status
of a parent. If she is a foreign national, then her own country of origin
ought to have jurisdiction over her, and not the country she wishes to
leave. However, it is generally accepted that states can prevent illegal acts
that take place within their own jurisdiction, regardless of the citizenship
of those who commit these illegal acts. A parent who intentionally refuses
to bring his child to the hospital may be tried for recklessness, regardless of
his nationality. If migration really is a domestic act that places one's child
at risk, and creating such risks is illegal, then the state can legitimately
prevent a parent from partaking in such migration, and so prevent him
from exiting the state. And just as a parent who fails to bring his child
to a hospital can be prevented from leaving a state precisely because he
has broken the law, a parent who places their child at risk by beginning
an emigration process may be similarly prevented from leaving because he
has broken the law.
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Though the state is permitted to prevent parental migration, perhaps
the state has no duty to, if the risks are not quite so extreme. One might
hold this belief if one also holds that states are permitted to deport foreign
nationals. If deportation is permissible, then so is allowing emigration.
Of course, many hold that deportation is not permissible for foreign na-
tionals whose lives would be at certain risk from extreme famine, violence,
or persecution,20 and so we might suppose that states should intervene to
prevent children migrating to countries with these extreme and immediate
risks. But if children will merely fail to receive reliable healthcare or edu-
cation, then states have no duty to protect them from deportation, and so
no duty to prevent their parents from migrating.
I believe, however, that children do deserve protection from deportation
to countries without reliable healthcare and education. This is because we
ought to lower the threshold of risks children should be forced to face, com-
pared to adults. Children have fewer mental capacities, and are less able to
survive in an unsafe environment compared to adults. If the country a child
is returning to lacks reliable healthcare, children will be more susceptible
to various contagious diseases, partly because they have less immunity, but
also because they may struggle to take precautions. If a child also lacks
education, she may be unable to develop the capacities in the future to
care for herself as much as she could with this education. Because of this,
children should be protected from deportation even if the risks in their
countries of origin are not substantial enough to protect adults from de-
20David Miller, Immigration: The Case for Its Limits in (eds.) A. Cohen and C.
Wellman. Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing
2005: 193-206; Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy
and the Response to Refugees, Cambridge: University Press, Cambridge 2004.
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portation.21 If children should be protected from deportation to countries
without reliable healthcare or education, then the state may similarly be
required to stop parents from bringing their children to this country.
Some may argue that, though the state has a duty to avoid deport-
ing children to countries without education or healthcare, the state has
no duty to forcibly prevent such migration. Parents, we might suppose,
have the right to deny their children some levels of education and general
healthcare to progresses their own culture and conception of the good life.
Diﬀerent groups, and diﬀerent parents, have diﬀerent conceptions of what
is necessary in life, and so parents ought to have some discretion over what
necessities children must be provided.22 For this reason, parents are occa-
sionally given the right, within a state, to pull their children from school at
an earlier age, or refuse to vaccinate their children as infants. If such poli-
cies are morally permissible, then states have no duty to prevent migration
to countries with similar risks, such as preventing migration to a country
without reliable schooling or vaccinations. So long as there is no extreme
21Indeed, this general approach is occasionally taken, in an ad-hoc bases, in some
states, which will protect a family from deportation because of the harms towards chil-
dren, even though adults could generally survive. A recent case in the United Kingdom
involved a woman and her son, both from Nigeria. The woman struggled to care for
him. When she was given a deportation notice, she fell into deep depression, further
neglecting her son. Her lawyers appealed her deportation, arguing that she was a lone
woman returning to Nigeria without family or support and this would result in desti-
tution. Her lawyers also demonstrated that her son struggled to develop various social
and cognitive skills as a result of her neglect, and that she was at risk of being traﬃcked
in Nigeria if she returned. Eventually, after a number of appeals, she was eventually
granted leave to remain. But this case is exceptional. It holds that, in every extreme
cases, families should not be deported. But less extreme cases should be viewed as com-
parable to cases of domestic negligence and recklessness. Parents should not be forced to
bring their children to any country that lacks services which parents must accept domes-
tically. See RA vs. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, Oﬃce of the Chil-
dren's Commissioner, JR/2277/2015. Available at: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/ra-and-bf-v-sshd-21.pdf.
22Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights? Political Theory 20(1992):
117; William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, Ethics 105(3)(1995): 529.
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and immediate risks to migrating  such as a child with diabetes migrating
to a country without insulin  then states should allow exit. There will be
risks, but there are clear subjective beneﬁts for the parents and, in these
parents' minds, these beneﬁts extend to their children.
These considerations ought to be taken seriously. But if migration is a
domestic act, as I argued above, then states should still only permit the
same risks through migration that are permitted for parents who stay. If
parents are required to bring their children to the hospital, even if this
conﬂicts with a parents' religious beliefs, the state should not allow par-
ents to migrate with their children to countries without reliable emergency
medical care. If the state requires that parents provide schooling for their
children until age eighteen, even if the parent believes this is not necessary
for their children, then the state should not allow parents to migrate with
their children to a country without any secondary schooling. This also
suggests that, if the state permits certain acts within the state, then states
ought to allow migration to a country that would require such an act. For
example, if a state allows parents to remove their children from school at
age sixteen, then the state ought to allow parents to migrate to a country
where, due to a lack of schools, they will be forced to remove their children
from school at sixteen.
We can summarize this as a general rule of thumb:
States should prevent parents from migrating when this entails
harm or risks to harm we do not allow parents to take while
remaining within the state, but allow parents to migrate if this
entails harm or risks to harm we do allow parents to take within
the state.
When following this rule of thumb, we will come across diﬃcult cases.
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Parents may have strong personal reasons for migrating. They may face
widespread and painful discrimination in a country, and wish to move to a
country without such racism. Though parents may have legitimate reasons
for migrating, we ought to still only allow risks that would be acceptable
for parents who stay. Within a country, we require parents to protect
their child even when this means facing racism. For example, a country
may have hospital wards with widespread discrimination, where patients
of African descent, though they receive adequate care, are given poorer
care and looked at with distrust. Parents from African countries may be
loath to seek medical attention, but they are still obligated to go to the
hospital if the child's life is at risk. For, the basic welfare of the child should
trump the parent's will to avoid racism. While we should certainly try and
end racist practices, and sympathize with parents who migrate with their
children because of racism, we should not grant them the right to do so.
We might suppose that, if the state should treat migration like other
parental acts, then a state which allows extensive freedom for cultural
minorities ought to allow extensive freedom to migrate. For example, in
the United States Amish parents can remove their children from school at
the age of fourteen and teach them a vocation instead.23 Perhaps parents
have a right to move to a country without schooling at fourteen if the
circumstances in the country are similar to that the Amish.
Most of the time, however, circumstances will not be very similar. Mi-
grating entails an irreversible choice. When a child leaves school at fourteen
23Shelly Burtt, In Defense of Yoder: Parental Authority and the Public Schools in
(eds.) Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin, Political Order, New York and London: New
York University Press 1998: 412-437 and David Archard and Colin MacLeod, Religious
Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defense of an Illiberal Education, Review of Politics
56(1)(1994): 51-70.
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within a state, but remains in the state, she can often return to school later
as an adult, and leave her community behind. In contrast, a fourteen year
old migrating to a country without schooling cannot later return to school
and leave her community behind. In a similar vein, because leaving a
country is irreversible, the risks compound. Though a fourteen year who
leaves school but stays in the country will face some risks  she will strug-
gle to learn math and reading skills later in life and so struggle to ﬁnd
employment  these risks can be somewhat mitigated through adult edu-
cation classes. In contrast, if a fourteen year old permanently moves to a
country without free secondary schooling, then the risks of poor education
will extend beyond childhood, into adulthood, where she will lack both
skills and the ability to try and obtain them. Similar conclusions may be
reached regarding some vaccinations and healthcare: A parent who refuses
to vaccinate their children or bring them to a doctor within a state is not
limiting their children's ability to access vaccinations and doctors in the
future.24 In contrast, migrating to a country without such services entails
preventing the child from accessing vaccinations and reliable doctors in the
future. As a general rule, we must account for the irreversible nature of
migration when calculating its risks; irreversible migration requires greater
safety than comparable acts within a state.
In current policies around the globe, the opposite is the case. The
acceptable safety required when migrating is often lower than the safety
required while remaining within a state. In the UK, for example, parents
are only banned from migrating with their children if they are planning on
24For vaccinations that cannot be obtained in the future, it is at least the case that
children, once adults, can access treatment for diseases that arise from their lack of
vaccinations. When children will face risks that cannot easily be treated, we might
argue states really do have a duty to require vaccination.
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marrying their child oﬀ or travelling to Islamic State-controlled territory.25
In contrast, a family is permitted to travel to Central African Republic or
South Sudan, both of which lack universal schooling and reliable health-
care.26 In other words, while parents do not have authority to remove
children from school or a hospital domestically, they do have authority to
permanently move to a country without schools and hospitals. But it is
precisely leaving a state that may be irreversible, and the consequences far
more permanent, requiring greater vigilance, rather than less.
Now that I have established that parents have no right to migrate when
risking their children's safety and capacities, and states have a duty to pre-
vent such migration, let us consider how, exactly, the state should intervene.
The state could consider the particular risks a child will face, because of
the parents' personal characteristics or motives. For example, the UK has
a policy of preventing a parent from travelling to Pakistan with their child
if there is evidence that the parent intends to marry their child oﬀ upon
reaching Pakistan.27 Such a policy, however, may fail to protect most chil-
252015 EWHC 869 (Fam) Case No: FD15P00125, FD15P00126, FD15P00127,
FD15P00128, FD15P00129; Court 46, The Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London,
WC2A 2LL, 27 March 2015. Before: Mr. Justice Hayden, Between The London Bor-
ough of Tower Hamlets, Claimant, and M and Ors, Defendants.
26John P. Renschler, Kelsey Walters, Paul N. Newton and Ramanan Laxminarayan,
Estimated Under-Five Deaths Associated with Poor-Quality Antimalarials in Sub-
Saharan Africa, The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 2015;
UNICEF in South Sudan, Summary ﬁnding of Sudan Health Household Survey (SHHS)
2010 and Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2010; D. Maxwell, K. Gelsdorf and M.
Santschi, Livelihoods, Basic Services, and Social Protection in South Sudan, Work-
ing Paper 1, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, Feinstein International Cen-
tre 2012; R. K. Rai, A. A. Ramadhan, and T. H. Tulchinsky, Prioritizing Maternal
and Child Health in Independent South Sudan, Maternal and Child Health Jour-
nal 16(6)(2012): 1139-1142; MSF, Patients and Families Killed Outside of MSF
Compound, 29/11/07, available at http://www.msf.org/article/patients-and-family-
members-killed-inside-msf-compound; Una McCauley, Separated Children in South Su-
dan, Forced Migration Review 24(2005).
27Forced Marriage, (Civil Protection) Act 2007,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/20/contents.
220
dren, as the risks often arise from the country the child is moving to, rather
than the intentions or actions of the parents. The state could instead ban
parents from travelling to certain countries that are especially unsafe, to
prevent permanent migration to such countries. This might involve, for ex-
ample, banning travel to South Sudan, which has an 18% school enrolment
rate, an illiteracy rate above 50%, and a child mortality rate of 74 deaths
per 1,000 live births.28 Under such a policy, the state would use physical
force if a parent attempted to travel to South Sudan, either revoking their
passports or imprisoning them as a last resort. Migration would only be
permitted if a parent proved that, due to their exceptional circumstances,
they were able to provide security and education for their children. The
burden of proof would be on parents to demonstrate that their predictions
on risks were accurate.
Some may feel that this policy would be overly harsh. It would prevent
even short trips to unsafe countries, as the state would be unable to diﬀer-
entiate between parents permanently migrating and those merely visiting.
This would also conﬂict with the liberal assumption that individuals have
the right to leave the country they are residing in. Travel bans prevent
merely possible risks to children, while certainly undermining freedom of
movement for parents.
A less controversial policy would entail discouraging parents from trav-
elling to certain countries with their children, without physically preventing
them from doing so. Such a policy could have signiﬁcant impacts on the
choices parents make, as many parents move to countries that are not safe
for children because they are unaware of the risks that such migration en-
28World Health Organization, South Sudan, Global Health Observatory 2014, avail-
able at http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.cco.
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tails. Such was the case when many repatriated from Israel to South Sudan.
After having lived their whole lives outside of South Sudan, the majority
did not know about malaria rates, ethnic-based violence, and the lack of
universal healthcare and education. A signiﬁcant percentage struggled to
ﬁnd this information because they lacked literacy, and most had no rela-
tives to call in South Sudan, and so simply assumed conditions would be
similar to those in Khartoum, Cairo, Tel Aviv, or other cities they had lived
in. In such cases, governments should disseminate information about risks
via public or private forums.
Importantly, the goal of this information should be to persuade parents
to stay, rather than to simply inform parents of the various risks.29 And
for parents who are already aware of the risks, the goals of the campaigns
should be to constantly remind them that migrating is illegal and unsafe,
and that staying is preferable to protect the security and welfare of their
children.
7.3 Coercion
The policy recommendations above are highly unlikely to be supported
in countries where governments actively encourage migrants to repatriate,
threatening to detain them or denying them work visas. In some such cases,
parents lack the funds to repatriate, and the government refuses to provide
such funds. NGOs and the UN step in, providing free ﬂights to parents
and their children, raising a Coercion Question. It is not clear if NGOs
29The UK does provide limited information to refugees considering return, but the
goal is always to ensure choices are informed. It is not to persuade parents to avoid
repatriating. See the website of Refugee Action, the NGO which facilitated the UK's
Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration program until 2014: http://www.choices-
avr.org.uk/countries_of_return.
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and the UN should help with such repatriation. While the assistance may
help parents be free from detention, it also places their children at risk.
In earlier chapters, I argued that NGOs should help with return if there
is little else they can do to help, if the return does not encourage further
coercion, and if parents are informed and unlikely to regret their choice.
But even if these conditions are met, it may be morally impermissible to
help parents return with children, given the risks children will face.
The question of whether to help families return became increasingly
relevant in the summer of 2012, when two immigration oﬃcials in Israel
sat in their oﬃces and printed out white excel sheets, listing the names
and addresses of several hundred South Sudanese children and their par-
ents, and then hiring dozens of policemen to travel throughout the country,
visiting the homes of each family, and using metal batons to bang on their
doors. One door belonged to the family of Nyandeng, the ﬁfteen year old
girl described in the introduction, who had arrived in Israel six years earlier
with her mother, eventually settling in the northern town of Naharia. As
police arrived at their home, Nyandeng and her younger brother were both
wearing their backpacks, about to walk to school:
My little brother left the house and saw big men come and
enter. They said to us, Sit. You are not going to school.
They were very scary looking and huge. My mother wanted to
call friends for help, and the three men said, No you cannot
call anyone. The immigration police told my mother to just
sign some papers and that's all. She signed that paper that
says she wants to go back. Everyone signs it. She needed to
sign, otherwise we would go to prison.30
Though Nyandeng's mother agreed to return, they lacked the means
30Interview with Nyandeng, Entebbe, 9 May 2013.
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to do so, and received a free ﬂight from OBI and $1,500 to each family
member. Nyandeng's mother describes how she felt before boarding the
ﬂight:
I was crying and crying. I did not want to go to prison, but I
have nothing to do in South Sudan. I was not born in South
Sudan and I have nothing here. Even my mother and father
had spent most of their lives outside of South Sudan, and died
in Port Sudan.31
We might suppose there were good reasons for the NGO to help Nyan-
deng, her mother, and her younger brother return. Children have a right
to freedom, which they cannot obtain in detention. Returning helps them
obtain this freedom, even if this means risking their health and safety. This
reason, I believe, is relatively weak. While it is true that basic freedom,
such as the freedom to leave a home, may be as important as health and
safety for children, it does not seem that more general freedom, such as
the freedom to leave a detention center, is more important than health
and safety for children. If children can still run, play, and attend school in
detention, then their freedom is not so overwhelmingly undermined as to
justify helping them repatriate to a country without education and med-
ical care, where violence is widespread. Of course, if there were serious
human rights abuses in detention then NGOs would be justiﬁed in helping
with return, but such justiﬁcations only arise if detention places a child at
greater risk than repatriating.
There is another reason we might believe NGOs should pay for repatri-
ation.
Some parental burdens are so great that no parents should be forced to
31Interview with Nicole, Entebbe, 9 May 2013.
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accept them, even when doing so is necessary for their children. No parent,
for example, should be forced to work in a dangerous and demeaning job
to feed their children, such as forcing a mother to work in prostitution
to support her child. Similarly, parents should not be forced to stay in
detention to protect their children. Parents have certain rights as distinct
from those of their children, and the right to be free from detention is one
such right. If so, perhaps NGOs should help parents repatriate to avoid
detention, even if this places their children at risk.
Though there is a limit to the burdens parents should be expected
to accept for their children's welfare, there is also a limit to the burdens
children should be forced to accept for their parents' freedom. If so, then
it is not clear that helping with return is the preferable option. Nor is it
the case that NGOs are themselves forcing parents to sacriﬁce freedom for
their children. Rather, NGOs are simply responding to the government's
detention policy, which they have no control over. In responding to this
policy, NGOs have two choices: either help secure parents' freedom at
the expense of children, or protect children's welfare at the expense of
their parents' freedom. The child's welfare should take priority, given that
children are generally more vulnerable than adults, and so deserving of
special protection.
There are, however, cases where an NGO is not the only agent helping
with return. As noted in Chapter 3, there are often multiple ways of
migrating or repatriating, such as the government paying for their ﬂights,
or parents paying for their own ﬂights. When families are likely to leave
the country regardless, and move to an unsafe country regardless, should
an NGO help them? I believe they should not, for similar reasons raised
in Chapter 3. A given NGO can never be certain that a given parent will
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leave if the NGO refuses to help, because it is never certain the parent
will have the means to leave on their own, nor certain the government
will ultimately pay for their ﬂight if the NGO does not. An NGO should
avoid helping with unsafe migration, to avoid possibly being necessary for
reckless migration. An exception should only be made when NGOs can
ensure a much safer return than would otherwise likely take place. This
might be the case if a parent will almost certainly return regardless and, if
she does not receive help to return, will use clandestine means to migrate,
placing herself and her child at risk. If an NGO can provide a very safe
passage over borders, then helping with such returns may be legitimate.
The above cases focus on parents who return to avoid detention. In
reality, many refugees return because they are misinformed about what
to expect, as noted in Chapter 4. Of the 126 individuals I interviewed
after return, fourteen falsely believed that, had they stayed in Israel, their
children would have remained on the streets without food, shelter, care,
or education. These parents told me that, in South Sudan, they could
at least ask relatives and friends for help. Importantly, of the fourteen
who believed their children would have no food in Israel, four left only for
this reason; when I coded the interviews, I saw that these four individuals
had no other information, from any source, that provided them additional
reasons to return.
Had parents stayed, their children would unlikely have been homeless
in Israel, and instead placed either in foster care, or detained with their
parents, still able to access food, shelter, healthcare and education. In
such cases, NGOs should tell parents that their children will access such
necessities, and that such necessities will be unavailable after returning.
Informing parents of this can help them make better decisions, even in
226
the midst of coercive conditions. Such information will also be helpful
for explaining to refugees why return assistance is denied, and will help
persuade parents to not pay for their own repatriation.
7.4 Conclusion
Children often lack capacity and, as such, lack the right to decide where
to live. Adults decide on their behalf, considering what might be in their
interests. To protect these interests, parents have no right to migrate to
a country that fails to provide suﬃcient security or welfare for children.
States should discourage parents from engaging in such migration if, in
migrating, this entails a reduction in security and welfare that would be
unacceptable for children staying within the state. This policy should be
applied for both parents migrating to a new country they have never lived
in, and repatriating to their country of origin. When states insist on en-
couraging such repatriation, and detaining migrants and refugees who stay,
NGOs should refuse to assist, unless returning is safer for children than
staying in detention, or much safer than returning via other means.
The analysis I raise may have implications beyond emigration and repa-
triation. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, countries suﬀering
from internal strife should possibly deny visas to minors attempting to
enter their territory. Similarly, perhaps some states have a duty to help
evacuate children from their territories, or from especially unsafe regions
within their territories. We might imagine the US government, or private
NGOs, helping relocate families in a high-crime area of Detroit, or the
Thai government helping families relocate from unsafe areas of southern
Thailand to the north of the country. While these are not the only policy
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solutions  it may be better to invest resources in making areas safe  such
policies may be the best option when children's lives and education are at
immediate risk, and change will not come in the near future.
The policies I have proposed are more limited, touching upon migration
and repatriation alone. However, they still have broad implications for
parental rights, some slightly disturbing, such as states denouncing the
choices of refugees returning to their countries of origin, and NGOs refusing
to help with return, even as minors and their parents are forced to live inside
the barbed-wire borders of a detention facility. These policies, though
disturbing, are still preferable to the alternatives. We may no longer see a
child once she crosses a border, but this does not mean she has suﬀered no
harm. We must account for such harm in formulating a theory of children's
rights. Just as parents should protect children within a state, they should
protect them when travelling between states, better ensuring they have
access to the safety, education, and healthcare they need.
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Chapter 8
Discrimination
In 1972, under the rein of Emperor Haile Selassie, a severe famine broke out
in Ethiopia, leading to the deaths of roughly 60,000 individuals. Amidst
unrest, the Marxist Dergue staged a coup d'etat that ended in Selaisse's
assassination, and the start of civil war in 1974.1 Three years later the war
reached the town of Axume in northern Ethiopia, where a toddler named
Milka lived with her mother. Together, Milka and her mother walked into
Sudanese territory, where they received food and shelter in a UN refugee
camp, but faced constant harassment from Sudanese authorities. In 2003,
Milka paid smugglers to take her by bus to Wadi Halfa, and then by boat
to Egypt, and then by jeep across the Sinai Desert, eventually reaching the
border fence with Israel. She climbed the fence, dropped onto a bound of
sand on the other side, and hailed a lift to Tel Aviv, where she worked on the
black market for over a decade, cleaning rooms in hotels, and then selling
fresh Ethiopian injera bread to locals in the surrounding neighbourhoods.
1Cormac Grada, Famine: A Short History, Princeton: Princeton University Press
2009; Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twen-
tieth Century, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2004.
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She married, had two children, and divorced in 2011, the same year her
injera business began to ﬂounder. It went under a year later, and she
struggled to pay rent or purchase food for herself or her children. As a
result, in the spring of 2012 she considered returning to Ethiopia. She felt
it would be safe, and had extensive knowledge about her home town, as
her sister had moved there several years earlier.2
As Milka considered whether to repatriate, an Israeli Member of Knes-
set stepped onto a podium in South Tel Aviv, and gave a speech before
thousands of anti-immigration protesters. Africans, she declared, were a
cancer to the body and the government should do everything possible to
encourage them to leave the country. The majority of Israelis agreed with
her.3 Shortly after her speech, citizens began smashing the windows of
African-owned shops, with one protester throwing a grenade at a nursery
with African children,4 and three others stabbing to death three Eritrean
pedestrians walking home from work.5 As protests against African mi-
grants continued, the Prime Minister stated that Africans were inﬁltrators
threatening the country. Soon after, the Ministry of Interior began oﬀer-
ing free ﬂights and money to almost all African migrants who agreed to
repatriate or resettle to a third country in Africa.6 Non-African migrants
of comparable legal status, such as those from Myanmar or Ukraine, were
2Interview with Milka, Tel Aviv, 29 July 2014.
3A study conducted in 2012 asked a random sample of respondents, To what
extent do you agree with the statement that `Africans are a cancer to the body'?
52% percent stated that they agreed with this statement. See Ephraim Yaar and
Tamar Hermann, Peace Index - May 2012, Downloaded on 3 October 2014 from
http://en.idi.org.il/media/602071/Peace%20Index-May%202012(1).pdf.
4Haggai Matar, Community Shaken after Night of Arson Attacks on African
Refugees, 972 Magazine, 27/04/12.
5Haggai Matar, Three Eritreans Stabbed in South Tel Aviv Internet Café, 972
Magazine, 31/07/12.
6Ilan Lior, Israel to Oﬀer African Migrants $5,000 to Leave, Haaretz, 30/10/13.
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never oﬀered such assistance to repatriate. As a result, Milka was told she
could receive $14,000 if she left. She accepted the oﬀer, hoping to start a
restaurant in Addis Ababa, and build a better life for herself and her two
children.
Was Milka a victim of wrongful discrimination when she was paid to
leave?
Milka, and many other migrants, were clearly wronged from the violence
and inﬂammatory speeches. But imagine that were no speeches or violent
attacks. Instead, the Prime Minister quietly set up a special budget to help
Africans leave, using no coercion or incitement, and only funds to make
return possible for them, but not others. Would such a plan be wrongful
discrimination? More generally: Is it wrong to pay unwanted minorities to
leave?
In this chapter, I move beyond discussing refugees alone, and address
migrants who are not at serious risk from returning, but who are assisted to
return because of their ethnicity. While such returns are less problematic,
they still pose the concern that repatriation is wrongfully discriminatory.
If it is wrongfully discriminatory, it is not clear why. When we think of
discrimination, we often imagine victims treated diﬀerently in a way that
either harms them or, at the very least, does not beneﬁt them. Victims
are denied visas, jobs, apartments, places in universities, and equal rights
before the law.7 Rarely do we imagine victims treated diﬀerently in a way
that is more beneﬁcial for them precisely because they are not wanted.
Such forms of discrimination are not limited to immigration control in
7Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry into
the Nature of Discrimination, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014; Deborah Hell-
man,When Is Discrimination Wrong?, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2008;
Shlomi Segall, What's so Bad about Discrimination? Utilitas 24(1)(2012): 82-100.
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Israel. Over ﬁfty years ago, in New Orleans, white segregationists provided
funds to African-American families who agreed to move to New York City.8
In a recent case in New York, a landlord paid black tenants $12,000 to leave
their apartments, increasing the value of the property as only white tenants
remained.9 As noted in Chapter 6, in 2010 the British National Party
(BNP) promised to pay $78,000 to asylum seekers agreeing to voluntarily
leave the country. The BNP made clear that only those who were not
White British would qualify, and no force would be used.10 More recently,
British Prime Minister David Cameron discussed the refugee inﬂux in 2015,
and his only mention of African refugees was in the context of a return
path, implying that African refugees would receive assistance to repatriate,
never mentioning similar return assistance for Syrian refugees.11 When
Milka was paid to leave, her case was not exceptional. Like similar cases,
it has simply been overlooked.
In the next section I will consider cases outside the sphere of immi-
gration, describing private individuals who pay minorities to leave towns
and apartment buildings. I address such cases outside of immigration to
determine whether, more generally, it is permissible to pay minorities to
leave. I demonstrate that current theories of discrimination cannot quite
answer this question. Theories either implausibly assume that discrimina-
tion is in no ways wrong when the beneﬁts outweigh the harms, or theories
accept that such beneﬁcial discrimination is wrong, but fail to specify if
8Clive Webb, `A Cheap Traﬃcking in Human Misery': The Reverse Freedom Rides
of 1962, Journal of American Studies 38(2)(2004): 249-271.
9DW Gibson, `I Put in White Tenants': The Grim, Racist (and Likely Illegal)
Methods of One Brooklyn Landlord, New York Magazine 12/5/15.
10Jon Smith, BNP would oﬀer ¿50,000 to leave the country, The Independent,
29/4/10.
11Emma Dabiri, Leah Green, and Bruno Rinvolucri, Africans Being Left Behind by
a Two-Tiered Refugee System, The Guardian 30/09/15.
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it is permissible. In Section 2 I argue that paying minorities to leave is
impermissible when certain conditions are met. In Section 3 I apply my
arguments to the case of migrant repatriation.
Before proceeding, a brief note on my focus and assumptions.
I shall focus on cases cases where an individual, in paying minorities to
leave, is engaging in an act she has no duty to pursue, giving assistance that
is above and beyond what the minorities would otherwise obtain. I shall
generally assume that such acts can be wrong in some ways but still all-
things-considered permissible. When I write wrong in some ways I mean
there are moral reasons to avoid the act, even if there are countervailing
reasons to partake in the act. When I write permissible I mean that,
because these countervailing reasons are especially weighty, individuals are
morally permitted to engage in the act, and others have reasons to permit
and legalize the act. I assume that one reason to permit a wrongful act
is that the consequences are suﬃciently beneﬁcial for a victim, who also
consents to the act because of these beneﬁts. For an example of such an
act, consider a sexist individual who believes women are mentally inferior
to men and so, as a result, helps women in need by providing generous
donations to women's shelters. While this man's actions have some wrong-
making features, including his sexist intentions and the demeaning nature
of his assistance, his actions may still be permissible, due to the beneﬁts
obtained for the women he assists. At the very least, it is worth consid-
ering when such actions may be permissible despite their wrong-making
features. This is not to claim that actions are permissible based solely on
consequences or that, if an individual acts permissibly, they are not worthy
of moral criticism. Nor do I assume that, if an individual beneﬁts from a
permissible act, they must be grateful. Rather, my assumption is merely
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that beneﬁts can create countervailing reasons for establishing permissibil-
ity.12
When presenting my arguments, I shall generally assume that paying
minorities to leave has wrong-making features. Intuitively, this seems clear,
and I shall present theories that explain this intuition. But though the
payments have wrong-making features, the beneﬁts may still constitute a
countervailing reason to permit the act. My goal is to establish when this
countervailing reason is suﬃcient to permit the act, and when it is not.
I will largely remain neutral as to the full range of reasons for why
discrimination is wrong. Some argue that discrimination is only wrong
when it excludes individuals, others when it denies opportunities, others
when it harms the worst oﬀ, others when it demeans minorities, and so
forth. Some believe, as I do, that discrimination can be wrong for two
or more of these reasons, depending on the context.13 My goal is not to
prove that any one or more of these reasons explains the wrongness of
discrimination, but to establish whether, in cases where there are multiple
reasons to believe discrimination is wrong, it is still permissible when the
victims beneﬁt.
When I speak of beneﬁts, I shall focus primarily on cases where individ-
uals are paid to leave, as in Chapter 6, or where individuals are provided
12We might call such acts wrongful permissible acts, or suberogatory acts but,
for simplicity, I shall use the word permissible on its own. Some deny the existence
of wrongful permissible acts, arguing that there are only right and permissible acts, or
wrongful impermissible acts, or neutral acts that are neither right or wrong. If one holds
this, then when I write permissible I merely mean that others should not interfere and
attempt to stop the act. See Julia Driver, The Suberogatory, Australasian Journal
of Philosophy 70(1992): 286295 and Hallie Rose Liberto, Denying the Suberogatory,
Philosophia 40(2)(2012): 395-402.
13Sophia Moreau, What is Discrimination? Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs
38(2)(2010): 157-160; David Benatar, The Second Sexism: Discrimination Against Men
and Boys, Malden, USA and Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell 2012: 5.
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free transport they otherwise could not obtain, as in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and
7. I shall not distinguish between assistance which makes it possible to
leave and assistance which merely incentivizes a person to leave, referring
to both as paying minorities to leave. I make no distinction primarily for
simplicity, to focus on puzzles of discrimination that cut across both types
of cases.
There are other forms of assistance, besides money and transport, which
similarly encourage minorities to leave. Minorities may be oﬀered free hous-
ing far away, or food aid in a distant refugee camp. There are also forms of
discrimination that, like payments to leave, involve signiﬁcant beneﬁts. An
employer might believe women have poorer math skills and promote them
to higher-paying managerial positions where math skills are not necessary.
I shall not directly address such cases, because when minorities historically
have been paid hard cash to leave, the racist and sexist goals of the payers
have been especially salient, as have the beneﬁts for the recipients. But
though I focus on money to leave, the conclusions I reach may be similar
for other cases involving beneﬁts for the discriminated.
Throughout the chapter I shall primarily focus on cases involving ethnic
minorities or women. I will not signiﬁcantly address other groups, primar-
ily for simplicity. If you believe that discrimination against other groups is
also wrong, this is consistent with the argumentation I put forth. Finally,
I put aside cases of structural injustice, where no agent has an explicit
intent to exclude.14 In all of the cases I present, the discriminator pays mi-
norities with the intent of encouraging them to leave precisely because the
14Fred Pincus, From Individual to Structural Discrimination, in (eds.) Fred L.
Pincus and Howard J. Ehrlich, Race and Ethnic Conﬂict, Boulder, CO: Westview 1994:
82-87, 84.
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discriminator thinks they are less valuable. The politician who paid Milka
to leave had openly racist preferences, but was giving Milka an opportunity
she otherwise would not have, privileging her above non-African migrants,
many of whom wanted to return home, but lacked support to do so. Given
the advantage that Milka gained, it is not clear if she was treated in an
impermissible manner.
8.1 Theories of Wrongful Discrimination
Current theories on discrimination cannot establish whether paying minori-
ties to leave is impermissible. To demonstrate this point, let us begin with a
domestic case, and consider what diﬀerent theories might say about an or-
ganization called the White Citizens Council, established in the American
South in 1954.
The Council, as a white supremacist group, had the primary aim of
keeping segregation legal. It spent a decade lobbying congressmen, boy-
cotting black-owned businesses, and even producing a children's book that
taught heaven was segregated.15 By 1962 it had failed to keep segregation
legal, so it changed its tactics, oﬀering thousands of African-Americans
transport and money to leave southern states, and move north. The ﬁrst
family to accept this oﬀer included Louis and Dorothy Boyde and their
eight children, all living in New Orleans. Louis had recently lost his job
after falling ill, and Dorothy was expecting another child. They accepted
the Council's $50, food, and bus tickets out of town,16 packed their belong-
15Timothy B Tyson, Blood Done Sign My Name: A True Story, USA: Random House
2005: 182.
16Clive Webb, `A Cheap Traﬃcking in Human Misery': The Reverse Freedom Rides
of 1962, Journal of American Studies 38(2)(2004): 249.
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ings, and boarded a bus for New York City, arriving two days later, elated
to start a new life with less overt racism, more stability, and greater em-
ployment opportunities.17 The Council had many goals in sponsoring their
migration, but one was simple: to reduce the number of African-Americans
in New Orleans.18
If there is something wrong with the Council's payments  and there
certainly seems to be  then a good theory of discrimination will explain
why, and also establish whether such payments are morally permissible.
Current theories of discrimination either fail to establish why such acts are
wrong or, though they can establish wrongness, cannot establish if they
are permissible.
Other Features Account
The ﬁrst theory is not quite a theory, but a claim: The payments were not
themselves wrong or impermissible. It was the other features of the case
that indicate wrongful or impermissible actions.
The Council engaged in other racist activities, and there was general
racism in New Orleans. Any institution that pays minorities to leave prob-
ably exists in a society where minorities cannot attend certain schools, buy
certain houses, or walk down the street without fear of being lynched. At
the very least, it is a society with widespread implicit biases and structural
inequalities, and it is these inequalities alone that are wrong and imper-
missible to support.
Another possible wrong-making feature is related to the potential invol-
untariness of the Boydes' decision. As victims of severe poverty and general
17Webb 2004 ibid: 249.
18Webb 2004 ibid: 253.
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racism, they were potentially compelled to accept the free transport and
cash.19 If ethnic minorities are compelled to leave town, they are victims
of forced discrimination. Perhaps it is the forced nature of their departure
that disturbs us, rather than the oﬀer of money itself.
Finally, some might argue that the Bodyes were wronged because they
were exploited, rather than because they were paid. In general, wrongful
exploitation occurs when we enter a transaction with an individual whose
rights have been violated, and we beneﬁt oﬀ of their rights violations. If
a factory owner hires a worker, paying her a piece of bread a day, and the
reason she accepts such a low wage is because her land has been stolen,
then she is being exploited.20 Similarly, if the Boydes' reason for accepting
the $50 was because of general discrimination and poverty in New Orleans,
they were wrongly exploited. The White Citizens' Council gained from the
Boydes' unjust circumstances in the sense that, for a mere $50, it could
encourage African-Americans to leave, satisfying its racist preferences.
I do not believe that these other features of the case  racism in New
Orleans, the involuntariness of the consent, or exploitation  can fully ex-
19Webb 2004 ibid. 249.
20This theory of exploitation is slightly diﬀerent than that raised by others, such as
Valdman and Steiner. Both claim that, to wrongfully exploit another person, it must the
case that the exploited gain less from the exploiter than some counter-factual state of
aﬀairs where the exploited were not vulnerable or had their rights violated. This formu-
lation is problematic. Consider the following example: a starving person agrees to accept
a piece of bread to work, but had she not been vulnerable or had her rights violated, she
would have accepted nothing at all, and volunteered for the factory. It still seems like
exploitation if the woman really is vulnerable or had her rights violated even though,
in a counter-factual world where she was not vulnerable, she would have accepted the
same or less payment. She is exploited, I believe, because her reasons now for accepting
only a piece of bread is that she is vulnerable or had her rights violated. See Mikhail
Valdman, A Theory of Wrongful Exploitation, Philosophers' Imprint 9(6)(2009): 1-14;
Hillel Steiner, A Liberal Theory of Exploitation, Ethics 94(2)(1984): 225-241 and Hillel
Steiner, Liberalism, Neutrality, and Exploitation, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics
12(4)(2013): 335-344.
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plain the intuition that there is something wrong with paying minorities
to leave. Imagine the Council consisted of exactly one white supremacist
living in a very tolerant city. She spent her days knocking on the doors
of ethnic minorities, oﬀering money on the condition that they leave town,
and recipients accepted the money without facing any coercion or other
forms of discrimination. Many may feel uneasy about such payments even
though they entail no other forms of coercion or racism. Something seems
wrong with the payments themselves, and a good theory of discrimination
will explain why.
Harm and Beliefs-based Accounts
There are two theories of discrimination that struggle to explain the wrong-
ness of payments to leave, let alone if they are impermissible. The ﬁrst
theory claims that discrimination is wrong if it harms its victims. Diﬀerent
theorists claim that diﬀerent harms are morally relevant. Some claim that
it is wrong to exclude minority members, even if they are not made worse
oﬀ.21 Others claim discrimination is wrong when it disadvantages the worst
oﬀ in society.22 Some claim discrimination is wrong when it denies equal
opportunities to minorities.23 Finally, some claim discrimination is wrong
when it widens the gap between advantaged and disadvantaged groups.24
These harm-based theories seem to imply, counter-intuitively, that there
21Hugh Collins, Discrimination, Equality, and Social Inclusion, Modern Law Review
66(1)(2003): 1643.
22Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, The Badness of Discrimination, Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice 9(2005): 167-85, 167.
23Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry into
the Nature of Discrimination, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014: 175 and Shlomi
Segall, What's so Bad about Discrimination? Utilitas 24(1)(2012): 82-100.
24Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law, Oxford: Oxford University
Press 2015.
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was nothing wrong with the Council paying the Boydes, because they were
not harmed. Though the Boydes left, they were not excluded in the tradi-
tional sense. They were never forced to leave, and the money helped them
escape a society full of exclusion, and join one with less segregation and
far more job opportunities. While it is true that leaving New Orleans was
likely a diﬃcult experience, prying them away from friends, families and
the home they knew, it also helped them obtain opportunities they pre-
ferred to have. Nor did the family just happen to beneﬁt from the Council's
discriminatory payment scheme, as when a person is denied a job opportu-
nity, moves to another city, and happens to ﬁnd greater opportunities and
advantages in this new city.25 The White Citizens' Council speciﬁcally in-
tended for African-Americans to beneﬁt from migrating, to persuade them
to leave and never come back.
The Boydes, as members of a disadvantaged group, were also never
made worse oﬀ by the payments, or denied equal opportunities to white
residents. Nor did the payments widen the gap between their position and
the position of white residents of New Orleans. Precisely the opposite: As
they boarded the bus, cash in hand, they were given one extra opportu-
nity that white residents did not have, including very poor residents who
preferred funds to leave, but could not access these funds. It seems oddly
to fall under the category of aﬃrmative action, which Lippert-Rasmussen
argues is a form of justiﬁed discrimination. The bus tickets and money,
to use his words, closed the gap between how well-oﬀ those who bene-
ﬁt unjustly from discrimination are and how well-oﬀ they would be if no
discrimination took place henceforth.26
25Lippert-Rasmussen 2014 ibid: 157.
26Lippert-Rasmussen 2014 ibid: 160.
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Harm-based theories similarly struggle to establish the wrongness of
other cases involving payments. Today, some attorneys claim that women
can receive higher severance pay if they prove they were discriminated
against, including in the termination of their contracts.27 If this is true,
some companies may essentially pay women to leave, oﬀering generous
severance to women in return for their quiet acquiescence to the termination
of their contract. These women may be better oﬀ than if they received
no extra severance pay, and slightly closer, economically, to their male
counterparts. We might even imagine a woman paid to leave a company
and made economically better oﬀ than if no discrimination had taken place
at all, receiving more money than the men received in their salary and
severance pay. If we intuitively feel there is something wrong about such
severance pay, a good theory of discrimination should explain why.
A second set of theories, called belief-based theories, can better account
for the intuition that something is wrong. These theories view discrimi-
nation as wrong when the result of racist or sexist beliefs, regardless of
whether victims are excluded or disadvantaged.28 The Council had racist
beliefs which lead them to pay blacks to leave, and companies may have
sexist beliefs which lead them to pay women to leave.
Though belief-based theories explain the wrongness in these types of
cases, they cannot explain the wrongness of paying minorities to leave
without any racist or sexist beliefs. Consider a case, from 2015, involving
27Andrew S.Bosin, LLC. Discrimination and Harassment Claims Could In-
crease Amount of Severance Oﬀered, downloaded on 20 July 2015 from:
http://www.njbusiness-attorney.com/articles/discrimination-harassment-claims-
increase-severance.html.
28Richard Arneson, What is Wrongful Discrimination? San Diego Law Review
43(4)(2005): 775-807; Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 14(1)(1992): 149219.
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a Brooklyn landlord paying $12,000 to black residents agreeing to vacate
their apartments, never paying white residents this money. His interests
were ﬁnancial: An all-white building increased the market value of his
property, allowing him to charge more rent.29 He may have had prejudicial
beliefs  a recent interview suggests he did30  but if he did not, his actions
still seem disturbing, even if motivated by ﬁnancial gain alone.
Some may argue that the Brooklyn landlord is a case of racist beliefs.
The landlord was responding to the demands of white renters willing to
pay more to live in an all-white apartment. These white renters had racist
beliefs, or at least objectionable preferences and biases. It is wrong, some
argue, to discriminate in response to the racist preferences or biases of
others, even if the discriminator himself has independent non-objectionable
beliefs.31
But even if racist beliefs can explain the wrongness of paying minorities
to leave, such beliefs do not establish whether such payments are imper-
missible. It is precisely these racist beliefs that contribute to victims' ben-
eﬁting. If victims' prefer the money to leave than no money at all, perhaps
we ought not prevent these payments from transpiring.32 To be clear: this
29Importantly, there is no evidence he discriminated in his choice of tenants; he merely
encouraged black tenants to leave, while white tenants remained. He could then raise
the rent of the vacated apartments, as white residents were willing to pay more money
to live in an all-white apartment building.
30DW Gibson, `I Put in White Tenants': The Grim, Racist (and Likely Illegal)
Methods of One Brooklyn Landlord, New York Magazine 12/5/15.
31For example, it is wrong to only hire white salespeople to successfully sell to white
racist costumers. This is close to the argument raised by David Benatar. See Benatar
ibid: 7.
32Adam Slavny and Tom Parr note, in a footnote, a similar point. They argue that
discrimination can be wrong based on objectionable beliefs but suggest the possibility
that, even if discrimination is wrong because of the beliefs of the discriminator, dis-
crimination may still be permissible (or not all-things-considered wrong) if the victim
beneﬁts signiﬁcantly. They raise the example of a racist admissions oﬃcer in a low-
ranking university who hopes to reduce the number of dark-skinned students. Rather
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is not a criticism of belief-based accounts, which are intended to establish
wrongness, rather than permissibility. Rather, it is to emphasize that, if
we wish to establish when payments to leave are impermissible, we need a
theory distinct from belief-based accounts.
Expressive Meaning Account
The expressivist theory is especially eﬀective at explaining the wrong-
ness of the payments but, like belief-based accounts, does not establish
permissibility.
According to Scanlon and Hellman, both proponents of this general
theory, discrimination is wrong because it expresses an oﬀensive33 or de-
meaning message that minority groups are not fully human or. . . of equal
moral worth.34 One can express demeaning messages even if one has no
racist or sexist beliefs, and even if one is not aware one is oﬀending and
demeaning others. If a principal requests that black students and white
students sit on opposite sides of a classroom for purely aesthetic reasons
 and completely unaware of the history of segregation  his classiﬁcation
would be demeaning regardless of his beliefs.35
than rejecting these applicants, she persuades the admissions team at Oxford to accept
them instead. The students are happy with this result. Slavny and Parr conclude that
Suﬃciently large beneﬁts may be capable of defeating the wrongness of the discrimi-
nation. (p. 12). It is not clear, however, precisely when such large beneﬁts defeat the
wrongness, or at least make the discriminatory act morally permissible, and free from
state interference. See Adam Slavny and Tom Parr, Harmless Discrimination, Legal
Theory(forthcoming): 12.
33Thomas Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press 2008.
34Deborah Hellman, When Is Discrimination Wrong?, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press 2008: 35.
35Hellman 2008 ibid: 26. This example was original raised by Paul Brest. See Paul
Brest, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials, Boston: Little
Brown and Company 1975.
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One can even demean someone who is not aware they are being de-
meaned.36 A girl with cognitive disabilities may be demeaned if taunted
on the playground, even if her impairment means she is not aware she is
being taunted. Importantly, one can oﬀend or demean another even if they
beneﬁt in some ways. Hellman argues this point using an example of Nel-
son Mandela in prison on Robin Island. He and black inmates were forced
to wear shorts, clothes normally reserved for children. Mandela may have
beneﬁted from cooler clothing on such a hot island, but was wronged be-
cause he was treated in an infantilizing manner.37 We might imagine other
oﬀers with a beneﬁt that entails a demeaning message. A woman may be
given the opportunity to work in a pornographic ﬁlm that is violent and
degrading towards women. Let us put aside whether such practices are
wrong.38 It seems clearly wrong to go up to a woman on the street and
ask if she would be willing to take part in violent sexual acts in return for
money. Oﬀers for extra options can be demeaning even if, in accepting
such oﬀers, some women proﬁt.
There are a number of reasons why oﬀers can be demeaning, even if
recipients beneﬁt. One reason is that oﬀers objectify recipients, as in the
case of the woman above, or because they express a lack of sensitivity
to historical injustices, as in the case of the principal segregating children.
Beneﬁcial oﬀers can also demean if combined with an endorsement of racism
or sexism, such as oﬀering women extra severance pay to leave. Finally,
discriminatory oﬀers can demean others when treating them as members of
36Hellman 2008 ibid: 27.
37Hellman 2008 ibid: 27.
38Cynthia A. Stark, Is Pornography an Action?: The Causal vs. the Conceptual View
of Pornography's Harm, Social Theory and Practice 23(2)(1997): 277-306; Hellman
2008 ibid: 42.
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a group, rather than as individuals with their own autonomous decisions,
preferences, and talents. Imagine an orchestra director who selects an East-
Asian violinist, despite her poor performance, because he is inﬂuenced by
the stereotype that women of East-Asian descent are better at playing the
violin. The director disrespects her because he treats her as a member of a
group, rather than an individual with her own unique character and skills.
He demeans her even if she beneﬁts.39
The expressivist account seems consistent with the intuition that the
White Citizens' Council's actions were in some ways wrong. The Council
was treating the Boydes, and all African-Americans in New Orleans, as
members of a group, rather than individuals to be judged according to
their skills, character, and unique attributes. Because the payments were
combined with an endorsement of segregation, the payments also implied a
demeaning message: We do not want you so much, that we are willing to
give you money to leave. Indeed, the greater the ﬁnancial beneﬁt for the
victims, the more strongly the discriminator is expressing how much they
are willing to sacriﬁce personal resources to meet their racist preferences.40
In this sense, payments are distinct from merely requesting that another
39Benjamin Eidelson, Treating People as Individuals in (eds.) Deborah Hellman
and Sophia Moreau, Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2013. Sometimes, such treatment is not demeaning, or seems less
demeaning. If a white man is elected because of his gender and ethnicity, despite poor
performance, it does not seem he is demeaned, despite being treated as a member of
a group, rather than an individual. It may only be demeaning if the minority group
is in some ways disadvantaged, or has been historically disadvantaged. See Tarunabh
Khaitan, Prelude to a Theory of Discrimination Law, in (eds.) Deborah Hellman
and Sophia Moreau, Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2013: 145.
40Indeed, some argue that, whenever we undermine the dignity of others, we are
essentially expressing a certain oﬀensive message. See Tarunagh Khaitan, Dignity as
an Expressive Norm: Neither Vacuous Nor Panacea, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
32(1)(2012):1-19.
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person leave, without oﬀering any money at all. The money is constitutive
of the message, and so constitutive of the wrong.41
The idea that payments can be demeaning may be consistent with some
harm-based accounts. If payments are demeaning, they also socially ex-
clude,42 in the sense that individuals are told how little they are valued in
society. If payments are demeaning, they also undermine equality of op-
portunity, in the sense that individuals no longer have the opportunity to
be free from the demeaning message implied by the payments. Similarly,
if demeaning others harms them, and harming the worst oﬀ is what makes
discrimination wrong,43 then we can view demeaning payments as wrong in
this sense. In other words, some harm-based accounts, like the expressivist
account, can view demeaning others as wrong even when they beneﬁt.
Despite the expressivist account's helpfulness in establishing wrongness,
it does not establish permissibility. As Hellman herself notes, her theory
of discrimination does not say when the wrongfulness of [discrimination]
may be overridden by other considerations.44 Other considerations may
include the beneﬁts minorities gain, and their acquiescence in light of these
beneﬁts. Were payments to cease, this would deny minorities access to
41This is not to claim that, whenever an agent pays minorities to leave, they are
necessarily demeaning these minorities. We might imagine an anti-racist NGO that
provides funds to rescue minority members from a racist society. Their actions may not
be demeaning if the NGO makes clear they support equality, and provide money in a
way that mitigates any oﬀensive meanings that may arise. They might, for example,
provide money alongside lobbying for the end of racism, while making clear that the
payments are to help individuals achieve equal opportunity, rather than to reinforce
racial separatism. But when payments are provided as an endorsement for racism or
sexism, or in a way that evokes an oﬀensive meaning due to historical injustice (as with
the principal), then the payments do imply a demeaning message.
42Hugh Collins, Discrimination, Equality, and Social Inclusion, Modern Law Review
66(1)(2003): 1643.
43Lippert-Rasmussen 2014 ibid: 167.
44Hellman 2008 ibid: 31.
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money they could otherwise obtain, and which some wish to obtain. While
the demeaning character of discrimination constitutes its wrong, it remains
unclear if the beneﬁcial character of some discrimination establishes its
permissibility.
Some might argue that beneﬁts for victims  even signiﬁcant ones 
are not competing moral considerations, and so ought not make wrongful
discrimination permissible. Hellman and Yuracko both discuss a case that
evokes this intuition, involving a casino that forced female workers to wear
makeup, forbidding male employees from doing so. For diﬀerent reasons,
Hellman and Yuracko both conclude that the casino wrongfully discrimi-
nated against the women.45 This case is interesting, I believe, partly be-
cause the employees gained a salary, were not forced to work at the casino,
and possibly beneﬁted compared to alternative forms of employment. De-
spite these beneﬁts, I still feel the women were treated in an impermissible
manner for the reasons raised by Hellman and Yuracko. The weight of the
beneﬁt seems insigniﬁcant.
Even if this is true, the women were not beneﬁting from the discrim-
ination itself; they would still gain a salary in a world where employers
stopped requiring women to wear makeup, assuming the casino retained
its customers when the women stopped wearing makeup. If the govern-
ment banned sexist dress codes in casinos, it is unlikely women would be
worse oﬀ. This is not the case with payments to leave: Minorities would
lose money if this type of discrimination were banned, because the discrim-
ination is what entails paying individuals money.
45Hellman 2008 ibid: 46 and Kimberly Yuracko, Sameness, Subordination, and Per-
fectionism: Towards a More Complete Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, San
Diego Law Review 43(2006): 857-897.
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Some might argue that, even if minorities prefer the payments, such
preferences are not strong reasons to permit otherwise wrongful discrimi-
nation. This is because, more generally, preferences hold little weight in
establishing the permissibility of wrongful discrimination. If most women
in a country prefer banning the vote for women, their preferences seem less
important than our hope that all women be given the freedom to vote. But
there is an important distinction between preferences for forced exclusion
and preferences for voluntary incentives. When minority members support
forced discrimination, they are denying opportunities to others. Women
who support banning female voting are denying other women the opportu-
nity to vote. The same cannot necessarily be said about the Boydes. When
they boarded the bus, nobody else was forced onto the bus. In consenting
to leave, it was their private choice alone.
Of course, it was not quite their private choice alone. The Council's
actions, and the Boydes' consent to leave, may have harmed others in
society. This is a possibility I shall now address.
8.2 Impermissible Beneﬁcial Discrimination
If payments are only permissible when all parties beneﬁt and consent, then
payments are impermissible if there are parties harmed without beneﬁting,
or paid without consenting. In other words, payments may be impermissi-
ble when one of two conditions is met: third parties are harmed, creating
negative externalities for society; or the recipients of the payments have
failed to consent to the payments.
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Third-Party Harm
There are a number of ways payments can create harm for third parties.
One way is by increasing implicit bias, harming all members of a given
group, including members never paid to leave. If the public is unaware
there is an exchange of payments, they may assume that minorities are less
willing to stay, reinforcing the stereotype that members of this group are
less committed to staying.46 Imagine, for example, if a sexist CEO oﬀered
women generous severance payments to leave their place of employment,
leading more women to retire early. In such cases, others may assume
that women are more likely to retire early because they are less committed
to their jobs when, in fact, they are choosing to retire because they are
paid to do so. If this stereotype about women sets back the interests of
other women, including those never paid to leave, then others are harmed
without the corresponding beneﬁt.
Even if payments do not have these concrete impacts, they may still
demean all members of a minority group, including those never paid. The
discriminator is sending a general message: I am willing to pay money to
encourage members of this group to leave. Other members of the group
understand that they, too, are not wanted, even if never oﬀered payments.
Indeed, discrimination can demean individuals who are not of the minor-
ity group paid to leave, but are members of other disadvantaged groups,
including other ethnicities, religions, genders or sexualities. These groups,
residing in the same town, building, or place of employment, may under-
46A related argument has been raised by Deborah Satz with regards to some mar-
ket transactions. In her example, a reason to ban surrogacy services is it reinforces
stereotypes of women as baby-making machines, and this may harm other women. See
Deborah Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010: 130.
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stand that, in a close possible world in which their group was targeted,
they too would be unwanted. Being exposed to this possibility may be un-
settling, and possibly oﬀensive, without the corresponding ﬁnancial beneﬁt
obtained by the parties directly paid to leave. Payments may even oﬀend
members of the majority group who oppose the racist and sexist ideals
being promoted by the payment schemes. If I learn that my employer has
paid oﬀ all minority workers, so that only non-minorities remained, I would
feel the policy was oﬀensive towards the ideals I hold, speciﬁcally the ideal
of creating a society where all are valued regardless of their ethnicity, sexu-
ality, or gender. A small part of my interests have been set back as a result
of the payments, without any corresponding beneﬁts.47
Payments do not necessarily materially harm, demean, or oﬀend others
in the manner described. They needn't enhance biases if they only occur
sparingly, nor do they express an oﬀensive message if they only occur pri-
vately. If the landlord in Brooklyn only oﬀered these payments once, and if
he never advertised his actions, we might conclude that only those directly
given money were demeaned and, because they beneﬁted and consented,
were not treated in an impermissible manner.48 But given the public nature
47The above argument focuses on the public nature of the payments, as a public
expression of disrespect towards all members of a minority group. I believe that even
private payments could demean third parties. This is because discrimination can be
demeaning towards individuals who are not aware of the discrimination, and so never
personally oﬀended. Return, again, to the case of the girl with cognitive disabilities
who is taunted on the playground, demeaned despite being unaware of the meaning of
the taunting message, and so never personally oﬀended. If one can be demeaned from a
message one never comprehends, perhaps third parties can be demeaned from a message
they never hear. Whether one accepts this claim depends on whether one accepts it is
possible to wrong someone who is not aware they are wronged, and experiences no
reduction in welfare. Putting this debate aside, we can at least conclude that public
payments constitute a clear expressive harm towards third parties. They have been
wronged without any beneﬁts and, as such, have been impermissibly wronged.
48Such payments, though permissible, could still be open to critique due to the beliefs
of the landlord or the expressive nature of his actions. As noted in the introduction
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of the landlord's oﬀer, and the possibility that such oﬀers are pervasive,
these payments should be viewed as impermissible due to the way they de-
means others who do not beneﬁt. A similar claim can be made regarding
the White Citizens' Council. It oﬀered thousands of African-Americans
payments, possibly reinforcing the outside status of blacks in New Orleans,
and demeaning other African-Americans, who understood just how much
they were not wanted, even if never given money to leave. When oﬀers re-
inforce biases in this manner, and also demean other members of a minority
group, we should generally prioritize society's interests over the preferences
of the individuals receiving the money.
Though we should generally prioritize society's interests, there remains
a concern. Some recipients of payments may feel their interests should be
prioritized because they are from an especially disadvantaged group. This
argument has been raised in other cases involving beneﬁcial discrimina-
tion. In 1991 Manuel Wackenheim, a man with dwarﬁsm, would take part
in a sport called dwarf throwing. Large men would throw Mr. Wack-
enheim large distances for entertainment, paying him a steady income to
participate. France eventially banned dwarf-throwing due to its demeaning
nature, and Mr. Wackeneheim felt this unfairly denied him employment
for the sake of societal aims.49
While the tension between individual beneﬁts and societal harm can
never be fully resolved, a step in the right direction would be to adopt a
principle of proportionality. If preventing discrimination would cause dis-
to this chapter, if a man donates to women's shelters because he believes women are
less capable than men, he can be criticized for his sexist beliefs, even if his actions are
permissible.
49Manuel Wackenheim V France, Communication No 854/1999, U.N. Doc
CCPR/C/75/854/1999(2002).
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proportionate harm to minorities, denying them basic goods  including
food, shelter, and an adequate range of options  then the discrimina-
tion is permissible. Perhaps Mr. Wackenheim had the right to engage in
dwarf-throwing if he had no other employment opportunities. Similarly,
minorities have a right to payments to leave if they have no other means
of accessing employment, food, and other necessities. If they have such a
right, then the payments are permissible. This may have occurred with the
Boydes. If they had no other means of accessing employment other than
accepting the Council's assistance to move to New York, then the Council
acted permissibly, even if their actions demeaned other African-Americans.
If the Council acted permissibly, then the US government acted rightly in
not preventing the Council's payments.50
As such, we can arrive at the following conclusion: Paying minorities
to leave is impermissible if two jointly suﬃcient conditions are met. First,
third parties are harmed and, second, recipients are not dependent on pay-
ments for basic goods.
Consent
Even when third parties are unharmed, or recipients are dependent on
payments for basic goods, payments are impermissible when recipients have
not consented to their provision. There are two groups who may fail to
consent.
One is comprised of those who reject the oﬀer of payments, and have
been forcibly exposed to such oﬀers against their will. If women are oﬀered
50This assumes the US government was unable or unwilling to provide equivalent
payments for the Boydes. If it could, the government perhaps should have done so,
rather than permitting the payments.
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greater severance pay to leave, or black families funds to relocate, they are
treated impermissibly if they reject the oﬀer, given that they are demeaned
without any corresponding beneﬁt. This is not to claim we should deter-
mine permissibility based on beneﬁts or consent alone. I merely claim that,
if the vast majority reject the oﬀer, there is no conﬂict between their pref-
erences and the wrongness of demeaning treatment. Their preferences have
not been met, and they have been demeaned. Of course, some might claim
that, even if individuals do not consent to the payments, they still beneﬁt in
an objective sense. They are oﬀered a great deal of money, and this money
oﬀsets the wrong-making features of discrimination. This seems unlikely.
If recipients do not perceive this money as suﬃciently beneﬁcial to oﬀset
the wrong-making features of discrimination, it seems safe to proclaim the
beneﬁt is insuﬃcient to establish permissibility.
The second non-consenting group is comprised of individuals who accept
an oﬀer, but only because it was oﬀered. Given the choice, they would never
have wanted the oﬀer to begin with.51 This may occur when individuals
feel that, once a demeaning oﬀer is on the table, the expressive meaning
has already been conveyed, and so they may as well accept the money
and leave. Individuals may also accept an oﬀer to be polite, or to avoid
creating tension, while still wishing the oﬀer were never posed.52 As with
51As David Velleman puts it: Preferring to accept an invitation is consistent with
wishing you had never received it. See J. David Velleman, Against the Right to Die,
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17(6)(1992): 672. More generally, it can be rational
to consent to an oﬀer, but also rational to prefer the oﬀer never be available at all. See
Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conﬂict, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960.
52Velleman raises similar arguments in the context of euthanasia. One reason that
states ought not to grant the right to euthanasia is that, once a patient has the option,
they may feel pressure to accept it. More generally, we often would be better oﬀ without
an oﬀer even if we would consent to an oﬀer once it was given. For example, in a country
where dueling is legal, individuals may consent to duel to save their honor; but many
would prefer to never have the option to duel, to avoid being in a position where they
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the ﬁrst group, their preferences have not been met and they have been
demeaned. This may have occurred with the Brooklyn tenants. They
may have accepted money because it would be preferable to leave than to
continue living in the building of a racist landlord. These tenants may have
felt that, given the choice, they would have been happier had they never
been oﬀered the money at all.
Some may claim that, even if the vast majority of minority members
do not want the oﬀer to leave, the oﬀers should still be permitted if no
third parties are harmed or demeaned. If minorities are never told about
the oﬀers, all will never be able to accept them. Importantly, we cannot
know if an individual would have consented to being given the oﬀer unless
they are asked, Do you want me to oﬀer you money to leave? and this
question would be tantamount to an oﬀer. To address this concern, we may
wish to distinguish between the ways in which oﬀers are posed. Very public
advertisements may be more intrusive compared to private oﬀers, and so
may undermine consent more than private oﬀers. If payments should ever
be permitted, oﬀers should be limited to discretely advertised oﬀers alone.
8.3 Discrimination in Repatriation
Let us return to Milka, and consider whether states are permitted to pay
ethnic minorities to repatriate. To address this, we must ﬁrst address a
related question: When can states use discrimination to deny visas, sub-
jecting minorities to deportation? If it is permissible to deport someone
because of their ethnicity, then it seems permissible to pay them to leave
because of their ethnicity, using no coercion at all. In the private cases
need to reject a duel, and lose their honor. Velleman 1993 ibid: 676.
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of the last section, we needn't have delved into this issue; it seems obvi-
ously impermissible for a landlord to only accept white tenants, and for an
organization to force individuals to leave a city, so the question was only
whether payments were also impermissible. But if denying visas based on
ethnicity is permissible, it seems paying minorities to leave is as well.
There are reasons to believe racist visa denials are impermissible. Con-
sider two major justiﬁcations for immigration control. One is that citizens
have freedom of association.53 Citizens are similar to members of a large
club, and if clubs can exclude, then states are permitted to exclude as well.
Another justiﬁcation is that, if states have no control over who enters and
stays, this can overwhelm welfare institutions, harming residents within
the state. If either of these justiﬁcations is valid, then it seems they do not
permit racist exclusion. This is because, in general, freedom of association
and welfare do not permit racist exclusion. Private golf clubs, even if they
have a right to exclude, do not generally have a right to ban members of
a given ethnic group.54 Similarly, local municipalities, though they can
sometimes force some to sell their houses for overall welfare, cannot force
only some ethnicities to sell their houses for overall welfare.55 If excluding
53Christopher Heath Wellman, Immigration and Freedom of Association, Ethics
119(2008): 109-141.
54Of course, there is some private freedom of association where discrimination is per-
missible. If a person is less attracted to members of other ethnic groups, they are not
acting impermissibly when marrying a member of their own ethnicity. For, it is gen-
erally accepted that we cannot quite control who we love, or who we are attracted to,
and even who we become friends with. But such ethnic and gender-based exclusion is
unacceptable in more public establishments, where members have no intimate attach-
ments to each other, such as golf clubs, schools, and apartment buildings. See Sarah
Fine, Freedom of Association is Not the Answer, Ethics 120(2010): 351.
55Many object to the claim that immigration control is justiﬁed on the grounds I
described, arguing that states are nothing like clubs, and welfare gains do not justify the
use of force. My argument is that, even if we accept these justiﬁcations for immigration
control, ethnic-based immigration control is still wrong. For an argument against the
right to exclude based on freedom of association, see Sarah Fine, Freedom of Association
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ethnic groups is wrong regardless of association and welfare gains on the
domestic level, then such forced discrimination is also wrong in immigration
control.
Why make this leap? One reason is that consistency is important in
debates on immigration control. The justiﬁcations for immigration con-
trol, if there are any, is that they uphold values we apply in other spheres.
If we do not intuitively feel that people should be able to exclude ethnic
groups from their private clubs, then this weakens the state's right to ex-
clude ethnic groups from their territory. Similarly, if we do not intuitively
feel it is just to use force against only certain ethnicities, even when this
protects welfare, then deporting only some ethnic groups is also imper-
missible, even if this improves the welfare of citizens. These conclusions
are consistent with a range of theories in immigration ethics. Even David
Miller, a strong proponent of states' right to exclude, agrees that racist and
sexist immigration control is wrong, even if immigration control is generally
justiﬁed.56
Some argue that states  and, indeed, private clubs  do have a right
to deny membership based on ethnicity, or any criteria they wish. If one
holds this view, then there is another reason states should not deny visas
based on ethnicity. Denying visas would oﬀend or demean the state's own
citizens. Were a state to only provide visas to white applicants, this would
communicate to non-white citizens that they are less valued by the govern-
ment.57
is Not the Answer, Ethics 120(2010): 338-356.
56David Miller, Immigration: The Case for Its Limits in (eds.) A. Cohen and C.
Wellman, Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing
2005: 204.
57Christopher Heath Wellman, Immigration and Freedom of Association,, Ethics
119(2008): 139.
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This claim, originally raised by Christopher Wellman, seems to have a
disturbing implication. If the only reason discriminatory immigration is
wrong is that it oﬀends one's own citizens, this implies that a state with
only white citizens is permitted to deny visas to non-white visa applicants,
because there would be no non-white citizens to oﬀend. If we ﬁnd this im-
plausible, it seems we must reject Wellman's premise that denying visas is
only impermissible if it demeans citizens. But I do not believe his premise
 that denying visas is wrong when it demeans citizens  leads to his con-
clusion  that denying visas is only wrong when there are minority citizens.
As I argued in the previous section, discrimination can demean individuals
from other disadvantaged groups, including religious and sexual minorities,
who understand that, in a close possible world where they were targeted,
they too would be unwanted. And it demeans members of the majority
who would feel oﬀended by their government's racist visa policy.
From here we can conclude that paying minorities to leave, like racist
visa denials, is impermissible because it demeans or oﬀends citizens. When
Milka was paid money, she was essentially told, You are not wanted.
You referred to individuals of African descent. Even if the message im-
plied only that non-citizens from Africa were unwanted, from this we can
infer another message to citizens of African descent: If you were not a
citizen, the payments imply, you would be unwanted because of your
ethnicity. The greater ethnicity is used as an indicator of who receives
money to leave, the more citizens of the same ethnicity understand that,
in a close possible world, they too would be unwanted. This message may
oﬀend not only citizens of the same ethnicity, but all citizens who ﬁnd the
meaning oﬀensive in general, undermining the ideals they value.
As with domestic cases, the payments may also reinforce stereotypes
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and biases. If non-citizens of a certain ethnicity are paid to leave, the public
may increasingly associate a person's ethnicity with their outside status,
viewing citizens of the same ethnicity as outsiders. In some instances, this
may place minority citizens' lives at risk. Between 2012 and 2015 assailants
in Israel attacked at least two Jewish Ethiopian citizens. The assailants
mistakenly believed the men were non-Jewish non-citizen migrants from
Eritrea or Ethiopia.58 This not only harmed the men who were attacked,
but the public at large, which was opposed to any discrimination against
Ethiopian Jewish citizens, regardless of what they thought of non-citizen
migrants from Eritrea and Ethiopia. The more ethnicity is a metric for
who should be encouraged to leave, the more citizens may view ethnicity
as an indicator of who should be attacked or, at the very least, viewed as
diﬀerent, suspected as not belonging.
Though this generally creates a decisive reason to view payments as
impermissible, this reason may conﬂict with the interests of non-citizen
minorities who prefer to have the payments and leave. As argued in the
previous section, a principle of proportionality would permit paying mi-
norities to leave if, though the payments are demeaning towards others,
they provide food, shelter, and mobility to recipients. For this reason, the
US government ought to have permitted the White Citizens Council to pay
the Boydes to leave if the Boydes were dependent on such payments for
basic mobility and employment.
There is an important diﬀerence, however, between domestic cases like
58Vered Lee, Tomer Zarchin and Yaniv Kubovich, Protesters Attack Israeli of
Ethiopian Origin in Rally against African Migrants, Haaretz, 30/5/12 and Arin Hil-
lel Mizrahi, (Hebrew) Police Oﬃcer Hits Border Patrol Soldier: Thought he was
foreign national, Ynet 1/1/15, available at http://www.mynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
4631012,00.html.
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the Boydes and immigration cases like Milka. Migrants are often depen-
dent on payments to leave because of the government's own actions. The
Israeli government denied Milka a visa to access welfare beneﬁts in Israel,
causing her to became destitute, and causing her to become dependent on
the government's payments to leave and open a business in Ethiopia. If
the government acts wrongly in denying visas, then we cannot claim the
government acts permissibly because migrants need the money; they only
need the money because of the government's other impermissible actions.
Many would claim that the government is often acting permissibly in
denying visas. In the case of Israel, there is little evidence that the gov-
ernment was racist in allocating visas to migrants, and so denying a visa
to Milka may have been permissible, assuming she was not at risk in her
country of origin. If denying her a visa was permissible, and if denying her a
visa meant she needed money for basic goods, then it was better to provide
her basic goods by paying her to leave than to provide no payments at all.
It is true that the payments were racist, and so demeaning towards other
citizens, but basic goods for migrants  including the ability to go home
 arguably take priority over avoiding demeaning citizens. An alternative
conclusion we might reach is that basic goods for migrants is equally as
important as avoiding demeaning citizens. If this is true, the government
ought to ﬁnd mechanisms to provide basic goods to migrants in a way that
does not demean citizens. The government could, for example, oﬀer all
migrants funds to repatriate, or oﬀer all migrants visas to stay, ensuring
payments are not racist.
I shall not attempt to determine which conclusion is more plausible,
nor whether the government was permitted to deny Milka a visa. I shall
instead reach the following more modest conclusions. In cases where mi-
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grants are not dependent on payments for basic goods, the government
should cease providing payments to leave if this harms or demeans citi-
zens. In cases where migrants are dependent on payments for basic goods,
then it is preferable (though perhaps not obligatory) for the government to
provide payments to all migrants regardless of ethnicity, or to provide aid
to migrants that is not dependent on leaving. This will prevent demeaning
messages towards citizens, while still securing basic goods for migrants.
These conclusions rest on the assumption that migrants prefer to have
the payments than not. As argued in the previous section, payments in
the private sphere are impermissible when recipients have not consented to
them, either because they reject the payments, or would rather they were
never oﬀered at all. This is true even if payments do not harm or demean
others, and even if they provide basic goods to recipients. To consider if this
conclusion regarding consent is relevant in immigration control, we must
consider whether the consent of migrants matters in immigration control.
Some argue that consent does not matter. States, many claim, are
permitted to deny visas or deport a range of migrants, even without the
consent of these migrants. If states are permitted deport migrants without
their consent, we might suppose states are permitted to oﬀer payments
to leave, even if migrants have not consented to being exposed to these
racist payments. Even proponents of open borders may conclude that,
though coercion in immigration control is wrong, exposing migrants to
racist payments without their consent is permissible so long as no physical
coercion is used.
Of course, we might suppose that paying minorities to leave is suﬃ-
ciently racist as to be wrong even if no direct coercion is used. Migrants
have a right to a certain level of respect, and this respect is impossible if
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they are forced to endure racist oﬀers to repatriate. If so, states are only
acting permissibly if (but not only if) recipients of the payments consent to
their being exposed to such oﬀers. The consent of migrants does matter.59
I shall not attempt to determine which of the two claims is more plausi-
ble, and instead reach a more modest conclusion: The beneﬁts for migrants
in being paid to leave, and the consent they provide in leaving, is not a
relevant consideration if these migrants feel their lives would be better had
they never been oﬀered money at all. In such cases, states cannot jus-
tify their actions by appealing to consent. This leaves open the possibility
of other justiﬁcations for permitting payments, or the possibility that the
payments are impermissible for other reasons.
8.4 Conclusion
Many minorities would prefer to accept assistance to leave than face contin-
ued incitement by politicians, violent attacks on the street, and an inability
to ﬁnd a job, rent an apartment, and interact with others as equals. Oth-
ers wish to leave not because they face discrimination, but because they
hope to ﬁnd better opportunities elsewhere, only possible when handed a
large amount of cash to move far away. While paying minorities to leave
may seem intolerable, it helps minorities escape intolerance, or start their
lives anew, making it easier to resettle, ﬁnd a job, and integrate into a
new neighbourhood, city, or country. And while such payments are de-
meaning, they give resources to the demeaned, helping ensure their exit is
59To clarify: The consent is a necessary condition, but is not suﬃcient. It must also
be the case that no third parties are demeaned or harmed. The above reasoning refers
to instances where no third parties are demeaned or harmed, but where we still might
suppose the payments are impermissible because recipients have failed to consent to
their provision.
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smoother than it otherwise would be, at times enriching them more than
if no discrimination took place at all.
To consider when such oﬀers are permissible, it is not enough to consider
if individuals are demeaned or harmed, given the tremendous beneﬁts they
can accrue. We must appeal to other considerations, the ﬁrst relating
to third parties. Payments are only permissible if they do not harm the
interests of minority members never oﬀered assistance to leave. Such harm
can arise when payments demean other members of the same minority,
signalling to them that their ethnicity is less valued. Payments can similarly
harm the interests of non-minority members oﬀended by the message of
inequality and implicit biases that arise.
The second consideration is related to basic goods. If minorities are
dependent on payments to access food, shelter, or mobility, then payments
may be permissible even if they demean other members of society. In the
context of immigration control, if the state is permitted to deny visas to
migrants, they may be permitted to pay them to leave if this provides
basic goods that migrants would otherwise not access. It is preferable,
however, that the state ﬁnd other non-racist means of providing basic goods
to migrants.
The ﬁnal consideration relates to consent. Within the domestic sphere,
payments are impermissible if recipients would rather never be exposed to
the payments at all, regardless of whether they demean or harm others,
and regardless of whether they provide basic goods to recipients. Within
immigration control, such payments may still be permissible, albeit there
is one less reason for their provision.
Accounting for these considerations is essential for establishing a more
complete theory of discrimination. It is true that Milka preferred to return,
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feeling $14,000 provided more opportunities then staying in Israel. But
we ought to shift our gaze away from the money she received, and onto
the status of other migrants and citizens. In doing so, we can consider
a broader array of people, preferences, and outcomes, better determining
when discrimination is impermissible and repatriation is wrong.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
At 1:35pm on January 15th, 2013, Nhial boarded Ethiopian Airlines ﬂight
491, ﬂying from Juba to Addis Ababa. He wore a hat, to cover his Nuer
tribal scars, and settled into his seat, landing two hours later in Ethiopia,
where he took oﬀ his hat, strode into the sunlight, and asked a Nuer
stranger for help. Together, they drove into town.
When Nhial was a small boy, Northern Sudanese militias entered his
village, grabbed his leg, pulled him into a truck, and took him to their home
in the north of the country, where he worked as a slave into adulthood. He
eventually escaped to Khartoum, and then Egypt, arriving in Israel in
2007, where he worked, saved money, and read extensively about the risks
of living in modern-day South Sudan. In June 2011, he bought a ticket for
Juba, arriving on July 2nd, 2011, a week before South Sudan became an
independence country. He rested for a day, and then sought employment
in the oil industry, but his applications were ignored, even as his Dinka
friends were hired. Instead, he opened a small stall in a market, selling
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sweets, making enough to live on.1
In 2013, a day after the outbreak of the civil war, Dinka soldiers arrived
at his stall, grabbed his sweets and money, and demanded that he leave.
He did, jogging to the IDP camp, where we ran into each other a week
later, recognizing each other from Jerusalem. He told me he did not regret
his choice to return, despite being forced to ﬂee to the camp. We met again
on January 16th, by chance on the same ﬂight to Addis, him ﬂeeing the
country, me returning home. He still did not regret his choice and, half a
year later, joined the opposition military in South Sudan. In 2014 I visited
him in Gambella in Ethiopia, where he was still satisﬁed with his choice to
repatriate.
OBI never assisted Nhial in returning, but if they had, they would have
done no wrong. He was never coerced into leaving or paid to leave, saving
up money himself, ﬁnding enough information to be aware of the risks, and
returning without children, his choice endangering him alone. Nor was he
likely to regret his choice. The year he returned, past returnees in Juba
were happy with their decisions, and it was likely he, too, would be happy
with his.
Unlike Nhial, most refugees leaving Israel were coerced into their deci-
sions, either threatened with deportation or living in destitution. In such
cases, NGOs and the UN should refuse to help with return unless they
also lobby for the end of coercive government policies, and their assistance
does not causally contribute to more coercive policies. Even when NGOs
and the UN are not necessary for repatriation, because other agencies are
helping with repatriation, they may still be increasing the probability of
repatriation occurring, and so increasing the probability of coercion occur-
1Interview with Nhial, Juba, 4 January 2014.
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ring. In such cases, NGOs and the UN should only help with return if
they can ensure a much safer return than would otherwise take place, and
if they are providing information about the risks of returning.
In providing information on risks, NGOs and the UN should disclose
what they already know, but also strive to know more, reading existing
reports, and conducting their own post-return evaluations. When govern-
ments facilitate return, including completely non-coerced return, they also
have an obligation to conduct research, if this is necessary to fulﬁl their
other duties, unrelated to repatriation. If, for example, governments have
obligations to help prevent atrocities and poverty abroad, then they have a
duty to research data on atrocities and poverty. If they do not conduct such
research, but ought to, they are culpable for failing to inform refugees of
the risks of returning to countries with widespread atrocities and poverty.
Even when refugees are told accurate information, it may still be im-
permissible to facilitate return if most refugees will likely regret having
had the opportunity to return. More speciﬁcally, repatriation should be
discontinued if the vast majority of past returnees feel that the worst life
they could have lived had they stayed would have been better than the
best life they can now live in their country of origin. Assuming this feeling
is a result of repatriation alone, and repatriation is impossible to imagine
ahead of time, then NGOs and the government have a strong reason to
stop providing repatriation assistance.
Even when such regret is not widespread, NGOs and the government
should still refrain from providing money to refugees who agree to return,
if such money motivates refugees to repatriate to a country where their
lives will be at risk. Even if refugees are likely to be detained or deported
if they refuse to return, NGOs should still refrain from providing payments
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if encouraging return causally contributes to these coercive policies. Such
payments are only permissible if they either fail to motivate return and
contribute to coercion or if, though motivating return and causing coer-
cion, also provide refugees with the means of protecting and supporting
themselves in their countries of origin.
The above conclusions suggest that some repatriation assistance is per-
missible even if return is unsafe. If refugees are not encouraged to return,
nor misinformed or likely to feel regret, and if NGOs do everything possi-
ble to end coercion, then they are acting permissibly when assisting with
return. Though this return may involve a great deal of risks, adults have
a right to take such risks.
Though adults have this right, children do not. By 2014, at least twenty-
two children died after returning from Israel and, in my own sample, ﬁve out
of forty-eight children died within the ﬁrst two years. Regardless of how
informed and voluntary the return is, parents and their children should
not be assisted in repatriating unless repatriation is safer for children than
staying.
Even when return is completely safe, or when only adults are return-
ing, there are still ethical concerns if states and NGOs only assist some
ethnic groups to return. When the goal of this assistance is to decrease
the number of ethnic minorities in a country, the assistance is demeaning
towards citizens of the same ethnicity who understand that, in a close pos-
sible world, they too would be unwanted. Governments should discontinue
such repatriation, and NGOs should generally refuse to assist, unless no
third parties are harmed or demeaned.
In light of these conclusions, repatriation facilitators should change their
current policies. When refugees are coerced by governments into repatri-
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ating, NGOs and UN agencies should invest far more resources in lobbying
for the end of such coercion, meeting with policy makers to explain the
risks that refugees will face if they return, and raising court petitions to
free refugees from detention. Such eﬀorts will often mean NGOs and the
UN have fewer resources for repatriation itself, but the repatriation that
does take place is more likely to be voluntary, rather than forced. Re-
sources should also be invested in evaluating the outcome of repatriation,
ﬁnding information on the mortality rate, rate of displacement, and access
to healthcare amongst those who have returned. This requires that repatri-
ation facilitators travel to IDP camps in countries of origin to ask returnees
in these camps about their conditions. Facilitators should also interview
returnees who have migrated or ﬂed to surrounding countries, and they
should interview relatives of returnees, to ﬁnd out if returnees have died
after returning. The ﬁndings from such interviews must be clearly commu-
nicated to refugees who have yet to return. If the ﬁndings include evidence
that past returnees have severely regretted their decisions to return, there
are strong reasons to discontinue repatriation until conditions in countries
of origin have improved.
In addition to gathering and disclosing more information, facilitators
should discontinue providing payments that encourage repatriation that is
unsafe. To determine if payments encourage unsafe returns, NGOs and
governments should determine if there are strong correlations between re-
turn rates and the provisions of these payments, even while detention rates
and conditions in countries of origin remain unsafe. If payments do encour-
age unsafe return, they should be discontinued. It may still be justiﬁed to
provide aid to those who have already returned, if there is no evidence that
such post-return aid encourages future unsafe repatriation.
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When parents wish to return with their children, or unaccompanied
minors wish to return on their own, then facilitators should refuse to assist
if the children are unlikely to gain security, healthcare or suﬃcient educa-
tion in their countries of origin. To determine the likelihood of these risks,
facilitators should consider the mortality, literacy, and numeracy rates in
the country of origin. If the country is insuﬃciently safe, assistance should
be denied, and states should possibly block families from attempting to
pay for their own ﬂights, stopping them at the airport and revoking their
passports. At the very least, governments and NGOs should implement
campaigns to discourage such returns. When possible, NGOs and social
workers should meet with parents, trying to persuade them to not repatri-
ate, providing them detailed information on the lack of clinics, schools, and
safe locations in the country of origin. NGOs should also clearly commu-
nicate to parents their rights in the host country, explaining to them that
if they are detained, their children can access welfare services and foster
care. In cases where children will not have access to such services in the
host country, and will likely go without suﬃcient food, shelter, and secu-
rity, then NGOs should ultimately help with repatriation, but only if this
is safer for children than staying.
Finally, when return is safe, then repatriation facilitators should gen-
erally avoid supporting programs whose aims are to reduce the number of
unwanted minorities in the country. If payments are ever to be instituted,
oﬃcials should ﬁrst ask citizens, including citizens of the same minority
group, if they feel the payments are demeaning towards them, and casually
contributing to greater implicit biases in society. Oﬃcials should also ask
recipients of the payments if they are dependent on them for basic goods,
such as employment or mobility, and if they prefer to have been oﬀered the
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payments than not. It is only permissible to provide payments if there is no
evidence that third parties are demeaned or harmed, no evidence that re-
cipients depend on payments for basic goods, and signiﬁcant evidence that
recipients prefer to have the payments than not. Even when these three
conditions are met, it remains preferable that governments avoid such pay-
ment schemes. They may be morally permissible, but government should
strive to provide equal payments to all who wish to repatriate, rather than
targeting unwanted minorities alone.
In addition to the policy conclusions above, there are three broad theo-
retical conclusions I have reached, relevant beyond the scope of repatriation.
The ﬁrst regards consent.
We should not assume that coerced consent is invalid. We must consider
whether the agents obtaining consent have a duty to stop the coercion.
To establish this duty, we must consider whether the agents obtaining
consent have the ability to stop the coercion, and whether they have greater
resources to do so, or earlier promised to do so. We should similarly not
assume that, whenever a consenter is misinformed, they have failed to give
their valid consent. We must consider whether the agent obtaining consent
has a duty to inform the consenter. I argued that such duties arise when it is
easy to ﬁnd information, when there is a duty of care, and when agents have
other obligations which create duties to know. When such conditions arise,
and an agent fails to inform, she is culpable for the resulting uninformed
consent. Importantly, such culpability can arise even if the recipient of a
service would have consented had they been more informed. If they would
not have consented had they known they were being misinformed at the
time of the misinformation, then they have failed to give their valid consent.
Even if a consenter is fully informed and un-coerced, a service should
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still be denied if regret is likely, and four conditions are met: The regret
is likely to be so severe that recipients feel the worst life they could have
lived without the service would have been better than the best life with
the service; the regret is likely to arise from the service itself, rather than
other life choices; the individuals who regret accepting the service also
wish the service had never been oﬀered at all; and the service is epistemi-
cally transformative, involving an experience that would be impossible to
imagine ahead of time. This principle concerning regret has implications
beyond refugee repatriation, and ought to be incorporated into a number
of areas involving similarly life-altering services, most notably medical in-
terventions. But though regret is sometimes a reason to deny a service, it
usually is not, as life is rarely entirely worse and entirely transformative
from a single choice alone.
In addition to my theoretical contributions on consent, I have attempted
to contribute to the broader discussion on children's rights. It is widely
accepted that children have a right to an education that provides them
the capacity to function within an economy. I argue, more speciﬁcally,
that children have the right to an education necessary to function within
an economy that can secure food, shelter, and basic welfare. This would
entail a right to ﬂuent literacy and numeracy, in addition to the more basic
rights of immediate security, shelter, and healthcare. Parents, as such, have
a correlative duty to avoid moving to a country without these necessities,
and should be dissuaded from doing so.
Finally, I have addressed the broader question of whether discrimination
is morally permissible when the victims of discrimination beneﬁt. When
minorities are paid to leave, they beneﬁt, and so we cannot establish imper-
missibility by appealing to harm alone. To determine what is permissible
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in such cases, we must focus on the consent if the discriminated, and the
harm caused towards third parties.
In reaching the above theoretical conclusions, I have attempted to draw
upon a diverse array of examples, reaching a central methodology conclu-
sion: Fieldwork is essential for making us realize what we overlook, rather
than just applying what we already know. If we wish to make robust and
speciﬁc rules for political philosophy, we must consider a broader range
of cases. This is only possible if we expose ourselves to cases we might
otherwise not consider, which is easier if we speak to individuals we might
otherwise not meet.
Qualitative ﬁeldwork, in particular, is helpful for considering the sub-
tle details of cases. Through in-depth interviews, refugees described not
only the coercion they experienced, but the reasons for their actions, their
knowledge and preferences at the time of their actions, and their current
judgements about their past actions. Indeed, such details are often what
make ﬁctional cases so eﬀective in ethics. We know the future preferences
of the fourteen year old girl about to conceive, and the intent of the doctor
about to misinform a patient. In-depth case comparisons, like ﬁction, in-
clude rich details often missing in aggregate data on immigration, details
that can be essential in formulating action-guiding principles.
If what matters are rich details, then making philosophy relevant entails
not only replacing ﬁctional cases with real ones, but general descriptions
with speciﬁc ones. This requires speaking with subjects over an extended
time period, to learn about why they make decisions, and what they later
fear, know, and regret. In taking this approach, we can better estab-
lish if individuals have been wronged, and whether others have wronged
them, better formulating policies for governments and organizations, and
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the refugees and migrants they assist.
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Appendix A
Throughout the research process I followed ethics guidelines set forth by the
London School of Economics. To ensure informed consent, I communicated
the following facts to subjects prior to the interview:
1. The interview is for a research project, as part of a PhD at the London
School of Economics, a university in London.
2. The aim of the project is to better understand why refugees returned
from Israel, what has happened to them after returning, and whether
NGOs should have helped with repatriation.
3. Participation as subjects is voluntary, and subjects can refuse to take
part at any point during the interview, without giving any reason for
doing so.
4. The likely duration of the interview is between an hour to two hours
long.
5. There will be no monetary remuneration for participating in the
project.
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6. Personal information will be treated as strictly conﬁdential and will
not be made publicly available or given to any other person.
7. Findings from the interviews may be published and the PhD will be
made publicly available.
8. No identifying information will be included in the PhD or published
works.
I took the following measures to ensure data was protected:
1. All original data with identifying information remains securely pro-
tected within my own laptop and Dropbox account.
2. All names have been changed for publication, all identifying informa-
tion has been removed, and some data has been disaggregated.
3. When transporting data within and from South Sudan and Ethiopia,
I kept data on me at all times, never leaving data outside of my range
of vision.
I also took the following additional measures:
1. I did not provide a written consent form, as this would increase the
risk of personal information leaking to authorities. Because some par-
ticipants were critical of the South Sudanese government, I wanted to
mitigate any risks that participants' names would reach authorities.
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2. There were possible risks involved in being interviewed, particularly
in IDP camps in South Sudan during the ﬁrst months of the war. Par-
ticipants were aware of these risks, and wished to participate regard-
less. There were various reasons they wished to participate. Some
felt it was important to tell citizens and oﬃcials in Israel what had
occurred to them since they were forced to return. Others possibly
felt they would more likely receive aid from me, though I made clear
that I could not provide compensation for interviews.
3. For some participants, I did provide various forms of aid when doing
so was urgent, or when I was the only agent available to provide this
aid. When possible, I only oﬀered aid after individuals consented or
declined to be interviewed, to ensure they did not feel pressure to be
interviewed in return for aid.
4. In urgent cases where aid was delivered prior to an interview, I made
clear that continuation of aid was not dependent on whether they
wished to be interviewed or continue being interviewed.
5. I provided information to participants on ﬁndings as they became
available. For example, I provided information to IDP residents on
the conditions outside of the IDP camp, and information to those
outside the camp on conditions within the camp.
When interviewing children, I took the following measures:
1. I obtained informed consent from parents or guardians before inter-
viewing all subjects younger than 19.
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2. In obtaining consent from children under sixteen, I explained that
the interview was to learn about their life in Israel, South Sudan,
Uganda, and Ethiopia, for a book I was writing that many would
read.
3. Parents and adult siblings would speak with the children before any
interviews would begin, to ensure that the children felt comfortable
being interviewed.
4. If children expressed distress during the interview, I would stop the
interview.
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Appendix B
List of interviews
Interviews with refugees in Israel prior to the introduction of repatria-
tion (n=12)
1. Subject from South Sudan, Jerusalem, fall 2009
2. Subject from Darfur, Jerusalem, 6 July, 2009
3. Subject from Congo, Tel Aviv, 20th August, 2010
4. Subject South Sudan, Jerusalem, 18th August 2010
5. Subject from South Sudan March 24th, 2009.docx
6. Subject from Darfur, 2st February, 2009.docx
7. Subject from Eritrea 12 August 2010.docx
8. Subject from Darfur March 5th 2008.docx
9. Subject from Eritrea May 12th, 2009 in Tel Aviv.docx
10. Subject from Congo August 25th, 2010 in Tel Aviv.docx
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11. Subject from Darfur 11 March 2009.docx
12. Subject from South Sudan January 2008 tel aviv, wife of Mahiri.docx
Location and dates of interviews in South Sudan, 2012. Cited interviews
include names, all of which have been changed to protect the subject.
(n=27)
1. Aweil, 26 March 2012
2. Aweil, 19 March 2012
3. Aweil, 2 April 2012
4. Aweil, 31 March 2012
5. Aweil, 25 March 2012
6. Aweil, 16 March 2012
7. Aweil, 30 March 2012
8. Juba, 29 March 2012
9. Aweil, 28 March 2012
10. Aweil, 25 March 2012
11. Aweil, 20 March 2012
12. Aweil, 27 March 2012
13. Wau, 4 April 2012
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14. Wau, 16 March 2012
15. Juba, 12 April 2012
16. Juba, 15 March 2012
17. Aweil, 25 March 2012
18. Aweil, 21 March 2012
19. Aweil, 1 April 2012
20. Aweil, 24 March 2012
21. Juba, 12 April 2012
22. Aweil, March 16 2012
23. Awil, 25 March 2012
24. Aweil, 2 April 2012
25. Interview with Joseph, Juba, 10 April 2012
26. Interview with Gatluak, Juba, 15 March 2012
27. Interview with Yasmin, Aweil, 30 March 2012
Locations and dates of interviews in Uganda, 2013: (n=30)
1. Entebbe, 14 May 2013
2. Entebbe, 14 May 2013
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3. Entebbe, 14 May 2013
4. Entebbe, May 13 2013
5. Entebbe, 14 May 2013
6. Kampala, 7 May 2013
7. Entebbe, 14 May 2013
8. Entebbe 3 May 2013
9. Entebbe, 14 May 2013
10. Entebbe, 11 May 2013
11. Entebbe, 10 May 2013
12. Kampala, 7 May 2013
13. Kampala, 5 May and 7 May 2013
14. Kampala, 9 May 2013
15. Kampala, 7 May 2013
16. Entebbe, 14 May 2013
17. Kampala, 11 May 2013
18. Kampala, 10 May 2013
19. Kampala, 6 May 2013
20. Entebbe, 13 May 2013
21. Entebbe, 13 May 2013
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22. Entebbe, 13 May 2013
23. Kampala, 6 May 2013
24. Entebbe, 8 May 2013
25. Entebbe, 10 May 2013
26. Entebbe, 9 May 2013
27. Entebbe, 9 May 2013
28. Interview with Natalina, Entebbe, 11 May 2013
29. Interview with Nicole, Entebbe, 10 May 2013
30. Interview with Nyandeng, Entebbe, 9 May 2013
Dates of interviews in Juba, South Sudan, 2013-2014: (n=61)
1. 26 December 2013
2. 9 January 2014
3. 27 December 2013
4. 27 December 2013
5. 20 December 2013
6. 21 December 2013
7. 11 January 2014
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8. 29 December 2013
9. 9 January 2014
10. 22 December 2013
11. 23 Dec 2013
12. 9 January 2014
13. 18 December 2013
14. 27 December 2013
15. 27 Dec 2013
16. 8 January 2014
17. 2 January 2014
18. 20 December 2013
19. 1 January 2014
20. 20 December 2013
21. 20 December 2013
22. 1 January 2014
23. 1 January 2014
24. 15 December 2013
25. 9 January 2014
26. 30 December 2013
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27. 15 December 2013
28. January 2 2014
29. Dec 29 2013
30. 1 January 2014
31. 22 December 2013
32. 23 December 2013
33. 23 December 2013
34. 1 January 2014
35. 20 December 2013
36. 12 January 2014
37. 14 December 2013
38. 27 December 2013
39. 15 December 2013
40. 6 January 2014
41. 9 January 2014
42. 1 January 2014
43. 21 December 2013
44. 23 December 2013
45. 1 January 2014
284
46. 21 December 2014
47. 22 December 2013
48. 10 January 2014
49. 4 January 2014
50. 4 January 2014
51. 4 January 2014
52. 25 December 2013
53. 22 December 2013
54. 11 January 2014
55. 27 December 2014
56. Interview with Matthew, 4 January 2014
57. Interview with Mol, Juba, 30 December 2013
58. Interview with Nathaniel 14 December 2013
59. Interview with Nhial, 1 January 2014
60. Interview with Stephen, 6 January 2014
61. Interview with Vanessa, 25 December 2013
Eritrean who moved to South Sudan after returning to Eritrea: (n=1)
1. Juba, Jan 12 2014
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Interviews with South Sudanese in Ethiopia, 2014 (total: 9; total new
subjects: 8)
1. Addis Ababa, 12 June 2014
2. Addis Ababa, 21 June 2014
3. Gambella, 15 June 2014
4. Gambella, 16 June 2014
5. Addis Ababa, 12 June 2014
6. Gambela, 16 June 2014
7. Addis Ababa 12 June 2014
8. Gambella, 16 June 2014
Interviews with North Sudanese who returned from Israel and ﬂed to
Ethiopia: (n=2)
1. Addis Ababa, 12 June 2014
2. Addis Ababa, 20 June 2014
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Interviews with returnees in Ethiopia: (n=2)
1. Interview with Daniel, Addis Ababa, 10 June 2014
2. Interview with Bessie, Addis Ababa call to Dessie, 9 June 2014
Interview with Eritrean refugees who were resettled from Israel: (n=2)
1. Interview with Massawa, Addis Ababa, 8 June 2014
2. Interview with Tigisti, Dessie, 8 June 2014
Interviews, via Skype, with returnees to Guinea (n=2)
1. Guinea, 10 September 2014
2. Guinea, 20 September 2014
Interviews, via Skype, with returnees to Nigeria (n=3)
1. Lagos, 9 September 2014
2. Lagos, Blessing, 9 September 2014
3. Lagos, Rose, 10 September 2014
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Interview, via Skype, with returnee to the Philippines (n=1)
1. Manila, 13 August, 2014
Interviews with returnees to Thailand: (n=14)
1. Nakon Ratchasima, 16 August 2014
2. Udon Thani, 16 August 2014
3. Unknown (Skype Call), 13 August 2014
4. Chaiyaphum, 13 August 2014
5. Nongbualumphu, 14 August 2014
6. South Korea (Skype Call) 19 August 2014
7. Bangkok, 13 August 2014
8. Bangkok, 14 August 2014
9. Udon Thani, 13 August 2014
10. Ubon Ratchathani, Sakda Khomsan 14 August 2014
11. Sakon Nakhon, 16 August 2014
12. Nakhon Phanom, 14 August 2014
13. Nakhon Phanom, 14 August 2014
14. Udon Thani, 16 August 2014
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Interviews with migrants before repatriation: (Total:=8 Total new sub-
jects: 7)
1. Returning to Togo, Tel Aviv, 29 July 2014
2. Returning to Togo, Tel Aviv, 29 July 2014
3. Returning to Colombia, Herzilyah, 30 July 2014
4. Returning to Colombia, Herzilyah, 30 July, 2014
5. Returning to Colombia, Herzilyah, 30 July, 2014
6. Returning to the Philippines, Tel Aviv, 28 July 2014
7. Interview with Milka 29 July 2014, Tel Aviv, returning to Ethiopia
(conﬁrmed her return in January 2015)
8. Interview with Saeda, Tel Aviv, Israel 29 July 2014
Interviews with Northern Sudanese who stayed in Israel: (n=3)
1. From Darfur, Tel Aviv, 20 Dec 2012
2. From Darfur, Tel Aviv, 22 Dec 2012
3. From Darfur, Tel Aviv, 23 Dec 2012
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Interviews with repatriation facilitators, and those involved in repatria-
tion: (n=10)
1. Interview with CIMI Director, Jerusalem, 22 September 2011
2. Interview with CIMI employee 1, Jerusalem, 23 September 2011
3. Interview with CIMI employee 2, Berlin, 3 March 2011
4. Interview with Galia Sabar, Tel Aviv, 17 Dec 2012
5. Interview with Jean Marc, Jerusalem, 14 Dec 2012
6. Interview with HIAS-Israel Director, Jerusalem, 11 Dec 2012
7. Interview with HIAS and OBI employee, Tel Aviv, 28 April 2012
8. Interview with OBI Director, Jerusalem, 6 October 2010
9. Interview with HIAS coordinator of AVR, Jerusalem, 19 Dec 2012
10. Interview with Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) oﬃcial, Tel Aviv, 7
August 2013
Interviews with NGO employees uninvolved in repatriation: (n=2)
1. Interview with Sigal Rosen, Tel Aviv, 9 December 2012
2. Interview with Sharon, ASSAF volunteer, Tel Aviv, 2013
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Interviews with UNHCR oﬃcials: (n=3)
1. Interview with Sharon Harel, Assistant Protection Oﬃcer, UNHCR
Israel, Tel Aviv, Dec 20 2012
2. Interview with Larry Bottinick, Senior Protection Oﬃcer, UNHCR
Israel, 16 December 2015
3. Interview with Ewen Macleod, Head of Policy Development and Eval-
uation Service, UNHCR, Skype Interview to Geneva, 10th February
2016
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Total returning, payments, and detention rates
Month
Total returning
to South Sudan,
Sudan, Eritrea,
and Ivory Coast
Money paid to
Sudanese and
Eritreans
Signiﬁcant Events
May-June 2012 1,200-3,000 $1,5001
South Sudanese told they will be detained indeﬁnitely or deported
if they do not return. The Government also amends the Anti-
Inﬁltration bill, allowing more widespread detention of asylum
seekers.2
July 2012 0-100
August 2012 0-100
September 2012 unknown 0-100
On 16 September 2012, the High Court of Justice invalidates pro-
visions of Anti-Inﬁltration Law which allows for prolonged deten-
tion.3
Government then issues new procedure allowing the state to ar-
rest anyone suspecting of criminal acts, without trial.4
October 2012 0-100
Human rights organizations submit petition against procedure
above.5
November 2012 0-100
December 2012 570-6566
0-100
Ivorian refugees threatened with deportation if they do not leave
by January.
January 2013
unknown 0-100
February 2013 124 0-100
March 2013 53 $1,5007
UNHCR, in an unprecedented move for the organization in Israel,
submitted a request to ﬁle a friend of the court brief with the High
Court of Justice on 7 March 2013. 8
In an initial hearing at the High Court of Justice on 12 March, or-
der nisi issued for the government to explain why the amendment
to the anti-Inﬁltration Law should remain intact.9
April 2013 59 $1,500
May 2013 70 $1,500
June 2013 75 $1,500
State prosecutor announces, in a court hearing, that the state
is unlikely to accept any claims of Eritrean nationals for refugee
status.10
July 2013 164 $1,500
August 2013 170 $1,500
Hotline for Migrant Workers reports slight improvements in living
conditions in detention facilities.11
September 2013 89
$1,500
Nulliﬁcation of anti-Inﬁltration amendment which allows deten-
tion of asylum seekers.12
October 2013 180 $1,500
Interior Minister Gideon Saar proposes plan to Prime Minister
Netanyahu to raise grant from $1,500 to $5,000. No ﬁnal decision
reached.13
No asylum seekers released, despite High Court order.
November 2013 116
From mid to
late November:
$3,500
Following human rights petition to high court, some detainees
released, consistent with High Court Order.
Following this, the Cabinet approves increasing payment from
$1,500 to $3,500 in mid-November.14
December 2013 295 $3,500
Knesset Passes new amendment, detaining new asylum seekers
for one year.15
January 
August 2014
Aprx 331216
Per month: 414 $3,500 Asylum seekers continue to be detained.
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1Based on the 126 interviews conducted with returnees to South Sudan.
2Israel: Amend Anti-Inﬁltration Law, 10 June 2012.
3Amnesty International, Blind to Violations, Deaf to Obligations: Israel's Human
Rights Record, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/015/
2013/en/c88f325d-74ba-434e-9db0-44b544eb732b/mde150152013en.pdf
4Amnesty International, Assaf, and the Hotline for Migrant Workers, Israel's Policy
towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Prolonged Administrative Detention, March 2013.
http://assaf.org.il/en/sites/default/ﬁles/Israeli%20Policy%20of%20Prolonged%20Administrative
%20Detention%20March%202013.pdf
5ibid
6The Labour Statistics do not diﬀerentiate between African countries that are not
Sudan and Eritrea. However, nearly all Ivorian refugees repatriated after January 2013,
so I only include Sudanese and Eritrean migrants as the total numbers of returnees in
the relevant sample.
7Interview with Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) oﬃcial, Tel Aviv, 7 August 2013.
8Talila Nesher, UN refugee agency petitions High Court to overturn `inﬁltration'
law, Haaretz, 12 March 2013, available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/un-
refugee-agency-petitions-high-court-to-overturn-8216-inﬁltration-law.premium-1.508765
9The Association of Civil Rights in Israel, High Court of Justice
Prepares to Hear Petition against Anti-Inﬁltration Law, available at
http://www.acri.org.il/en/2013/05/29/anti-inﬁltration-law-2/
10Amnesty International, 7 June 2013, http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/MDE15/005/2
013/en/07259891-b209-4058-b370-e76c3cdccfe8/mde150052013en.pdf
11Maya Kovaliyov-Livi and Sigal Rozen, `From one prison to another': Holot Deten-
tion Facility, Hotline for Migrant Workers in Israel, June 2014.
12Barak Ravid and Ilan Lior, Court Invalidates Legislation Allowing Is-
rael to Detain Migrants without Trial, Haaretz 16/9/ 2013, available at
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.547311
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